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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1  Purpose of the research  This  thesis  explores  the  role  of  policy  in  the  emergence  of  the  venture  capital sectors of the US and UK. Venture capital, despite its relatively recent genesis, has backed many of the most successful new technology‐based firms coming from the US  over  the  past  50‐60  years.  Intel,  Apple,  Genentech,  Federal  Express,  Yahoo, Google,  Facebook  and many more  success  stories  have  been  backed  by  venture capital (VC) at some point in their growth. Such has been the impact of the venture capital sector that in 2000, the 2180 firms that had received VC in their existence made up “20% of all public companies  in the US, 11% of sales… and one‐third of total  market  value,  in  excess  of  $2.7  trillion”  (Shane  2008  p.  162).  Out  of  the millions of firms created in the US each year, the VC sector invests in an average of 820  firms annually (ibid).  In  this way  it  is clear  that venture capital’s  impact has been disproportionate.   VC investment is, at its core, based on a simple trade‐off. Often the most innovative small  firms  are  those  that  have  few  assets  but  require  significant  amounts  of capital to grow. However with little track record and high operating costs, there is little  information  about  the  firm  and  its  risk  profile.  Consequently  the  risks associated  with  investment  in  these  small  firms  become  much  higher  in  the absence  of  quality  information.  These  firms may  lack  collateral  as  well,  making them unfavourable investments for banks. Venture capitalists (VCs) fill this gap by making  equity  investments  in  the  firms,  providing  the  capital  the  firm  needs  to grow  in  exchange  for  a  share  of  the  ownership.  The  provision  of  investment  in return  for  equity  is  far  from  new;  investors  have  been  supporting  risky  new ventures  in  exchange  for  shares of  the  return  for  centuries,  if  not millennia  (see Michie 1981). 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What  differentiates  the  venture  capital  sector  from  its  privateer  forebears  is  its organisation  and professionalization. The  success of  the  venture  capital  industry has  come  from  its  ability  to mediate  between  two  groups  that might  otherwise never  interact  profitably.  VC  has  traditionally  raised  funds  from  institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, and then invested those funds  in  entrepreneurial  ventures.  By  joining  the  wealth  of  the  institutional investors  and  the  innovativeness  of  small  firms,  venture  capitalists  are  able  to generate returns for investors and wealth in their national economies.  To date the nation that has received the most of this wealth generation derived by venture  capital  has  been  the  US,  where  the  sector  first  emerged.  Given  the disproportionate impact of the VC business model in the US, it is unsurprising that the venture capital business model has caught  the attention of policymakers and investors  worldwide.  The  Lisbon  Treaty  has  sought  to  develop  VC  sectors  in Europe  and  other  policy measures  have  been made  to  develop  local  VC  sectors around the world (see Armour and Cumming 2007). Despite some cases of success (chief among them Israel, see Avnimelech and Teubal 2006), few domestic venture capital  sectors  outside  the  US  have  managed  to  replicate  the  success  of  the  US sector (Black and Gilson 1998, Jeng and Wells 2000, Armour and Cumming 2007).  This  thesis  examines  the  case  of  the  UK,  which  has  sought  to  develop  its  own venture  capital  sector,  and  compares  it  to  the  case  of  the  US  that  it  (directly  or indirectly) has sought to emulate. The UK venture capital sector has generally been described as  a  great  success  (Black and Gilson 1998 p. 266),  and has often been rated the largest in Europe (see BVCA 2007 p. 91), but closer examination shows that  many  figures  relating  to  VC  funding  in  the  UK  reflect  not  only  early‐stage investment but a range of other types of equity‐based deals, such as management buy outs (MBOs).  This suggests that the actual impact of the VC sector, in terms of supporting  early  stage  firms,  in  the  UK  is  significantly more  limited  than  initial figures would suggest (European Commission 2006).   This thesis seeks to understand the differences in the role that policy has played in the  emergence  of  the  VC  sectors  in  the  US  and  UK.  The  two  nations  share  a 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common  language,  similar  cultures,  and  have  a  similar  market‐based  economic structure1. However, the UK VC sector has evolved in a very different way from the US  and  has  been  less  successful  in  generating  funds  for  early  stage  investment, despite ongoing and substantial public investment over the past eighty years. If the commonalities between the US and UK, and the presence of government support cannot  explain  the differences  in  the  emergence of  the  two  sectors,  then  a more nuanced exploration of the role of policy on the two sectors is therefore required.   The thesis therefore seeks to contribute toward policy debates about how, and to what  extent,  government  policy  has  shaped  the  evolution  of  the  generally successful US venture capital sector and the less successful UK sector.  It does this by  examining  the UK  government’s  ongoing  attempts  to  address  the  understood ‘equity gap’ and provide capital to high‐growth firms.  In particular, it explores an important subsample of the UK sector ‐ the UK venture capital trust sector.  Using the VCT sector as a non‐representative but ‘crucial’ case, it asks whether the stated or  implicit  framing  assumptions  behind  policies  in  the  UK  case  are  empirically supported.    It  sees  to  examine  these  assumptions  by  comparing  principal‐agent and evolutionary interpretations of the VC sector against the data collected in the thesis  on  the  performance  of  VCTs  and  other  government‐backed  equity investments.  
1.2  Line of argument  The  thesis  argues  that  much  of  the  venture  capital  literature,  and  the  resulting policy that informs it, has drawn implicitly or explicitly from the principal‐agent or contracting perspective (see Alchian and Demsetz 1972 and Jensen and Meckling 1976)  for  explaining  the  existence  and  functioning  of  venture  capital  as  an organisational  form.      However  it  suggests  that  this  is  not  the  only  theoretical perspective  that  might  inform  understanding  of  the  VC  sector,  and  that  an evolutionary or  capabilities perspective  (reflecting  in  some ways what Dosi  et  al (2006  p.  1450)  refers  to  as  the  ‘Stanford‐Yale‐Sussex  synthesis’,  a  school  of                                                         1 The commonalities are such that the US and UK economies are widely referred to collectively as representative of the ‘Anglo‐Saxon’ model of capitalism (see Albert 1991 and Hall and Soskice 2001 for an expanded discussion of this proposed model). 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thought  following  Nelson  and  Winter  1982,  and  here  incorporating  work  on dynamic capabilities including Teece and Pisano 1994 and Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) might  add  additional  insights  about  VC  that  a  principal‐agent  perspective can itself not suitably explain.  The research question therefore seeks to provide an empirical comparison of the role of policy in the emergence of the VC sectors of the US  and  UK,  and  a  theoretical  comparison  of  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of principal‐agent  and  evolutionary  approaches  in  explaining  the  empirical  data collected.   The  thesis  argues  that  the  US  government  has  played  a  significant  and underappreciated role in developing the US VC sector, less by directly intervening in the market for small firm finance but by more often by indirectly increasing the supply of capital for small firms (for instance via the ERISA rules change) and the demand for capital (by providing extensive support for R&D in small firms). In this setting  the  US  VC  sector  has  developed  capabilities  to  exploit  the  institutional factors  (such  as  the  federal  system  (Bush  2005)  and  the  NASDAQ  market (Ingebretsen 2002))  present  in  the US.  The dynamic  capabilities  (defined  in  this thesis in line with Eisenhardt and Martin 2000) developed in the US sector include the  ability  to  take  advantage  of  their  positions  in  networks;  and  their  ability  to assemble complementary assets to build firms that may then be exited via IPO.   This is contrasted to the case of the UK venture capital sector, which is somewhat different  from the US case  in that the UK government has played an ongoing and active role in the development of the national sector. The thesis suggests that the notion  of  the  ‘equity  gap’,  first  discussed  in  1931  (Macmillan  Report  1931),  has become  a  ‘boundary  object’  (see  Star  and  Griesemer  1989)  that  has  come  to dominate  policy  discussions  for  the  past  eighty  years.  As  time  has  passed,  the ‘equity gap’ has been widely accepted but has continued to mean different things to  different  actors,  who  agree  that  it  exists  but  view  and  interpret  it  in  vastly different ways. The discussion of the UK VC sector seeks to move beyond an ‘equity gap’ interpretation and instead suggests a capabilities‐based explanation of the VC sector.  It  argues  that  the  capabilities  developed within  ICFC,  the  first  large  scale policy  intervention  to  address  small  firm  finance,  were  based  on  financial  and 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accounting  capabilities  rather  than  the  dynamic  capabilities  for  the  building  of complementary  assets  seen  in  the  US.    These  capabilities  then  informed  the structure  of  the  UK  VC  sector,  driving  the  ultimate  growth  of  the  private  equity sector  at  the  expense  of  early  stage  investment.    The  thesis  then  suggests  that subsequent interventions by the UK government into small firm finance have been characterised by competition among institutions such as the stock markets, the UK VC  sector,  and  the  investment  trust  sector  for  the  design  of  policy  structures  to reflect  their  own  interests.    This  has  resulted  in  a  system  that  is  more  heavily reliant  on  direct  government  intervention  than  that  of  the  US,  and  a  private  VC sector  with  relatively  little  capacity  or  interest  in  making  or  developing  high‐growth firms.  This  historical  and  qualitative  evidence  is  then  supplemented  with  quantitative evidence  that draws upon a  complete dataset of  all  investments made under  the venture  capital  trust  (VCT)  scheme  and  several  subsequent  government‐backed policies.  The  quantitative  analysis  provides  empirical  support  for  several  policy issues  identified  previously  as  playing  key  roles  in  the  development  of  the  UK venture  capital  sector.  These  include  the  challenges  in  designing  policies  that provide proper  incentives and reflect  the  level of demand  for capital  from  firms; the  role  of  capabilities  for  identifying  and  supporting  investments  in  early  stage firms; and the importance of venues for deriving profitable exit from investments.  The  thesis  then  draws  upon  the  two  cases  to  argue  that  the  principal  agent perspective  has  explanatory  power  for  some phenomena  but  lacks  the  ability  to suitably explain other elements identified in this thesis as key to the emergence of VC in the US. The principal‐agent view can provide a convincing explanation of the success of the US (suggesting that once market failures were addressed the market has operated efficiently), while framing the case of the UK as a case where market failure (likely in the provision of capital) has remained prevalent despite ongoing intervention.  The  evolutionary/capabilities  framework  emphasises  the  role  of networks, government intervention and means of exit in the US, and identifies the importance of the capabilities in enabling VCs to take advantage of these features. The VC sector in the UK would be characterised by complex, analytical capabilities 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(rather than the simple, unstable adaptive processes discussed by Eisenhardt and Martin  2000  and  proposed  as  being  key  in  the  US)  that  are  not  suited  to  the dynamic  funding  and  competitive  environments  in  which  small  firms  operate. Consequently in the absence of the capabilities for dealing with these markets, the evolutionary theory would identify the problem not as an ‘equity gap’ but as a gap in  capabilities,  networks,  and  means  for  profitable  exit.  At  the  same  time  the evolutionary perspective, despite its useful explanatory powers, is quite limited in its  ability  to  directly  suggest  policy  measures,  which  is  something  the  principal agent  and  market  failure  framework  is  able  to  do  quite  readily.  The  challenge therefore  is  to  begin  to  explore  means  of  developing  an  evolutionary  theory  of policy,  and  the  thesis  concludes by making  some  initial  steps  toward  addressing this issue drawing from the writings of Alexander Gerschenkron (1962, 1968). The thesis concludes by identifying some initial policy conclusions, which point to the importance  of  developing  capacity  for  investment  and  encouraging  the development of desired capabilities.  
1.3  Data  The thesis uses historical, quantitative and qualitative data to draw its conclusions. The discussions of the US are largely based on existing academic and professional literature and accounts. This is due to the large and prominent body of  literature already in existence regarding the success and emergence of the US VC sector.  The  analysis  of  the  UK  relies  upon  a  range  of  sources.  It  draws  extensively  on policy  documents,  Parliamentary  proceedings,  media  accounts,  scholarly literature, surveys and targeted interviews. The analysis of the UK focuses on the sector  as  a  whole  and  does  not  explicitly  address  regional  aspects  in  venture funding (such as the schemes in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) as part of its remit; there is some discussion of regional issues but the scope for this thesis is limited to the UK as a whole.  The thesis also includes analysis of new quantitative data comparing the success of the  Venture  Capital  Trust,  Regional  Venture  Capital  Funds,  Early  Growth  Funds, 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University  Challenge  Funds,  and  Enterprise  Capital  Funds  in  providing  funds  to small early stage firms. The Venture Capital Trust (VCT) data was hand‐collected for  this  thesis  from  the  annual  securities  filings  for  approximately  100  VCTs, representing  each  fund  in  the  sector.  The  data  on  the  other  funds  was  hand‐collected  from  the  Library  House  database.  One  formulation  of  this  dataset was used  for  the analysis  in Nightingale et al  (2009), although  the  formulation of  the database used  in  this  thesis  includes  several  cases  and variables not  included  in that analysis.   In  order  to  answer  the  research  question  and  therefore  determine  how government policy has affected the emergence of the VC sectors of the US and UK, the  thesis will  provide historical  evidence  from  the  two  cases.    The US  case will serve as a contextual case, against which the more in‐depth analysis of the UK with be contrasted.  The analysis of the UK will use historical and qualitative material to argue  for  the  importance  of  demand  for  capital,  capabilities  and  institutions  for exit on the UK sector.  These areas will then be examined using quantitative data to provide  initial  empirical  support  for  these  assertions.  These  qualitative  and quantitative  data will  then  be  brought  together  and  used  to  build  the  argument that  the  evolutionary  perspective  is  able  to  illuminate  important  aspects  of  the emergence of  the VC  sector  that  are  less  easily  explicable by  the principal  agent approach.  
1.4  Organisation and structure of thesis  Chapter  2  provides  a  review  of  the  literature  surrounding  the VC  sector  and VC policy, and presents a brief overview of the theoretical perspectives presented in the  thesis.  It  outlines  the  theoretical  framework  that will  inform  the  subsequent analysis.  Chapter  3  provides  an  explanation of  how  the  research question  and  theoretical frameworks were  operationalised  for  the  purpose  of  the  thesis.  It  discusses  the selection  of  a  multiple‐case  study  method,  and  the  use  of  mixed‐method 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techniques  within  that  framework.  It  also  discusses  case  selection  and  the execution of the research.   Chapter 4 discusses the case of the US. It adopts an approach examining three key relationships that contribute to success  in the VC sector. Drawing primarily  from existing  literature  it  shows  that  far  from being  an  ideal  form  from  its beginning, venture  capital  as  an  institution  has  grown  and  evolved,  taking  advantage  of unique institutional features of the US system and particular regions. Government involvement  in  the  US  VC  sector  has  been  significant  but  largely  based  on encouraging  supply  of  and  demand  for  capital,  rather  than  direct  provision  of government funds to firms or VCs. It develops an argument that venture capitalists in  the  US  may  be  interpreted  as  demonstrating  a  number  of  capabilities  and dynamic capabilities that  facilitate the success of venture capitalists  in extracting value  from  their  environment  and  assembling  complementary  assets  into  a valuable form.   Chapter  5  turns  its  attention  to  the  UK.  Drawing  upon  primary  accounts,  policy documents,  interviews and academic  literature,  it discusses the emergence of the UK venture capital sector.  It develops the argument that the  ‘equity gap’ that has defined much  UK  small  firm  policy  represents  a  boundary  object  that  is  widely acknowledged but does not  share  a  common definition.  It  presents  an  argument for the emergence of capabilities in the UK, suggesting that the UK’s VC sector has been shaped in a path‐dependent manner such that many of the capabilities in the VC  sector  have  reflected  those  capabilities  developed  in  the  extensive  training programmes  of  ICFC.  It  discusses  challenges  relating  both  to  demand  for  capital among  firms and  in  finding and generating opportunities  for profitable exit  from investments.    Chapter 6 provides quantitative evidence  in support of  the conclusions drawn at the  end  of  Chapter  5.  This  quantitative  analysis  is  based  upon  two  datasets discussing  the  relative  success of  several UK government‐backed programmes  in directing funds to early stage firms. It suggests that the schemes implemented after the  VCT  programme  have  been more  successful  in  directing  funds  toward  early 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stage firms. It also provides initial data supporting the proposed capabilities‐based explanation of the development of the UK VC sector in the previous chapter. Finally it also provides data addressing the nature and quality of exit opportunities in the UK,  suggesting  that  lucrative  IPOs  are  still  generally  elusive  to  UK  firms  and investors,  but  that  there  are  questions  about  the  broader  demand  for  capital among small firms.  Chapter 7 discusses  the  context of  the  comparisons between  the US and UK and links  them to  the  framing theoretical perspectives.  It discusses  the strengths and weaknesses  of  the  principal‐agent  and  evolutionary  views  in  explaining  the empirical  findings  of  the  thesis.  It  proposes  an  initial  means  of  addressing  the weaknesses of the evolutionary perspective in generating policy, and concludes by discussing policy implications and further areas for research.   
1.5  Contribution to the innovation and technology policy literature  This  thesis  makes  empirical  and  theoretical  contributions  to  knowledge.  It provides  a  historical  contribution  by  providing  an  updated history  of  the UK VC sector, focusing on the range of factors and institutions contributing to success. Its historical  contribution  will  fill  a  gap  in  the  literature  by  addressing  the  recent policy  history  of  the  UK  sector  since  the  mid  1990s.  However  the  primary empirical contribution is quantitative, in the form of a new, hand‐collected dataset of  all  investments  made  by  firms  in  the  Venture  Capital  Trust  sector  from  its creation in 1995 to 2006. This dataset, because it is based on statutory securities filings, is complete and authoritative. This dataset is analysed and combined with another  dataset  of  all  investments made  under  a  group  of  schemes  introduce  in 1999 and the early 2000s. Together, these datasets provide a comparative picture of the effectiveness of government‐backed schemes in providing VC investments.  The thesis makes its theoretical contribution by arguing that an evolutionary and capabilities perspective may be able to explain aspects of the development of VC in the US and UK that would not be as immediately explicable using a principal agent framework.  In  this  way  an  evolutionary  perspective,  in  providing  an  alternate 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framing of issues of venture capital and small firm finance, may highlight areas for policy  development  that  would  not  be  immediately  identified  using  the  more standard  principal‐agent  or  contracting  framework.  It  then  makes  initial  steps toward discussing how the evolutionary perspective might be extended to address policy issues in a more full‐fledged manner.  




2.1  Introduction  The previous chapter presented an overview of the arguments and structure of the thesis,  and  discussed  the  data  and  contributions  that  will  be  presented  in subsequent  chapters.  This  chapter  seeks  to  explain  and  contextualise  venture capital and its role in policy. Venture capital has come to be seen as a key part of small  firm  finance, which will be discussed  in Section 2.2.  It will discuss venture capital, its structure and the roles venture capital plays in Section 2.3. The chapter then  examines  the  role  and  structure  of  policies  to  support  VC  in  Section  2.4.  It then  summarises  theoretical  perspectives  in  which  the  success  of  VC  may  be interpreted in Section 2.5. The chapter discusses and frames the research question and  providing  a  framework  for  subsequent  analysis  in  Section  2.6.  The  chapter summarises and concludes in Section 2.7.  
2.2  Venture capital and its role in small firms  For all  the attention that venture capital has received,  it  is  important to consider that it  is not the only aspect of financing employed by small firms. In this section we will  discuss  the  role  and  structure  of  small  firms,  and  briefly  summarise  the literature surrounding small firm finance and risk.  
2.2.1 Small firms: their importance and growth Small  firms  are  widely  seen  to  be  very  important  to  national  economic development.  Their  overall  effects  on  national  economies  are  debated,  however they  do  play  several  key  roles  in  economies.  They  have  the  opportunity  to  take advantage  of  emerging  technologies  (Rothwell  and  Zegveld  1982)  to  generate disproportionate effects relative to their size. These effects may often be linked to small firms’ roles as innovators. Although their cumulative impact on innovation is less than that of large firms (Acs and Audretsch 1988), their small size and active management gives them the potential to exploit radical innovations more quickly 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than  larger  rivals  (Hoffman  et  al  1998).  This  is  particularly  true  when  firms operate in highly innovative industries with largely skilled labour and many large incumbents  (Acs  and  Audretsch  1987).  Further,  the  technological  trajectories  of the sectors in which firms operate have very different patterns and characteristics for the appropriability of innovations (see Pavitt 1984 and Tidd et al 2001 p. 114). Beyond  the  role  of  innovation,  Storey  (1982  pp.  13‐14)  identifies  a  number  of other  roles  for  small  firms within  the  economy:  among  them  that  they  generate jobs, and serve as the ‘seedcorn’ from which the large firms of the future will come.   Small firms have long been understood to play a key role in driving employment, driven  by  research  such  as  Birch  (1979), who  argued  that  firms  employing  less than 20 people generated 66% of net new jobs in the US. This was later criticised and  found  to  be  somewhat  misleading  (see  Davis  et  al  1993),  but  the  idea  has persevered and has become commonly accepted, despite the empirical challenges. It  is  clear  that  small  firms have  important  roles  to play  in economic growth  (see Wennekers  and  Thurik  1999),  and  that  economies  have  increasingly  become better  structurally  suited  to  the  more  dynamic  roles  that  small  firms  play (Audtretsch 2002).  The  idea  of  small  firms  as  potential  large  firms  of  the  future  draws  on  several related assumptions:  that  small  firms have  the opportunity  to grow significantly, and (perhaps implicitly) that the greater the number of small firms that exist, the more  likely  large  firms  will  develop.  Both  of  these  issues  have  been  addressed extensively in the literature. Small firm growth has long been understood in terms of Gibrat’s Law,  the assumption that growth rates are  invariant  to  firm size. This has been  tested extensively  (see  the  review  in Sutton 1997, as well  as Mansfield 1962,  Wagner  1992,  Lotti  et  al  2003,  and  Audretsch  et  al  2004).  Although  the results vary significantly, a general consensus seems to be that the law tends to be applicable  somewhat  generally,  although  there  are  a  number  of  exceptions  that have been identified.   The assumption that large firms may be grown from small firms is one impetus for policies supporting firm formation. However research (see Santarelli and Vivarelli 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2007 for a review) suggests  that although good firms with high growth potential do  exist,  the markets  for  new  firms  are  very  heterogeneous  and  increasing  firm formation  is more  likely  to  encourage  ‘churn’,  in which  firms  enter  and  exit  the market  rapidly,  destabilising  the  sector  and  impairing  growth  (see  Beesley  and Hamilton 1984, Caves 1998 and Agarwal and Audretsch 2001).  Once  new  firms  are  created,  they  face  significant  threats  to  survival.  One phenomenon identified in Gibb 1990 and Aurswald and Branscomb (2003) is the ‘valley of death’ effect, in which firms seeking to grow must survive a period of low profitability  and  high  mortality  before  becoming  successful  (see  also  Littunen 2000)  This  has  been  further  empirically  supported  by  data  in  Nightingale  et  al (2009).  
2.2.2 Risk in small firms Although  small  firms’  size  and  characteristics  give  them unique  opportunities  to exploit  innovations,  they  also  represent  high  levels  of  risk  and  uncertainty  to potential  investors.  Screening  potential  investments  is  difficult,  especially  for potential funders of technology‐based firms (Macmillan et al 1987), because of the specificity of the information involved. This specificity leads to higher transaction costs  associated  with  identifying  potential  investments,  screening  these investments  and  moving  forward  with  these  investments  (Dyer  1997).  This  is because the more specific (and therefore useful) the information used to evaluate a potential investment, the less useful that information will be for the examination of other  potential  investments  (see  Zander  and  Kogut  1995, Macmillan  et  al  1987, Guler  and  Guillen  2007).  Further,  the  costs  associated  with  gathering  relevant information  will  be  higher  the  more  specific  the  information  (Hansen  1999). However, considering small firms simply as ‘risky’ does not help us to understand the nature of the risks inherent in these firms. The forms of risk facing small firms may usefully be characterised in terms of market risk, technology risk, and agency risk2.                                                          2  This  typology  is  adapted  from Fiet  (1995 p.  553‐554), who  considers  technology  risk  a  part  of market  risk.  Given  our  understanding  of  the  endogeneity  of  technology  (see  Romer  1990),  it  is worth classing technology as a separate form of risk, as it is not necessarily an aspect of market or agency risk. 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Market risk may be considered to be the sum of risks posed by external forces in the  market.  This  includes  factors  such  as  the  scale  and  level  of  competition (Scherer 1980); the risk of new entrants into the market (Porter 1980); the risk of substitute  products  (ibid);  and  poor  market  attractiveness  (Tyebjee  and  Bruno 1984).  Market  risks  may  be  addressed  by  understanding  the  dynamics  of  the market or sector in which a potential investment operates – in the case of the VC sector,  this  involves  familiarity  with  the  sector  (Zider  2000  p.  134,  Sahlmann 1990).  Technological  risk  is  based  in  the  inherent  uncertainty  that  comes  from  the process  of  developing  technology.  The  process  of  converting  science  into technology,  and  technology  into  a market‐ready  product,  is  far  from  linear  (see Pavitt 1999 and Nightingale 2004). Therefore  firms  (especially  small  firms) with business models based on new technologies expose themselves to significant risks as they attempt to bring products to market. It is impossible to predict whether a technology will meet expectations, or meet those expectations on time (Tidd et al 2001 p. 146). However, investors who are familiar with a technology may then be able  to  use  their  understanding  of  that  technology  to  evaluate  the  merit  of  a particular  investment,  mitigating  that  risk  to  some  extent  (Megginson  2004). Conversely,  potential  investors who  lack  an  understanding  of  a  technology must make an assessment based on only market  and agency  risk,  opening  them up  to failure.  The  risk  posed  by managerial  staff  is  often  framed  in  terms  of  agency  risk  and principal‐agent theory (as in Alchian and Demsetz 1972 and Jensen and Meckling 1976),  which  frames  the  contractual  relationship  between  two  agents,  and provides  context  for managing  risk between owners  and managers.  Later  in  this chapter  we  will  address  the  characteristics  of  the  principal‐agent  view  in  more detail as a theoretical framing device.   However before addressing the theoretical implications of this view it is important to frame the ways in which investors and firms manage the risks that come from these investments. 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2.2.3 Finance for small firms Given  the  risks discussed  above,  small  firms  face particular  challenges  in  raising the  capital  they need  to  survive  and  expand. Because many  small  firms may not have a proven track record or assets, it may be difficult to raise funds (Storey 1982 p.  144‐150).  For  innovative  or  technology  based  firms,  raising  capital  is  a significant  challenge,  given  that  R&D  is  capital  intensive  and  inherently  risky. Whereas most entrepreneurs may use personal funds or friends and family to back their ventures (see Avery et al 1998, Hanley and Girma 2006), the capital demands of technology‐based firms tend to mean that they must look to external sources of capital (Cassar 2004), and must choose between seeking debt and equity funding.  Debt is the most prevalent form of external capital provision to small firms (Berger and Udell 1997 p. 67). Access to debt is characterised by two forms of information asymmetries: the ex ante risks that firms or individuals misrepresent their ability to suitability to repay the debt capital (adverse selection, as in Akerloff 1970), and the  ex  post  risk  that  the  firm  will  not  operate  under  the  terms  of  the  contract (moral hazard) (Binks et al 1992 p. 36‐37). Under conditions of adverse selection and moral hazard, Stiglitz and Weiss (1982) suggest that market failure may occur as ‘gaps’ emerge in the provision of debt as interest rates rise, driving out low‐risk loan opportunities.   A solution  to  the  lack of debt capital, as suggested by de Meza and Webb (1987) and  Cho  (1986),  is  that  rather  than  seeking  debt,  small  firms  should  seek  funds from  equity  sources.  The  trade‐off  associated  with  equity  funding  is  that entrepreneurs lose some of the control of their business.   The  choice  between  equity  and  debt  capital  therefore  becomes  particularly relevant. Myers  and Majluf  (1984)  argue  that  there  is  a  ‘pecking  order’  for  firm funding.  If  firms  do  use  external  finance,  they  will  seek  out  debt  before  equity funding because of the informational costs associated with giving and maintaining equity  funds  (ibid  p.  584‐585).  This  hypothesis  has  been  widely  examined  (see Shyam‐Sunder  and  Myers  1999  for  one  discussion).  Small  firms  also  provide 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conflicting evidence about  the pecking order hypothesis  (see Watson and Wilson 2002 and Helwege and Liang 1996 for contrasting views). However, despite these much of this stream of research is more applicable to larger firms and is based on the assumption that small firms have a choice between forms of external finance, when  in  many  cases  they  may  not.  In  these  cases  firms  may  be  forced  into receiving external finance on undesirable terms (see Chaganti et al 1995).   For  the  earliest  stage  small  firms,  and  particularly  those  oriented  around technology,  the  financing  options  available  may  be  particularly  stark,  as  their assets  may  be  largely  based  around  intangible  assets,  rendering  debt  capital unlikely  or  impossible.  However  for  some  of  these  early  stage  firms  with  little collateral,  these  intangible assets may still be able to generate significant returns (see Zider 2000 p. 132). This is the market gap that the class of investments known as ‘venture capital’ seeks to fill.  
2.3  Venture capital, its role, and its key relationships:   There are many definitions of venture capital, but the one we will use in this thesis will be that adopted by Soderblum and Wiklund (2005), who adapt theirs from the European Venture Capital Association definition.  In  this way we  identify venture capital as a financial intermediary that invests money from institutional funders in privately  owned  early  stage  companies  that  have  large  growth  potential  (p.  12).   This approach to funding firms, referred to as ‘classic’ venture capital by Bygrave and Timmons (1992), may be contrasted with other approaches to equity finance that may provide refinancing for existing assets.  VC is part of the broad class of investments based around deals for equity in firms. These  investments,  characterised  (particularly  in  Europe)  as  private  equity,  are broadly  defined  as  including  business  angels  ‐  individuals  who  make  equity investments in firms – and the broad sector of buy‐out activity (ibid), identified by Bygrave  and  Timmons  (1992)  as  ‘merchant  capital’.  This  latter  sector  involves providing  funding  for  deals  involving  the  ownership  and  management  of  firms. These may  include management  buy‐outs  (MBOs),  management‐buy  ins  (MBIs), 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and  buy‐in  management  buy  outs  (BIMBOs).  Although  this  class  of  investments (referred  to  broadly  in  the  thesis  as  MBOs)  is  often  called  ‘venture  capital’, especially in Europe,  in this thesis they will be considered separately, as they are not the focus of the enquiry.  The venture capital  sector  is generally organised around  limited partnerships,  in which  the  venture  capitalist  serves  as  the  general  partner  (GP)  and  the institutional  investors who back the  firm are the  limited partners (LP) (Gompers and Lerner 2001, Zider 2000 p. 134). The limited partnership agreement gives the GP complete control over the fund, and governs the disbursement of  the returns, which are usually designed  such  that GPs get priority  in getting paid  in order  to avoid agency issues (ibid). At the same time the relationship is designed to ensure that the LPs have little say in the running of the fund, so their role is virtually that of a ‘silent partner’.   One result of this structure is that VCs have several different types of interactions with  stakeholders,  and  all  must  be  managed  well  for  a  relationship  to  develop successfully. These relationships also give us a means of developing an analytical framework  for  examining  the  success  of  the  VC  sector,  and  we  shall  use  the framework  suggested  in  Zider  (2000  p.  135)  and Mason  and  Harrison  (2002  p. 430)  (and  also used  as  a  framing device  in Gompers  and Lerner 2002)  to  frame relationships as key elements for success of domestic VC sectors. These sub‐areas of  research  include  the  relationship  between  VCs  and  the  firms  they  fund (including selection and structuring of VC deals); between VCs and the institutional investors who back them; and between firms and the markets for investment exit. These three areas make up the core of the VC literature.   
2.3.1 The VC­firm relationship Much of  the  literature surrounding  the VC sector  focuses on  the dynamics of  the relationship  between  VCs  and  the  firms  they  back.  This  relationship  generally focuses  on  several  key  aspects:  the  selection  of  investments;  the  staging  and structuring of control rights; syndication; and monitoring and value addition. 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Once the initial investment is made, VCs then must structure the deals to manage both the business and managerial risk to which they are now exposed. There are a number  of  techniques  used  by VCs,  but  two particularly  relevant  techniques  are staged investments (see Gompers 1995) and board control rights (see Kaplan and Stromberg 2001). These processes are often presented in terms of management of the principal‐agent relationship.   Staged  investments  are  among  the  most  powerful  tools  available  to  VCs  to minimise  moral  hazard  risks.  In  staging  investments,  VCs  set  specific  goals  and criteria that must be met by the firm in order for the company to receive its next infusion of cash (Gompers 1995 p. 1462). This allows VCs to manage their agency risk as firms grow. Therefore infusions of  funding may be more frequent  in early stages of investing when firms are based more on intangible assets, but then may grow  more  widely  spaced  as  the  firm  begins  to  accumulate  tangible  assets (Gompers  and  Lerner  2002  p.  164).  It  also  facilitates  the  early  identification  of problems,  giving  VCs  a  window  to  wind  down  businesses  that  do  not  meet expectations  without  committing  the  entire  sum  promised  to  the  firm  (ibid).  It serves as a way to ensure capital is allocated efficiently by firms without increasing the  likelihood  of  the  firm  being  liquidated  (Sahlman  1990,  Megginson  2002). Although staging can occasionally strangle good firms if VCs are not able to provide cash infusions on time (Steier and Greenwood 1995), staging has been found to be positively  associated  with  the  likelihood  of  reaching  IPO  (Gompers  and  Lerner 1999).   VCs also maintain control over investee firms via convertible securities. These are preferred stock shares that may be converted (usually at the VCs’ discretion) into additional  ordinary  shares  (Gompers  1993).  These  enable  VC  control  in  another way, ensuring that VCs will be paid first, but also providing them with a powerful mechanism for ensuring control while optimising returns (Sahlman 1990). These 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powers  give  the  VCs  control  over  cash  flow,  membership  of  the  board,  and liquidation  rights,  among  others.  (Kaplan  and  Stromberg  2003).  If  the  firm does poorly,  control  is  allocated  such  that  VCs  will  obtain  full  control  (Kaplan  and Stromberg  2004,  Aghion  and  Bolton  1992,  Hellman  1998).  The  removal  of executives  and  managerial  teams  has  generally  been  found  to  be  much  more common in the US than Europe (Hege et al 2003 and Schweinbacher 2002).   
2.3.1.3 The process of VC investment: Syndication Once  an  investment  is  identified,  VCs will  often  partner with  other  investors  to jointly make  an  investment.  The  reasons  for  this  have been debated  and  remain rather  unclear.  Soderblom  and  Wicklund  (2005)  suggest  that  there  have  been numerous  rationales  suggested  for  syndication,  among  them:  risk diversification, in  which  VCs  use  multiple  investments  to  diversify  the  risk  profiles  of  their portfolios  (see Gompers  and  Lerner  1999,  and De  Clercq  and Dimov  2003);  and information  sharing  (see  Stuart  and  Sorenson  2001),  where  VCs  syndicate  to expand the boundaries of their individual sectoral and locational knowledge. Other rationales  include  improved  screening,  where  VCs  get  second  opinions  on  their investments (see Lerner 1994, drawing upon Sah and Stiglitz 1986); deal flow, in that VCs let other investors into promising deals with expectations of reciprocation (see Lerner and Schoar 2004); value addition in portfolios, where VCs accumulate different skills for value addition via syndication (Hellman and Puri 2002, Hellman et  al  2004)  and  image,  where  VCs  syndicate  for  reputational  gains  (Hsu  2004). Similarly  (and more  cynically),  firms may demonstrate  classic  ‘window dressing’ behaviour by  joining  late‐stage syndicated  investments to give the appearance of having invested wisely, even if there is little financial gain involved (Lakonishok et al 1991).  Once  they decide  to syndicate, VCs  tend  to  identify syndication partners  through existing networks  (Gompers  and Lerner 2002 p.  258‐259),  although  the ways  in which  networks  are  deployed  may  depend  on  the  purpose  for  which  the syndication is being done. They generally partner with firms who have similar (or slightly  lower)  levels  of  reputation,  suggesting  that  first‐tier  VCs  (if  such  a distinction exists) would be more likely to syndicate with first‐ or second‐tier VCs, 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and  that  fourth‐tier  VCs  tend  to  syndicate  with  other  fourth‐tier  (or  lower) investors (Lerner 1994).   
2.3.1.4 Monitoring and value addition in venture capital investments The venture capitalist’s role post‐investment is debated and subject to theoretical interpretation.  Some  approach  the  VC’s  role  as  primarily  one  of  monitoring investments  (see  Gompers  1995,  Kaplan  and  Stromberg  2001).  Monitoring activities seem to be related to more directly to the relationship and characteristics of  both  the  VC  and  the  firm  in  question  (Sapienza  and  Gupta  1994).  Use  of monitoring  activities  over  shorter  intervals  has  also  been  found  to  increase  the rate of returns on investments (Hege et al 2003).  Moving  beyond  pure  monitoring,  a  range  of  additional  value  addition  activities performed  by  VCs  have  been  identified.  Boards  of  VC‐backed  firms  have  been shown  to  be more  active  in  strategy  formation  than  boards without  VC‐backing (Fried et al 1998). Cumming et al (2005) characterise the value addition activities as  financial,  marketing,  administrative  and  strategic/management,  and  find financial  and  strategic/management  value  addition  activities  are  associated with more  successful  VC  fundraising.  Although  such  detailed  breakdowns  are  not always  available,  Sapienza  (1992)  and  Sapienza  et  al  (1996)  shows  that  US  VCs play  a  unique  role  in  value  addition.  Hellman  and  Puri  (2000)  suggest  that  VC‐backed  firms  are more  likely  to  have  their  products  reach market  than  non‐VC‐backed firms. One possible explanation for this is that VCs are able to add value by using  their networks  to add value and help bring  their products  to market, as  in Steier  and  Greenwood  (1995  p.  347‐8).  This  area,  including  the  definitions  of ‘monitoring’ and  ‘value addition’  is particularly relevant  to  the  thesis and will be discussed in further detail subsequently in Sections 2.5 and 2.6.  
2.3.2 The LP­GP relationship: VCs and institutional investors There has been a limited but growing literature on the attitudes and behaviour of limited  partners  (LPs),  the  investors  who  back  VC  and  other  asset  classes.  LPs’ attraction to VC and other alternative investments comes from the unusual nature of the risks and rewards associated with the sector, which are different from those 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of conventional asset classes (Schneeweis and Pescatore 1999). Despite the lack of transparency  in  the  VC  and  PE  sectors  (Schmidt  2003),  the  risk  profile  of  the alternative  investment  sector  is  so  different  from  traditional  market‐associated risks that it becomes appealing to LPs.  Beyond this  there are other pressures associated with  investment  in these areas, whether  due  to  business  concerns  of  LPs  (see  Hellman  et  al  2004, who  suggest banks  back  VC  as  a  means  of  driving  potential  business  later),  or  associated political  and  other  motivations.  Lerner  et  al  (2005)  suggest  that  university endowments tended to be the most sophisticated investors relative to alternative investments, whilst public pension funds tended to be the least sophisticated.   The  selection  of  which  VC  funds  to  back  is  also  important.  Sahlman  (1990) suggests that more successful funds will be those more willing to make fixed‐term investments with incentives most closely linked to performance. This drives VCs to seek  to prove  themselves,  leading  to widely  varying  results  (see Gottschalg  et  al 2004). Given this pressure Gompers (1994) shows that young VCs who have  less experience are more likely to exit their investments quickly (possibly too quickly). They do this as a means of signalling to potential investors that they are capable of delivering  positive  results,  a  phenomenon  that  Gompers  calls  ‘grandstanding’. Although  grandstanding  phenomena may  be  detrimental  to  firms,  they make  up part of the reputational capital (see Megginson 2001) that plays a key role in the development and growth of networks (which will be discussed later in Chapter 4).   
2.3.3 Supply and demand factors: Exit markets  In order for VCs to deliver the returns they promise to institutional investors, they must  first  exit  their  investments.  Cumming  and  Macintosh  (2003)  identify  five ways  in which  a  venture  capitalist  can  exit  an  investment:  initial  public  offering (IPO); trade sale, in which the whole company is sold to another firm in that sector; secondary  sale,  in  which  the  company  is  sold  to  other  financial  institutions; buyback,  in  which  entrepreneurs  buy  the  VCs’  shares  back  from  them;  and liquidation, where the VC abandons the investment. 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Of  these  investments  VCs  often  rely  on  the markets  for  IPOs  and  trade  sales  to provide  successful  exit  opportunities  (Jeng  and Wells  2000).  Of  the  options  VCs face when seeking to exit an investment, IPO is the most preferable option – in the peak of  the dot‐com boom, VC  investments exited by  IPO provided 60%  internal rate of return versus acquisitions, which provided only 15% IRR (Black and Gilson 1998).  In  addition  to  these  high  returns,  IPOs  are  also  prestigious,  providing valuable reputational boosts to VCs and serving as a benchmark of VC success that can  be  used  to  further  verify  additional  investments  that  come  up  for  IPO (Megginson and Weiss 1991). There is disagreement in the data on the importance of the length of time that an investment is held for the final investment valuation (see  Giot  and  Schwienbacher  2005  and Megginson  and Weiss  1991  for  differing views).  Gompers  (1995)  shows  that  younger  VC  firms  are  more  likely  to  have lower  exit  values,  which  is  again  linked  to  the  ‘grandstanding’  phenomenon discussed above. The US system has thrived in large part because there have been successful  exit  opportunities  to  VC‐backed  firms  (Megginson  2002,  Black  and Gilson  1998).  Conversely,  in  countries where  IPO  options  for  exit  are  absent  or weak, the VC sector has generally been weak as well, necessitating other means of exit (Jeng and Wells 2000, Armour and Cumming 2007).  
2.4  Policy and national performance of VC sectors  Much of the literature described in the previous section was based upon studies of the US venture capital sector.  The US VC sector was the first, and remains the most successful,  venture  capital  sector. However  there has been  significant  interest  in attempting  to  replicate  the  success  of  the  US  in  other  nations,  with  a  body  of literature emerging that examines the elements of US or other national policies for encouraging  VC.  This  literature  may  broadly  be  broken  down  into  broad comparisons of national VC sectors, and studies of particular national schemes.  
2.4.1 Comparisons of national VC sectors: Policies and institutions There  are  a  number  of  roles  that  governments  may  play  in  supporting  venture capital  sectors  that  have  been  linked  to more  successful  VC  sector  involvement. These  include setting  legal and regulatory environments, support  for supply‐side 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factors that enable VCs to raise funds, and interventions that support firms, either directly or indirectly.  Legal and regulatory frameworks include areas such as tax rates, bankruptcy laws, labour  regulations  and  general  legal  structure.  Gompers  and  Lerner  (1998)  find that  decreases  in  capital  gains  tax  (CGT)  rates  are  associated  with  the commitments to new VC funds, while Poterba (1989) suggests that CGT may also drive  demand  for  VC  by  promoting  entrepreneurship.  These  suggestions  are supported by economic models in Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003, 2004). Cumming and Walz  (2004)  suggest  that more  robust  legal protection  for VCs’  returns may also  be  linked  to  higher  IRRs.  Bankruptcy  laws  that  do  not  penalise  repeat entrepreneurs have also been argued by Cumming et al (2008) and Cumming and Armour (2006) to  foster entrepreneurship as part of a  ‘legislative road to Silicon Valley’.  Similarly,  restrictive  laws  on  the  labour  market  have  been  found  to  be linked with lower VC activity (Black and Gilson 1998, Jeng and Wells 2000). There is also limited evidence (largely relating to the US, see Gompers and Lerner 1998 and  Marti  and  Balboa  2001)  discussing  the  role  of  government  regulations  in supporting the raising of funds for VC investments via institutional investors.  Further,  there  is a cluster of  literature suggesting that,  in  line with La Porta et al (1998),  countries  based  on  English  common  law  provide  better  protection  and incentives  for  growth  than  do  firms  based  on  the  legal  systems  of  continental Europe  and  Japan.  Lerner  and  Schoar  (2005)  find  that  firms  in  common  law countries  tend to have higher valuations  than those  in countries with other  legal systems. Megginson (2002) similarly suggests  that VCs have easier access  to  IPO markets in countries with common law legal systems. These findings are echoed by Black and Gilson (1998) and Armour and Cumming (2006).  Extensive evidence  (see Black and Gilson 1998,  Jeng and Wells 2000, Megginson 2002,  Armour  and  Cumming  2006)  shows  that  VC  is most  successful  in  nations with deep and liquid stock markets. Most firms are found to prefer to seek exit via a market  that  is  close  to  them  (Jeng  and Wells  2000), which  then  in  some  cases rules out the most lucrative markets such as NASDAQ. The main exception to this 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is  the  Israeli  VC  sector  (Avnimelech  et  al  2004),  which  has  grown  by  using NASDAQ as its primary means to exit.  In  recent  years  additional  attention has been directed  toward  the building  of  an ‘enterprise‐friendly’ business culture in Europe, in line with many of the objectives described above. The Lisbon Agenda of 2000 set forth a vision of Europe as a hub for knowledge‐based  industries, aiming to become the worlds most common and dynamic  knowledge  economy  by  2010  (European  Commission  (2003);  although see  Watson  (2001)  for  a  more  sceptical  view).  This  was  based  on  extensive Europe‐wide  investment  in  R&D  but  also  had  elements  of  streamlining employment  and  business  regulations  (Soete  2004  p.  106).  Venture  capital  is widely perceived to be a key part of this, by providing the capital that will enable this  transition  to  a  knowledge  economy  (see  Hanusch  and  Pyka  2007  p.  8). Consequently there has been significant policy interest in interventions to develop and support VC sectors not just by creating a business environment in which they can  thrive but by more directly  intervening  to provide  funds  to support  firms or investors.    These  schemes  have  been  based  on  a  variety  of  rationales,  but  the dominant rationale is the market failure approach.   
2.4.2 Market failure and government interventions in VC sectors When  examining  the  rationales  given  for  policy  intervention  in  the  provision  of capital  to  firms,  perhaps  the  most  common  justification  used  is  market  failure. Murray (2007, p. 116‐7) discusses the ambiguity of the term market failure, which often moves  beyond  its  traditional  association  of  the  price mechanism  failing  to achieve social aims, and instead becomes a rhetorical device indicating that some actors are unable to find funding. In such a setting, the issue becomes identifying whether  such  a  result  is  due  to  an  inefficient  market  (in  which  case  there  is  a failure  of  supply),  or  whether  the markets  are  operating  efficiently  and  are  not giving  funds  to  poor  investments  (in  which  case  there  is  a  failure  of  demand) (ibid). 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This perceived ‘market failure’ lends itself to the interpretation of an ‘equity gap’, where  financial  institutions  are  interpreted  to  be  failing  to  provide  small  firms with  the  funding  they  require.  The  idea  of  an  equity  gap  has  been  especially prominent in the UK, where such a ‘gap’ was originally identified in 1931 and has been  the  target  of  ongoing  policy  intervention  for  nearly  eighty  years.  Murray (2007  p.  118)  suggests  that  ‘equity  gaps’  remain  an  issue  around  the  world. However  the  scale  and  historical  scope  of  the  case  of  the  UK  equity  gap  are significant. Murray  (1999)  has  suggested  that  the  term  ‘equity  gap’  implies  that there may be only one such gap, when in fact there may be several at different key points in firm growth.   In  cases where  there  is  (or  is  perceived  to  be) market  failure,  there  are  several direct means  that  governments have used  to  intervene  to  support  the  growth of domestic  VC  markets.  This  has  been  addressed  in  two  ways  from  a  policy perspective:  by  addressing  the  demand  side  of  capital  by  supporting entrepreneurs, and by supporting the supply side by providing  financial or other support  to VC sectors. Murray (2007, p. 127‐128) provides a general  typology of both forms of interactions, and we will subsequently discuss these roles.  
2.4.2.1 Government intervention in entrepreneurship There  are  a  range  of  ways  in  which  policymakers  has  support  the  role  of entrepreneurship,  and  Murray  (2007,  p.  127)  presents  one  framework  that presents  a  five‐part  typology  for policies may  stimulate  entrepreneurship. These are demand‐side intervention, supply‐side intervention, input factors, preferences, and individual decision‐making processes. From this perspective demand‐side and supply‐side  interventions  are  focused  on R&D expenditure  (such  as  the US  SBIR programme,  see  Lerner  1999)  and  stimulating  competition  for  the  former,  and labour  mobility  (see  Black  and  Gilson  1998  and  Saxenian  1998)  and  regional development (see Mason and Harrison 2003) for the latter.  Other  forms  of  intervention  to  support  entrepreneurship  include  input  factors such as higher education (see Galbraith 2007 on the role of higher education in US economic success, as well as Dosi et al 2006).  Influencing preferences  is another 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form  of  intervention  –  by  changing  the  images  of  entrepreneurs  and entrepreneurship  policymakers  may  make  starting  one’s  own  business  more appealing  (see  Peterman  and  Kennedy  2003  and  Kruegel  and  Brazeal  1994). Finally  there  are  issues  that  support  the  decision‐making  process  and  support business  operations,  such  as  those  matters  discussed  above  regarding  taxes, bankruptcy  laws  and  the  overall  legal  framework  for  potential  founders  of  new businesses.  These  interventions  are  intended  to  make  it  easier  and  more  desirable  for potential  entrepreneurs  to  ‘take  the  leap’  and  found  their  own  businesses. However  these  incentives  are  subject  to  the  risk  of  market  ‘churn’  identified  in Santarelli  and  Vivarelli  (2007),  who  suggest  that  encouraging  firms  to  enter markets only drives older firms out of business, creating relatively few net positive effects.  In  this  way  there  is  something  of  a  tension  between  Santarelli  and Vivarelli’s  implication  that  firm  growth  is  perhaps  a  more  appropriate  policy objective  than  firm  formation,  and  the  common  policy  focus  on  the  supply  of capital.  This  represents  an  ongoing  tension  in  the  area  of  small  firm  policy: between  supply‐side  policies  (which  focus  on  building  the  supply  of  capital available  to  firms,  and  implicitly  seek  to  drive  firm  creation)  and  demand‐side policies  (which  focus  on  growing  existing  firms  and  building  demand  for  capital from  firms)  that  will  inform  later  discussions  of  policy,  particularly  in  the  UK. Another  implication  of  this  is  discussed  below,  in  terms  of  the  types  of  roles governments play in intervening in VC.  
2.4.2.2 Government intervention in VC: Direct and indirect roles Murray  (2007,  p.  128)  suggests  that  there  are  two  generic  forms of  government interaction:  direct  intervention,  where  the  government  itself  plays  venture capitalists,  and  indirect  intervention,  where  the  government  plays  a  role  in supporting the activities of private VCs.  Direct  intervention  comes  when  governments  themselves  play  a  role  in distributing funds (for example see cases in Finland (Maula et al 2007)). One key debate  in  this  area  is  whether  direct  government  intervention  in  national  VC 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sectors  helps  or  hurts  the  development  of  private  VC.  Armour  and  Cumming (2006)  and  Cumming  and MacIntosh  (2006)  discuss  evidence  from  Canada  that government‐backed VC  ‘crowds out’  the  investments of private VCs by providing funds on better  terms with  fewer conditions or oversights, resulting  in a  ‘market for  lemons’  for  poor  quality  firms.  However  Leleux  and  Surlemont  (2003)  and Manigart  and  Beuselinck  (2001)  find  no  such  ‘crowding  out’  effect  in  a  pan‐European sample, although Manigart et al (2002) find that public VCs expect lower rates of return than their private counterparts.  Indirect  intervention takes the  form of schemes where public support  is given to increase the returns to private funds. These have been seen more widely in cases such as the Yozma scheme in Israel (Avnimelech et al 2004). More recently this has taken  the  form  of  hybrid  schemes  in  which  government  funds  are  pooled  with private  funds  to  support  VC  funds.  The  small  but  growing  body  of  literature  on hybrid venture capital funds (see Jaaskelainen et al 2007, Murray 2007) points to the role that governments can play in boosting the risk‐reward profile of potential investments that VCs might make.    This  section  has  summarised  the  literature  on  government  interventions  in venture  capital  and  small  firm  finance.   Despite  the  range of  empirical  literature addressing  various  aspects  of  the  venture  capital  sector,  the  theoretical perspectives  that underlie  these analyses  is often unclear.   The  following section will  present  contrasting  theoretical  interpretations  of  VC  that  will  facilitate  the creation of a theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis.  
2.5  Economic perspectives and venture capital: Principal­agent and 
evolutionary views  This thesis seeks to explain and extend our understanding of the role of policy in the  emergence  of  VC  in  light  of  the  prevalent  theoretical  understanding  and  an alternate perspective  that may explain additional nuance and detail. This  section will discuss the prevalent principal agent approach as well as the potential of the 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evolutionary  and  capabilities  perspective  to  explain  the  activities  of  venture capitalists.   
2.5.1 Principal­agent theory and venture capital The  field  of  venture  capital,  dealing  as  it  does with  the  relationship  between  an investor  and  a  firm,  is  a  good  area  for  the  exploration  of  issues  relating  to principal‐agent  theory.  Variations  of  an  agency‐centred  model  of  the  firm  have been proposed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972),  Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Fama  and  Jensen  (1983).  This  approach  drops  the  assumption  of  informational symmetry  seen  in  the  standard  neoclassical  model  (Nightingale  2008  p.548), shifting the focus to incentives and monitoring costs. As it does this the definition of  the  firm  itself  changes.  Whereas  Coase  (1937)  and  the  transaction  cost economics  (TCE)  model  characterise  the  firm  as  a  unit  able  to  minimise transaction  costs,  the  agency  approach  (particularly  Alchian  and Demsetz  1972) argues that the firm is ultimately a ‘legal fiction’ made up of a nexus of contracts. In this  perspective  firms  consist  of  groups  of  individuals  who  are  contracted  to provide services to each other in a particularly specialised market (ibid p. 777). In this perspective  the whole of  economic  activity may be  explained via  incentives; any activity may be made possible if the incentive structure is correct.  The  informational  asymmetries  between  investors  and  firms,  and  the  associated agency,  moral  hazard,  and  hidden  information  risks  posed  by  this  relationship make the VC case an ideal situation in which to test and extend agency theory (as in Alchian and Demsetz 1972 and Jensen and Meckling 1976). Consequently the VC literature has seen significant  research addressing principal‐agent‐related  issues, for instance contracting (Kaplan and Stromberg 2001, 2003; Trester 1997); moral hazard  and  learning  by  parties  in  the  agency  relationship  (Bergeman  and  Hege 1998, Chan et al 1990). The risk posed by managerial staff is often framed in terms of  agency  risk  and  principal‐agent  theory,  but  does  not  solely  include  issues  of dishonesty  and  information  asymmetry.  Fiet  (1995  p.  554)  includes  monitoring costs  such  as  distance  between  investor  and  firm  (Gupta  and  Sapienza  1992), portfolio  size  (in  which  larger  portfolios  allow  less  time  for  investment 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monitoring)  (Cumming  2006),  and  various  forms  of  game  playing  (Williamson 1975  p.  30)  as  constitutive  of  additional  elements  of  managerial  risk.  These  all incorporate  human  and  managerial  aspects  in  the  success  of  the  firm,  and  are generally managed by the manipulation of incentives and contracting (see Hellman and Puri 2002).  This  principal‐agent  perspective  is  obviously  very  useful  for  explaining  many functions  of  VC,  and  these  explanations  deeply  inform  the  VC  literature.  For instance  significant portions of  the  literature  refer  to  the VC‐firm relationship  in terms  of  ‘monitoring’  and  its  associated  costs,  adopting  the  principal‐agent terminology (see Gompers 1995 and papers cited above). From a strictly principal‐agent  perspective  the  role  of  the  venture  capitalist  is  largely  based  on  ensuring that the activities of the management are consistent with his or her own goals. The relationship is viewed and modelled as an exercise in appropriate contracting and ensuring that resources are distributed in the manner that will ensure appropriate desired outcomes of all parties. From this perspective (taken to its more extreme extension)  the  relationship  between  the  VC  and  the  firm  is  simply  a  contractual relationship between two nexuses of contracts, with no other interaction required.  While  few VC  scholars would  accept  the  extreme definition of monitoring  as  the sole, definitive sum of post‐investment activity by VCs, it does represent something of  a  bias  in  the  literature.  Contracting  and  monitoring  (and  indeed  general awareness of agency risk) are crucial to VC success. However adopting an extreme position that disregards any other VC‐firm interactions from impacting the firm is also  likely overly simplified. Further, a purely agency‐based  interpretation of  the role of the VC characterises the success of VC simply in terms of deal identification and management of agency risk. This more simplified approach may be amenable for certain  forms of economic analysis, but may also disregard other elements of the  venture  capitalist’s  role.  We  now  seek  to  explore  the  explanations  of  the evolutionary  perspective  of  the  firm,  which  provides  a  fundamentally  different explanation of the economic activities in which VCs engage. 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2.5.2 Evolutionary and capabilities­based approaches While the principal agent approach uses as its core a neoclassical model with only one  key  assumption  of  the  traditional  neoclassical  model  suspended,  the evolutionary  perspective  rejects  most  of  the  assumptions  of  the  neoclassical approach.  This  evolutionary  approach  rejected  equilibrium  in  favour  of  a Schumpeterian dynamic  interpretation of  the economy (Nelson and Winter 1982 p.  278‐287).  It  also  adopted  the  Schumpeterian  (Schumpeter  1950)  notion  that innovation drives the development of economies (Nelson and Winter 1982 p. 277). It  adopted  a  bounded  rationality  approach  in  rejecting  the  neoclassical  view  of firms as maximising utility among set options, instead incorporating and adapting the notion of routines (Nightingale 2008 p. 554).  The  evolutionary  approach’s  alternate  understanding  of  firms  is  also fundamentally  realist  in  that  it  seeks  to  represent  economic  entities  relatively closely to their actual roles,  for  instance viewing firms not as artificial constructs but as actual organisations that,  in models, act approximately as  ‘real’ businesses would (Dosi and Marengo 2007 p. 492). Its theories are grounded in what agents ‘on the ground’ do, and why they do it (ibid). Firms are understood to be composed of routines, defined as a “pattern of behaviour that is followed and repeated but is subject to change if conditions change” (Winter 1964, p. 263). These are preserved and passed on through organisations (Dosi et al 2000) and are based around the process of problem solving (Cohen et al 1996). Crucially, the outcomes of problem solving  processes  differ  (Nelson  and Winter  p.  132).  This,  and  the  metaphor  of routines as the ‘genes’ of an organisation (ibid p. 134‐6), lead to a key distinction between the evolutionary and neoclassical perspectives. Whereas the neoclassical view  understands  firms  as  identical,  the  evolutionary  approach  allows  for  firm heterogeneity from the ground up. Firms in evolutionary theory are understood to be  composed  of  different  routines  and  will  have  different  approaches,  thus engendering  heterogeneity  required  for  the  evolutionary  competition  that  will determine whether firms thrive or fail (Nelson and Winter 1982 p. 41‐43).  The  evolutionary  framework  set  out  in Nelson  and Winter  (1982),  Freeman and Soete (1997), Dosi (1982) and others laid the intellectual and economic framework 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for  an  alternate,  heterodox  interpretation  of  economic  activity  that  ultimately viewed  knowledge  as  the  basis  of  the  firm3  (Dosi  and  Marengo  2007  p.  498). Developing parallel  to  this new  line of economic activity was an emerging broad school  of  management  theory  that  welcomed  the  evolutionary  perspective  and developed  a  framework  for  the  study  of  management  issues  that  was complementary to the evolutionary perspective. This approach had its roots in the resource‐based view (RBV) of  the firm4. The RBV perspective characterises  firms as  ‘bundles’  of  resources  (see  Penrose  1959  p.  63,  Amit  and  Schoemaker  1993) that may gain and sustain a firm’s advantage over time (Peteraf 1993). Firms gain sustainable competitive advantage by utilising resources that allow them to create value in ways their competitors cannot (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000 p. 1105).   The knowledge resources that firms deploy are then characterised as capabilities5 (Tidd  et  al  2001).  This  perspective  has  its  roots  in  Cyert  and  March’s  (1963) behavioural  view  of  the  firm,  in  which  firms  are  seen  as  adaptive  systems  that address problems using routines, procedures and shortcuts, and are able to learn over  time. This perspective  informed Nelson and Winter’s discussion of routines, but  also  informed  a more  knowledge  and  capabilities‐based  explanation  behind the makeup of firms (see Foss and Knudson 1995 and Montgomery 1995).   At the same time this approach’s flaws began to become clear in that it made little explicit  allowance  for  changes  in  capabilities  over  time  –  although markets  and firms  operated  in  dynamic  environments,  the  capabilities  framework  did  not provide a means to address changes in firms over time (see Chandler 1992). This problem was addressed and extended by Teece et al (1994, 1997), who extended the  framework  to  address  dynamic markets,  describing  ‘dynamic  capabilities’  as                                                         3 This general term should not be confused with the knowledge‐based view of the firm (KBV) which adapts RBV perspectives but buts knowledge purely at the centre of the firm. See Grant (1996) for one approach to such a view, and Tsoukas (2003) for a discussion of its consequences. 4 Nightingale (2008) frames the differing metaphysical and epistemological contexts of the history of  the  theory  of  the  firm  as  part  of  a  broader  paradigm  shift.  In  this  process  he  identifies fundamental  cognitive  and  theoretical  differences  between  the  RBV,  and  capabilities/dynamic capabilities  views  described.  Given  that  these  views  share  far  more  commonalities  in  their assumptions than differences, they will be discussed henceforth as a capabilities‐based view of the firm.  This  is  intended  to  serve  as  an  over‐arching  category  representative  of  the  common characteristics of these views and their evolutionary underpinnings. 5 Tidd et al (2001) refer to these knowledge resources as competences, while others refer to them as capacities. For the purpose of this thesis, we treat this as an issue of nomenclature only. 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view Problem solving/cognition/knowledge  No  Yes (central focus of analysis) Incentive governance  Yes  (central  focus  of analysis)  Not  necessarily  (see  Coriat and Dosi 1999) Behavioural microfoundations  Perfect,  far‐sighted, rationality  Bounded  rationality  with limited vision Organisational behaviour  Strategic  (in  a  game theoretic sense)  Driven  by  routines  and capabilities Learning  No  Yes Units of analysis  Transactions; strategies;  allocation of  information; allocation of property rights 
Capabilities;  routines; institutions (arguably) 
Noneconomic  dimensions  of organisations  Not necessarily  Trust, power, etc Economic dimensions outside the firm  Not  unless  directly contracted/ incentivised  Institutions  play  key  role, even if indirect  Given  the  potential  usefulness  of  the  evolutionary  perspective,  it  is  therefore moderately  surprising  that  there  is  not  more  scholarly  literature  examining venture  capital  and  its  emergence  from  a  broadly  evolutionary  or  capabilities‐based  perspective.  Capabilities  are  generally  discussed  in  passing  in  the  VC literature  (see  Fried  and  Hisrich  1994  p.  31,  and  Locket  and Wright  2005,  who present a capabilities‐based explanation of university spin‐outs), but there is still significant scope for a more theoretically‐based examination of the VC sector and its  emergence  in  a  capabilities‐based  perspective.  This  thesis will  attempt  to  fill this gap by presenting  the emergence of  the VC sectors of  the US and UK  from a capabilities‐based  perspective,  and  arguing  that  this  approach may  yield  unique insights that a principal agent perspective is less able to present. It will also adopt Eisenhardt  and Martin’s  realist  perspective  on  dynamic  capabilities,  interpreting capabilities  as  real  and  identifiable.  Chapters  4  and  5 will  seek  to  identify  these capabilities  for  the  sectors  they  will  study  as  part  of  the  venture  capitalists’ relationship with the management of risk. 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2.6  Framing the thesis research  
2.6.1 The role of comparison of national sectors This  thesis  seeks  to  fill  a  gap  in  the  literature  by  examining  the  comparative development  of  two  national  VC  sectors.  Much  of  the  comparative  literature described  in  this chapter  (see  for  instance  Jeng and Wells 2000 and Armour and Cumming  2006)  has  been  based  on  analysis  of  quantitative  cross‐country  data, often drawn from national or international VC trade association. Other aspects of the  comparative  literature  (see  Sapienza  et  al  1996,  Manigart  et  al  2002)  have been based on cross‐country survey data.   These comparative studies  link  into a  stream of  literature debating  the extent  to which the success of  the US may be extrapolated to other national cases. Murray (2007 p.121) discusses the problem that the case of the US poses to policymakers in other  countries.  Several pieces of  the  comparative  literature  (see Armour and Cumming  2006  and  Jeng  and  Wells  2000)  discussed  in  Section  2.4  carry  the implicit assumption  that  if a nation  follows  the sets of policies  (particularly  legal and regulatory policies) found in the US, that a nation will move into a position to replicate the US VC sector’s success. However this is challenged by Gilson (2003), who suggests that following the US case is impossible because of the combination of  circumstances  that  facilitated  the  creation  of  Silicon  Valley.  Similarly,  Kenney and von Burg (1998) draw upon David’s (1985, 1994) concept of path dependence to  argue  that  simple  replication  of  the  US  VC  sector  ignores  the  range  of institutional and historical path dependent factors that have driven the US success and make replication or emulation of this success much more difficult.   If  one  accepts  the  view,  discussed  above,  that  there  is  a  single  ‘road  to  Silicon Valley’  that  includes  a  set  of  legal  and  institutional  regulations,  then  in principle the  replication  of  the  success  of  the  US  should  be  relatively  straightforward.  If another country makes its legal and institutional framework as similar as possible to that found in the US, that country’s VC sector should grow and flourish. 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The UK is widely presented as an example for this argument; with its VC sector one of the largest in Europe, it would be interpreted as a success story for VC. However if we examine this case more closely, the results do not seem to easily mesh with this view. Sapienza et al (1996) suggest that the UK VCs’ role in venture addition was similar to that of the US, but slightly weaker, given that the UK’s industry was less mature. Although the means for measuring maturity are subjective, the UK VC sector in 2009 seems less well‐developed than the US VC sector in the early 1990s (approximately  thirty  years  after  its  founding).  Further,  some  of  the  data  that supports the assumption of the UK’s success (for instance Jeng and Wells’s (2000) finding that 45% of VC investments in the UK exited in 1998 did so via IPO) differs from the results expected elsewhere (i.e. Murray (1994), who found that IPOs were the  third  most  popular  means  of  exit  for  VCs  because  of  their  associated  risk). Further,  significant concerns have been raised  that  the UK venture capital  sector (and the financial community more broadly) is not playing a sufficient role in the provision of capital to small  firms (HMT/SBS 2003). This raises a question:  if  the UK shares the common law, institutional and other backgrounds perceived by the VC literature to be part of the ‘legislative road to Silicon Valley’ (as in Armour and Cumming 2006), and is seen widely as a VC success story, why has the ‘equity gap’ persisted,  and why  did  the  UK  government  announce  in  2009  the  creation  of  a £1bn fund to invest in technology based firms (BIS 2009)?  It is this paradox that this thesis seeks to address. It intends to provide context for the comparison of the VC sectors of two nations with similarities in legal, political and  institutional  structure.  Its broad aim  is  to understand why  the UK VC sector has followed a different path of emergence from that of the US. More specifically, it seeks to understand the role that policy has played in growth of  the VC sector  in the UK and US. The role of policy in the development of these sectors is crucial in that it allows us to determine the extent to which interventions made in one case have  been  comparable  to  interventions  made  in  another  case.  The  UK  and  US governments  have  both  had  extensive  involvement  in  supporting  their  domestic VC sectors, and the  form of  these  interventions, and the subsequent outcomes,  is the main area for analysis. 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2.6.2 Research questions and a theoretical framework The empirical  aspect of  the  research question  therefore  seeks  to understand  the role  that policy has played  in  the emergence of  the VC sectors of  the US and UK. However  a  pure  comparison  is  only  of  limited  value;  a  broader  theoretical perspective  is  required  in  order  to  fully  contextualise  and  understand  the differences between the two cases. In order to do this, we must draw not only upon the  observed  role  of  policy  but  also  seek  to  understand  the  stated  framing assumptions that have played underlying roles in the emergence of the VC sector. While  our  understanding  of  these  framing  assumptions  is  naturally  limited  to those that have been stated or demonstrated, they can provide us with the grounds for theoretically‐informed analysis.  The overall research question asks: ‘What has been the historical role of policy in the emergence of the UK and US venture capital sectors? Further, are the stated or implicit  framing  assumptions  behind  the  creation  of  UK  policy,  particularly regarding  the  principal‐agent  perspective,  reflective  of  empirical  data?    And  can the  evolutionary  perspective  provide  theoretical  understanding  of  the  VC  sector that  a  principal‐agent  view  cannot?’  The  first  part  of  this  question  will  be addressed  empirically  and  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  following chapter.    However  in  order  to  provide  the  needed  theoretical  insights, we must develop  a  theoretical  framework  for  answering  the  second  and  third  research questions  presented  above,  particularly  relating  to  principal‐agent  and evolutionary views and their relation to venture capital.     The  principal‐agent  view  is  perhaps  the  most  common  theoretical  perspective used  in explaining  the dynamics of  the  relationships  in which venture capitalists engage. The principal‐agent approach draws upon  the view  that all  relationships are  contracted  and  the  economic  system  is  based  upon  incentives  and  their appropriate  application.  From  this  perspective  the  VC  sector  is  characterised  by efficient contractual relationships in which the management of principal‐agent risk is the basis of the relationship between VCs and the firms they back. Everything in this  relationship  is  straightforwardly  subject  to  incentive  or  control  structures: 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Dimension of analysis  Pure principal agent view  Pure  evolutionary/ 
capabilities view VC defined as:  Contractual  equity‐based relationship  between investors and firms  Equity investment with value addition  based  upon  a  two‐way relationship Role of contracting  Yes  (central  dimension  of analysis)  No Role of capabilities  No  Yes  (central  dimension  of analysis) Institutions  No  Yes Networks  No  Yes Value addition  None;  only  aspect  of  VC relationship  with  firm  is monitoring  Yes Policy agenda  Clear:  address  market failure  and  agency relationships  Unclear:  no  initially  obvious policy agenda  These  present  a  clear  distinction  between  the  ways  in  which  these  two perspectives would interpret the role of venture capitalists. This is the distinction that the subsequent research will seek to operationalise. In analysing the cases of the UK and US, these two views present contrasting sets of predictions.   The  principal‐agent  view  would  explain  the  US  as  a  case  in  which  any  initial market failures were addressed (likely by policy measures), and that consequently the market has operated efficiently. From this view the sector largely would have taken care of itself, assuming that appropriate contracting ensured the efficiency of the  markets.  This  view  would  predict  the  UK  VC  sector  to  be  able  to  generate similar levels of success as long as efficient screening and contracting was in place, and market  failures were addressed. These would be areas  for policy, but would suggest that once market failures were addressed the sector should flourish.  The evolutionary view would be expected  to explain  the case of  the VC sector  in the  US  as  an  instance  in which  capabilities  have  been  developed  over  time  that have allowed it to succeed and grow rapidly. It would expect that those capabilities would reflect the institutional structure of the US. The policies implemented by the US  government  would  then  be  expected  to  have  supported  the  development  of 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capabilities that enabled the sector to become successful. This view would predict the UK as being relatively unlikely to directly replicate the success of the US, given the  UK’s  path‐dependent  historical  differences  (even  if  it  does  have  more similarities  with  the  US  economy  than  differences).  The  success  or  failure  of policies directed toward supporting the VC sector in the UK would be determined by their ability to support the creation of capabilities.  The  empirical  chapters  that  follow  will  allow  us  to  examine  these  sets  of predictions  in  order  to  determine  the  extent  of  these  approaches’  explanatory power.  We  would  expect  to  see  both  theories  demonstrating  some  ability  to explain  aspects  of  both  sectors.  Given  the  extensive  literature  on  the  high‐tech sectors of the US, we would expect both theories to have some explanatory power for  that  case,  as  they  will  likely  have  already  been  considered  in  that  context. However the proposed explanations made by these theories for the ability of VC to grow in the UK are rather more clearly distinct, and should allow the identification of clear differences  in  the explanatory ability of  these  two perspectives. Once we have examined  the differences  in  these  two cases, we will be able  to answer our research  question,  providing  a  theoretically‐informed  explanation  of  the  role  of policy in the success of venture capital sectors of the US and UK.  
2.7  Conclusion  This  chapter  has  provided  an  overview  and  general  empirical  and  theoretical framework that will be used to answer the research questions posed in this thesis. It discusses the role and importance of small firms, as well as their financing. It has summarised  the  three  key  relationships  in which  venture  capitalists  engage  and has reviewed the  literature on  these areas.  It has also reviewed the  literature on VC policy and its justifications. It has profiled the principal agent and evolutionary perspectives  of  the  firm  and  discussed  their  implications  for  venture  capital. Finally it has outlined and contextualised the research question, and presented the theoretical framework that will be used to answer it. 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The  following  chapter will discuss  the  research design and methodology used  to operationalise this framework, enabling the answering of the research question. It will  discuss  the  selection  of  the  cases  and  the  techniques  and methods  used  to collect  the  data.  After  that  chapter  subsequent  chapters  will  present  empirical evidence that helps to build the argument and framework outlined above. 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Chapter 3: Operationalising the Research Framework  
3.1  Introduction  The  previous  chapter  presented  an  exploration  of  the  empirical,  theoretical  and policy  research  in  which  this  thesis  is  grounded,  and  discussed  the  research framework  that will be employed  in  this  thesis. The  thesis  seeks  to  compare  the role of policy in the emergence of the VC sectors of the UK and US, and explore the ability  of  the  principal  agent  and  evolutionary  perspectives  to  explain  the differences between the emergence of the two nations’ VC sectors. In order to do this we must take the research question of the thesis, which asks what role policy has played the development of VC sectors in the UK and US, and operationalise it into a  testable  form. This chapter will discuss  the process by which  the research question  was  examined  and  carried  out.  Section  3.2  will  discuss  the  choice  of research method and framework for executing a methodology with multiple units of analysis. Section 3.3 will discuss the selection of venture capital as the sector on which the study will focus, and the selection of the national cases of the UK and US. Section  3.4  will  discuss  the  execution  of  the  research,  and  Section  3.5  will summarise and conclude.   
3.2  Research design and method  The research question for this thesis has at its base the comparison of the role of policy in the development of two national venture capital sectors, and the ability of two  theories  to  explain  the  differences  in  the  development  of  those  sectors.  Answering the research question will require a means to execute a comparison of the cases, and a theoretical  lens through which to view them.   These will now be discussed  in  sequence.      The  comparison  of  the  cases  will  be  done  via  two contrasting  cases.    The  first  case,  that  of  the  US,  will  serve  as  context  for  the extended discussion that follows of the case of the United Kingdom.  While the US case primarily focuses on historical texts, the UK case will combine historical texts, qualitative data and quantitative analysis. 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The  research  question  will  finally  be  answered  by  analysing  these  contrasting cases  in the context of the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2.  It will use the notion of a ‘boundary object’ as a means by which to suggest that different theoretical framings may provide different explanations or results.  
3.2.1 Research design: Multiple cases In  order  to  produce  theoretically  and  empirically  sound  insights  into  the comparative  role  of  policy  in  the  VC  sectors  of  the  UK  and  US,  a  basis must  be established for the context of the comparison. The research question adopted for this thesis focuses on the examination of two empirical cases, the UK and US, and we first seek to draw a comparison of these. The focus on the role of policy in the emergence of these national cases necessitates the use of an historical approach to the initial aspect of the research question.   If  the  main  units  of  analysis  are  national  sectors,  there  are  a  range  of  other institutional variables that impact a sector and whose impact must be considered, including (among many others)  firms,  financial  institutions, systems of corporate governance, and stock markets, not to mention path‐dependent historical factors. In light of this it becomes clear that the unit of analysis is inexorably linked with a sizeable  number  of  other  variables.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  determine  the boundary  between  the  phenomenon  we  seek  to  measure  (impact  of  policy  on development of VC) and the external context. In light of this it  is  ideal to utilise a case  study  methodology  (Yin  1994  p.  16).  This  approach  allows  researchers  to utilise  multiple  levels  of  analysis  to  examine  a  given  topic.  Consequently  this approach also gives significant flexibility in research method, which will allow for a more  nuanced  approach  to  understanding  the  impact  of  factors  such  as  those discussed above (Bassey 2001 p. 7). Beyond  this, an embedded approach of case study methodology allows  the examination of multiple  sub‐units of  analysis  (Yin 1994, 41‐2), for instance the three types of relationships (VCs and firms; VCs and funders;  and VC‐backed  firms  and markets  for  exit)  in which  venture  capitalists engage, as discussed in Section 2.3. 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Given  the  comparative  nature  of  the  research  question,  a  multiple  case  study approach  is  particularly  appropriate  (and  not  only  because  multiple  cases  are generally regarded as being more robust than single case studies, see Herriott and Firestone  1983).  By  adopting  a  multiple‐case  study  of  the  emergence  of  the  VC sector  in  two  national  economies,  the  thesis will  seek  to  generate  a  comparison that will facilitate a comparison wherein the contrasting results may be explained by theory (described by Yin (1994 p. 46) as theoretical replication).   With  the  adoption  of  a  multiple  case  method,  it  then  becomes  important  to consider the relative theoretical positioning of these two cases in relation to each other.  Eisenhardt  and  Graebner  (2007  p.  27)  identify  this  as  the  issue  of ‘theoretical  sampling’.   The position of  the  two cases  in  this  thesis  is particularly relevant  as  direct  comparisons  are  necessarily  difficult  due  to  the  range  and intangibility of variables discussed above.  As discussed in section 2.6.1, there is an ongoing  debate  about  whether  the  case  of  the  successful  US  VC  sector  can necessarily be extrapolated  to other national  contexts.     Beyond  this debate,  it  is clear  that policymaking  in  countries outside  the US  is done  in  the  context of  the success of US in this area, which has been extraordinarily well‐documented.  Given these facts, the model of theoretical sampling employed in this thesis will use the US as a contextual case; while the case of the US is not itself the focus for collection of  empirical  data,  an  understanding  of  the  development  of  the  US  VC  sector provides  the  context  required  to  understand  the  subsequent  case  and  analysis. From here,  the  case  of  the US may  be  used  to  contrast with  the  vastly  different outcomes seen in the UK, which is the main focus of empirical data collection.  This model,  of  the  contextual  case  informing  the main  case  for  empirical  data,  is  line with  Flyvberg’s  (2006)  discussion  of  the  importance  of  context‐dependent knowledge  in  cases;  policymakers  in  the  UK  have  operated  in  the  context  of  US success,  and  therefore  in  order  to  understand  the  development  of  UK  policy we must also be aware of this key contextual factor.  In order to develop a clear understanding of the role of policy in the development of  the  UK  venture  capital  sector,  a  detailed  approach  must  be  taken.    A  purely qualitative  approach  may  provide  some  insights,  but  the  use  of  quantitative 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techniques  has  the  potential  to  support  and  validate  assertions  made  in  the qualitative  analysis.    However  this  method  is  not  without  challenges.    The following subsection will discuss the implementation of a mixed‐method design for the case of the UK.  
3.2.1.1 Research design: Mixed­method cases  While  the  initial  contextual  case  of  the  US will  largely  be  drawn  from  historical sources, the discussion of the case of the UK will draw upon both qualitative and quantitative  techniques.  In  this  case  Cresswell’s  (2003  p.  215)  discussion  of  the qualitative sequential mixed method approach is employed as a general template. In  this  case,  quantitative  methods  are  used  to  provide  empirical  evidence  for assertions  drawn  from  quantitative  data,  rather  than  to  generate  the  results themselves.  This  therefore  allows  us  to  use  quantitative  techniques  to  support broader, more qualitative assertions that quantitative methods alone might not be able  to  provide  (or  that  qualitative  methods  might  not  be  able  to  adequately support).  For this thesis, the initial conclusions regarding the UK will be supplemented with quantitative  material  on  the  distribution  and  performance  of  UK  government‐backed schemes to support investment in small firms. The complete dataset of all investments  made  by  the  Venture  Capital  Trust  scheme  and  an  accompanying dataset  of  investments  made  by  approximately  six  other  schemes  will  provide empirical  support  for  the  qualitative  assertions made  about  the  role  of  policy  in shaping the UK VC sector. They will also further provide an empirical  foundation for the theoretical interpretation of the data.  
3.2.2 Research design: Theoretical interpretation Given  the  desire  to  adopt  a  theoretical  replication  approach  (as  discussed  in Section 3.2.1),  in which  theories are used  to explain differences  in outcomes,  the thesis follows Nelson and Winter’s appreciative theorising model (1982, p. 46). In doing  this we use  a  realist  perspective,  using  theory  as  a  “tool  of  inquiry”  (ibid) 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that may be used  to  further our examination6. Given  the  theoretical perspectives informing  the  investigation,  a more  appreciative  approach  is more  useful  in  this case, allowing us to use empirical data to inform theory (Balmer 1993 p. 55).  As discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, this thesis seeks to compare the ability of two contrasting  theoretical  frameworks  of  principal‐agent  and  evolutionary perspectives to explain the role of policy in the VC sector. Given the complexity of the data associated with these types of questions, the thesis uses a transformative approach to examination of empirical data (Cresswell 2003 p. 212) nested within the context of the multiple‐case study approach. This approach in its typical form uses  a  theoretical  lens  in  the  interpretation  of  qualitative  and  quantitative  data (see Benbasat et al 1987) that informs the analysis. However in this case we seek to  compare  the  explanatory  abilities  of  two  theories,  seeking  to  understand  the strengths and weaknesses of both in explaining the empirical outcomes seen and discussed above.   The  interpretation  of  the  empirical  cases  in  light  of  the  theoretical  perspectives will also be driven by the notion of the ‘boundary object’ (see Star and Griesemer 1989).  The  concept  comes  from  sociology,  and  refers  to  commonly  constructed ideas that individual actors acknowledge and act around, but which may be given different meanings by different actors. In the words of Star and Griesemer:   “Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs  and  constraints  of  the  parties  employing  them,  yet  robust  enough  to maintain  a  common  identity  across  sites.  They  are  weakly  structured  in common use, and become strong structured in individual‐site use… They have different meanings  in  different  social  worlds  but  their  structure  is  common enough  to  more  than  one  world  to  make  the  recognisable  means  of translation” (ibid p. 393).  This framework will be applied to the case of the UK, specifically in relation to the existence of ‘equity gap’ facing small firms. Chapters 5 and 7 will propose that the equity gap has served as a boundary object upon which actors and policymakers                                                         6 This  is  in contrast  to a  ‘grounded theory’ approach, as  in which  the research  is seen  to have no preconceptions guiding research at all,  and  the empirics  then drive  the building of a  theory  from the ground up (see Strauss and Corbin 1998) 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have mapped their own understandings of venture capital and small firm finance. If one accepts that there are theoretical perspectives that inform interpretations of the funding gap (and which subsequently  inform the publicly‐stated rationale for policies), then the thesis argues that changing theoretical perspectives (i.e. framing the issue from an evolutionary rather than principal‐agent perspective) will result in  crucially  different  interpretations  of  the  areas  of  policy  to  be  addressed.  Further, it argues that the interpretations from one perspective may not be easily replicated by another.   
3.3  Case selection and the venture capital sectors of the US and UK  The research question focuses on the venture capital sectors of the US and UK, but the selection of VC and these national cases was driven by their unique capacity for providing  insights  about  the  relationship  between  policy,  small  firms  and innovation. The following subsections describe the rationales for selection of these sectors to be parts of the research question.  
3.3.1 Selection of venture capital as a sector for study The decision to focus on VC drew upon a number of unique factors that make it an interesting  area  for  the  study  of  policy.  First,  venture  capital  represents  an intriguing perspective on innovative firms in that its success as a sector is linked to innovation (as VC is most well‐known for backing technology‐based firms), but the sector  itself  does  not  directly  harness  technology.  In  other  words,  while  its presence  and  success  may  be  interpreted  as  a  loose  proxy  for  ‘innovativeness’ (however one chooses to define that term) in an economy, competitive advantage in  the VC sector  is not necessarily directly derived  from any  technical advantage held by VCs themselves. This means that issues such as national science output and R&D  are  less  of  a  factor  for  the  VC  sector  than  they  would  be  for  a  more technology‐based sector.  Secondly, the decision to focus on VC may be characterised by the nature of assets within VC as an organisational form. Provision of capital by VCs is important, but apart  from  finance  the  remainder  of  the  assets  present  in  the  VC  sector  are 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intangible. This makes direct comparisons of the sector more difficult because the actual  investment  process  itself  becomes  more  inscrutable.  Because  of  this  it makes  the  area  amenable  to  a  theoretically‐informed analysis;  indeed one might argue  that  given  the  intangibility  of  the  topic  some  element  of  theoretical interpretation is virtually required. This would make the analysis contained within this thesis even more relevant.   Thirdly, venture capital makes an appealing area  for  further study because of  its high profile as a complex yet universal problem. The success of many VC‐backed companies  has  made  it  a  priority  for  governments  and  the  topic  has  received significant attention in media and policy circles. Its prominence makes it easier to find materials and coverage of the sector, and its high profile means that there are also  a  range  of  perspectives  from  different  stakeholders  that  are  available  that might  have  not  been  available  for  less  prominent  (or  ‘sexy’)  policy  areas.  These perspectives  reflect  a  range  of  implicit  theoretical  interpretations,  enabling  the addressing and answering of the research question.  
3.3.2 Selection of the US and UK as cases After adopting VC as the sector to be studied, finding suitable cases of VC sectors is the  next  priority.  In  this  situation  theoretical  replication  becomes  particularly important.  Given  that we  are  seeking  situations  that  produce  contrasting  results but  for  predictable  reasons  (Yin  1994  p.  46),  the  national  cases  used  must  be similar with significant national comparability.  If  we  seek  to  analyse  the  emergence  of  domestic  VC  sectors,  there  is  a  strong argument to include the US as one case. Given its  large size and disproportionate success, its success, and especially that of Silicon Valley, has largely been sought to be emulated worldwide. There exists a rich body of literature discussing the US VC sector,  again  due  in  large  part  to  its  prominence.  Given  this,  its  history  and definitive  role  in  the  creation of many of  the  largest VC‐backed  firms,  the US VC sector makes a very useful benchmark for the analysis of another sector that has followed a different path. 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Given  these  conditions  and  circumstances,  the  UK  is  a  good  complement  to  the case of the US. The two nations share a common language and similar culture, and both have a market‐oriented system of capitalism. They are widely considered by scholars  in  the  comparative  political  economy  literature  to  represent  a  common ‘Anglo‐Saxon’ form of capitalism (see Hall and Soskice 2002, Albert 1991). Beyond these similarities, the VC sector of the UK is recognised as being one of the largest, if not the largest, in Europe (see Jeng and Wells 2000), with this success attributed to its similarity to the US system (Black and Gilson 1998). The long history of the UK small firm investment sector is also useful for making contrasts with the case of the US. In addition to these theoretical factors for the UK, there are logistical and practical issues as well, especially considering proximity to the topic and resources required to study the area.  There are a number of other nations that could then be selected for a second case that  have  been  rejected.  Japan  and  Germany,  despite  large  economies,  have economies with very different structures and financial institutions, that make them unsuitable for consideration. Most other continental European economies may be disqualified  for  the  same  reason  (although  the  VC  sector  has  been  successful  in countries  such as Finland,  see Lumme et al 1998, Ali‐Yrkko 2001). Australia and New  Zealand,  despite  generally  common  economic  structures,  have  relatively small VC sectors, and there are issues with proximity and access to data. Israel and Canada are also similar to the US and have flourishing sectors. However  in many cases their sectors may be judged as ‘too close’ to the US in that they have relied on US markets  (namely  NASDAQ)  for  exit  rather  than  their  own  domestic  markets (see  Avnimelech  and  Teubal  2006  and  Cumming  2002,  respectively),  which  are smaller than those of  the US and UK. For both of  these cases access and distance would be issues inhibiting further study.  
 50 
3.4  Operationalising hypotheses and data collection  Analysis  of  entire  sectors,  particularly  those  as  large  and  complicated  as  the venture  capital, may be difficult,  so  an operational  framework  for  examining  the cases  in  this  thesis will  prove  useful  for  structuring  our  analysis.  Several  of  the broad overviews (see Gompers and Lerner 2002, Florida and Kenney 1987 p. 36) of the VC literature have framed the venture capital process in terms of a ‘cycle’ in which VCs  raise  funds  that  they  invest  into  firms, which  are  then harvested  and returned  to  investors,  followed  by  the  VCs  raising  more  funds.  This  approach provides  a  useful  heuristic  for  understanding  the  broad  dynamics  of  the  cycle itself,  but  is  perhaps  not  the most  useful method  for  analysing  the  success  of  a national sector. A cyclical approach considers the elements that lead to growth, but does not necessarily break those elements into their constitutive parts (especially in a comparative case, when one or more element may be weaker than others). It also does not easily enable an analysis of the dynamics of the markets that impact particular elements of the ‘cycle’.  Instead this thesis will base its analysis on a framework suggested in Zider 2000 p. 135 and Mason and Harrison 2002 p.  430  (and also used as  a  framing device  in Gompers and Lerner 2002) examining venture capital in terms of the relationships venture capitalists engage in. These sub‐areas of research include the relationship between  VCs  and  the  firms  they  fund  (including  selection  and  structuring  of  VC deals); between VCs and the  institutional  investors who back them; and between firms  and  the  markets  for  investment  exit.  These  three  areas,  in  addition  to discussions of capabilities and value addition (some of which are part of the firm‐VC relationship), will be discussed in relation to both cases.  The analysis of these areas will draw from a range of sources, as discussed below:  
3.4.1 Historical sources – United States The sources used in the discussion of the US sector include a number of histories of aspects relating to the sector. Reiner’s (1989) doctoral thesis is an excellent and in many ways authoritative history of the early stages of VC in the US, and other first 
 51 
person  accounts,  such  as  Hambrecht  (1984)  and  Livingston  (2007),  and  others have proved useful. Other histories  including Ingebretsen (2002), Wilson (1985), Geisst (1997) and others were used as well.  In  some  cases  policy  and  other  original  documents  have  also  informed  the examination  of  the  case  of  the  US.  These  were  in  some  cases  obtained  from government departments or otherwise from libraries. Additional library work for collection  and  analysis  of  policy  documents  was  carried  out  at  the  Library  of Congress  in  Washington  DC  and  the  Stirling  Evans  Library  at  Texas  A&M University.   The discussion of the US sector also involved analysis and incorporation of existing scholarly  literature on  the  topic. The US VC sector has been very widely studied, and as such the  literature surrounding the topic  is deep and wide. The review of the  literature  began with  readings  of  some  of  the  key  authors  on  the US  sector, especially  Josh  Lerner  and  Paul  Gompers,  and  radiated  out  as  further  dynamics were explored. Tools such as Web of Science, ISI and Google Scholar were used to identify key contributions to the literature.  
3.4.2 Historical data collection ­ UK The UK VC sector has been well‐studied but considerably less extensively than that of  the  US.    Given  the  particular  importance  of  historical  data  for  judging  the comparability of the two sets of theories discussed in the Chapter 2, great attention was paid to the collection of a wide range of sources.  Several existing histories of  the UK’s system of  finance  for small  firms, especially during the period around the Macmillan Gap, were useful in informing the analysis. These include Lonsdale (1997) and Thomas (1978). Coopey and Clark (1995) was especially helpful in that it is two texts in one: the first half is a history of ICFC/3i, while  the  second half  is  a  personal  perspective  on  the  history  and nature  of  the organisation from a past CFO. 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While histories were helpful for forming context, original documentation was used wherever  possible  to  fill  out  and  provide  useful  contextual  information.  These documents were obtained from a number of libraries and other reference sources, including  the  British  Library,  LSE  Library,  Cass  Business  School  Library  and Guildhall, all in London; the Financial Services Authority; the National Archives at Kew; the University of Brighton Library; the University of Sussex Library; and the Keith Pavitt Library at SPRU. From these sources a range of original historical and policy  documents  were  collected.  In  addition  they  provided  the  basis  for  an extensive examination of the financial media over the past thirty years, which has also  proved  quite  helpful.  Historical  archives  of  broadsheets  including  the 
Financial  Times,  The  Times,  The  Guardian,  The  Daily  Telegraph  and  The 
Independent,  as well  as  other  business‐oriented  periodicals  such  as Director and 
The Economist, provided period perspectives on the success and emergence of the VC  sector.  In  addition  annual  reports  and  securities  filings  of  relevant  firms  and organisations were examined in some cases.  The historical  analysis  also  included  extensive  examination of  policy documents, with  particular  reference  to  documents  relating  to  small  firm  policy  since  1979. While  useful  histories,  for  instance Lonsdale  (1997) provided  guidance  to policy documents and issues between 1979 and the early 1990s, a gap was identified in the  history  of  policy  from  the  mid  1990s  to  the  present.  Therefore  a  range  of documents from this recent period were collected from government agencies and other  stakeholders,  including  the  DTI  (and  later  BERR,  DIUS  and  BIS);  HM Treasury;  the  Bank  of  England;  Lords  Select  Committees;  the  London  Stock Exchange; the Royal Society; the Confederation of British Industry; the Federation of Small Businesses; and others.  In addition, a number of interviews were carried out to provide background to the insights  being  generated  from  the  historical  examination.  These  were  less systematic  than  opportunistic,  designed  to  fill  gaps  in  knowledge  and  provide contextual understanding to inform the history being discussed.   
 53 
3.4.3 Empirical data collection ­ UK As discussed above,  there are benefits to historical analysis on its own, but there are also great merits in the incorporation of new empirical data, especially in the generation  of  policy‐relevant  results.  Therefore  several  forms  of  empirical  data were collected.   The main  empirical  contribution  comes  in  the  form of  two  proprietary  datasets. The first dataset was hand‐collected by the author for the purposes of the thesis. It focuses on the investments made under the Venture Capital Trust scheme. Under the  establishing  rules  of  the  VCT  scheme,  all  trusts  participating  in  the  scheme must be listed on the London Stock Exchange. On this basis, securities filings were accessed  via  the  Financial  Services  Authority  and  augmented with  the  Thomson One  Banker  database.  This  allowed  the  creation  of  a  database  containing  every investment  made  by  every  venture  capital  trust  from  1995  to  early  2006.  The dataset was  cross‐referenced with  the  Trustnet  database  (www.trustnet.com)  to ensure completeness. Full details of the collection of this dataset and those below are discussed in Chapter 6.  The second dataset was collected as part of a project discussed in Nightingale et al (2009). This dataset used the commercial Library House database as the basis for an  analysis  of  policy  interventions  made  largely  since  1998.  It  includes investments  made  by  Regional  Venture  Capital  Funds,  Early  Growth  Funds, University  Challenge  Funds,  Enterprise  Capital  Funds,  and  regional  schemes  for Scotland, Wales  and Northern  Ireland.  These  investments were  cross‐referenced with documentation from the original funds to ensure validity. The dataset used in this analysis also includes several variables that were not used in the Nightingale et  al  (2009)  study,  and  includes  some  cases  that were  not  included,  including  a number of Northern Irish firms.   These two datasets were finally combined to provide a single dataset examining all UK  government‐backed  investments  in  these VC‐style  schemes  since  1995.  They were  then  analysed  to  provide  insights  on  the  impact  of  changing  government models of finance. 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4.1  Introduction  The  previous  chapters  have  presented  the  background  and  framework  for  the research  question  in  this  thesis,  as  well  as  the  means  and  research  method  by which  they  will  be  operationalised.  This  chapter  provides  a  discussion  of  the emergence  and  success  of  the  US  VC  sector,  which  will  provide  context  for  the subsequent discussion of the case of the UK. Primarily using existing literature,  it will  argue  that  extensive government  intervention and  local  coordination helped support  the  emergence  of  the  VC  sector,  although  the  US  government  has  been more  inclined  to  support  supply  and  demand  for  capital,  rather  than  directly intervening  in  the market  for  VC The  chapter  then  presents  a  capabilities‐based perspective  that  may  give  a  more  nuanced  and  useful  explanation  of  the  US sector’s  success,    and  identifying specific  industry  level dynamic capabilities  that have been important to the success of the US sector.   The chapter begins by presenting a brief history of the US VC sector in Section 4.2. It  then discusses  the  importance of network effects  in driving demand  in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses institutional factors affecting the market for exit. Section 4.5 provides an overview of US government interventions in support of the US VC sector. Section 4.6 identifies and discusses several dynamic capabilities (as well as routines  or  non‐dynamic  capabilities)  that  have  driven  the  success  of  the  US sector. Section 4.7 summarises and concludes the chapter.  
4.2  The US venture capital sector: A brief history  It is tempting, and indeed quite common, to view the venture capital sector of the US as a single, monolithic entity revolving around Silicon Valley.  However we also know that US VC is also heavily concentrated in regions, including but not limited to Silicon Valley in northern California and the Route 128 region near Boston.  This section will discuss the emergence of the VC sectors in these cases, arguing that VC, 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as an organisational  form, did not but was the result of different sets of  iterative learning  processes  by  early  venture  capitalists.    This,  combined  with  path dependent  issues  and  regional  effects,  mean  that  the  concept  of  a  ‘US  venture capital  sector’  is more  of  an  aggregation  of  several  regional  subsectors  than  any one coherent industry.   
4.2.1  The  first  venture  capitalists:  AR&D  and  the  emergence  of  VC  as  an 
organisational form The period during and the decade immediately following the Great Depression had a  significant  impact  on  the development of  the market  for  risk  capital  in  the US. The  stock  market  crash  of  1929  had  in  part  been  due  to  speculation  regarding technology stocks, resulting in a backlash against technology investments (Hsu and Kenney 2005 p. 4). These economic struggles came at a  time when the nature of investment  and  wealth  was  changing  and  professionalising.  The  introduction  of financial  and  tax  reform  as  part  of  the  New  Deal  taxed  corporate  profits  and introduced  progressive  taxation  for  the  wealthiest  Americans  (Reiner  1991,  p. 196). At the same time the emergence of investment trusts (now known as mutual funds)  had  resulted  in more  private  funds  being  professionally managed,  which resulted in greater focus on blue chip stocks and avoidance of riskier investments (Geisst 1997 p. 184‐185). This resulted in concerns about the future of US national economic competitiveness, as expressed by the  investment banker Jean Witter  in 1939:  “No  one  in  the  high  income  tax  brackets  is  going  to  provide  the  venture capital  and  take  the  risk  which  new  enterprisers  and  expansions  require,  and thereby  help  create  new  jobs,  if  heavy  taxes  take  most  of  the  profit  when  the transaction is successful” (Reiner 1991, p. 201).  The situation in New England during this time was particularly bleak. Employment in  textiles  and  manufacturing  fell  by  more  than  75%  from  1919  to  1940  as Midwestern  economies  surpassed  New  England  by  exploiting  new  modern technologies  to  manufacture  industrial  goods  (Lazonick  1991,  p.34‐36).    Efforts had  been  made  in  New  England  to  address  the  issue  of  innovation  and competitiveness  in  the  past.  Local  efforts  had  included  a  Boston  Chamber  of Commerce‐backed industrial development corporation in 1911 and the creation of the New England Council (NEC), which had concluded that long‐term equity capital 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was required for small firms to grow and succeed (Hsu and Kenney 2005 p. 8‐10). In 1939  it  established a  committee  that  sketched out  the  initial  outlines of what would become the venture capital business model (ibid). This resulted  in several attempts  to  create  different  businesses  around  this  model,  including  the  New England Industrial Development Corporation (NEIDC), which was based on firms paying to be evaluated and considered for funding; and New Enterprises Inc, which provided  potential  angel  investors  with  information  about  small  firms  (Reiner 1991 p. 208). None of these schemes were successful.  More  successful  was  the  effort  of  a  group  of  prominent  Bostonian  businessmen and  academics  (including  General  Georges  S.  Doriot  of  Harvard  Business  School and Karl T.  Compton,  president  of MIT)  to  create  a  new  type of  firm  that would make  investments  rather  than simply  identify worthy  firms  (Florida and Kenney 1987a  p.  132).  When  they  launched  American  Research  &  Development Corporation  (AR&D)  in 1946,  they  claimed  they were not  simply  starting  a  firm, but an entire  industry (Hsu and Kenney 2005 p. 10). Their effort was driven not simply by a profit motive but also by a philosophical drive to eschew more high‐profile, profitable investments to support small firms (ibid p. 16‐20).  AR&D was organised as a traditional company, with shareholders and expectations of dividends (Reiner 1989 p. 179). In order to avoid the recently tightened US rules on  investments  trusts, AR&D was required by  the SEC  to  find minimum levels of institutional  investment  (ibid  p.  175).  With  a  stated  goal  of  raising  $5m  and  a minimum of $3 million,  the company only raised  just over $3.5m, primarily  from life insurance companies, investment trusts, and university endowments (Hsu and Kenney 2005 p 12‐13).  The  demands  of  shareholders  and  dividends meant  that  AR&D’s  first  few  years were  turbulent  as  it  struggled  to  return  a  dividend  to  its  shareholders  (Reiner 1989 p. 179), AR&D began to focus more on early stage firms and more technology and especially computing and information technology. Its most famed investment, in  Digital  Equipment  Corporation,  or  DEC,  skewed  AR&D’s  performance significantly when an initial investment of $70,000 in 1957 became a final gain of 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$355 million in 1971 when the stock was finally distributed (Gompers and Lerner 2001 p. 146). The significant gains from the DEC investment meant that AR&D was able to show strong returns, thus validating the business model.  With the VC business model validated, other Boston financial institutions began to join the VC market in the early 1960 (Wilson 1985 p. 33‐4). The emergence of the limited  partnership  (LP)  form  in  1959  (Lerner  et  al  1998  p.  152)  allowed  these problems seen in AR&D to be better addressed by giving GPs control without the demands of  regular  dividends.  It  also  solved  a  problem of  compensation,  in  that the Investment Company Act of 1940 mandated that managers of publicly traded investment  companies  (including  VC  and  SBICs)  could  not  receive  any  form  of performance‐based compensation (Liles 1977 p. 73‐82). This incentive had led to an  exodus of AR&D staff  to  rival  firms  that  could offer  compensation  that AR&D could not. (see Kenney and Florida 2000 p. 132‐3).   
4.2.2 Silicon Valley and the emergence of critical mass in California Parallel to the development of AR&D and the new firms in the Boston area, another cluster was emerging  in California. The  state had greatly benefited  from defence industries during the Second World War, but there were concerns that the region would slide back into recession or depression once the war ended (Markusen et al 1991).  Initial  reports  (see Wendt 1947 p.  43)  found  that  investors had difficulty purchasing equity shares  in  technology  firms because  firms  like Hewlett‐Packard were reinvesting their earnings and not taking any equity investment at all. In this period  groups  of  investors  began  to  form,  initially  making  investments  for reconversion activities (Reiner 1989 p. 205) but later increasingly in the new small technology‐based firms that were beginning to emerge in the area.  The  success  of  Hewlett‐Packard  and  other  firms  such  as  Ampex  and  Raychem established  to  investors  that  Californian  technology  firms  could  be  profitable (Bowes,  quoted  in  Reiner  1989  p.  228‐9).  Despite  this,  investment  in  the  area remained largely  informal. The introduction of the SBIC scheme (see Section 4.6) began  the process of  formalisation of  these  links as  informal groups of  investors began to form or join SBICs (Florida and Kenney 2000 p. 107). 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Perhaps  the defining moment  in  the burgeoning history of Silicon Valley was  the formation  of  Fairchild  Semiconductor  in  1957. Displeased  by  the workplace  and management at Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories, eight Shockley staff left the firm to start their own business (Lecuyer 2001 p. 666‐672). Drawing funding from a New York  investment bank  (whose manager of  the deal, Arthur Rock,  founded the first Silicon Valley partnership in 1961, ibid p. 182), Fairchild took up contracts to  produce  electronics  for  the  B‐70  bomber  project  (Lecuyer  2000  p.  168)  and became a  significant  success. However Fairchild’s  founders  learned  the  lesson of the  importance  of  equity  and  control  rights  as,  once  the  firm  began  to  reach  its growth  targets,  a  clause  in  their  contract  with  their  parent  company  allowed Fairchild  Camera  to  purchase  the  owners’  shares  at  a  low  price  (ibid  p.  170). Disenchanted by the experience several of the founders left the firm to found their own companies. These  ‘Fairchildren’ went on  to  found  several  key Silicon Valley firms and institutions,  including Intel (Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore), Amelco (Jean Hoerni, Sheldon Roberts and Jay Last), and the venture capital  firm Kleiner Perkins  (Eugene  Kleiner).  Beyond  this  they  proved  to  be  the  foundation  for  the networks that would later emerge in the sector.  Through the 1960s the VC sector began to grow and develop as it professionalised. More  firms  dropped  the  SBIC  business  model  and  became  limited  partnerships (LPs) (Fenn et al 1997 p. 13‐14). The sector was beginning to flourish, producing good  returns  as  exits  became more plentiful.  Following  the Fairchild  experience, VCs  began  to  develop  the  models  and  incentive  structures  to  ensure  that entrepreneurs would  be  able  to  retain  equity  stakes  in  their  firms  (Kenney  and Florida  2000  p.  111).  Entrepreneurs  who  had  founded  firms,  such  as  Eugene Kleiner, also began to establish their own VC firms, using their own experience as a means to assess and add value to investments.  By 1969, riding the highly buoyant IPO market7, VC LPs raised $171m, and as the sector professionalised around the LP model, the National Venture Capital Association was formed in 1973 (Fenn et al 1997 p. 14‐15).                                                         7 Ibbotson et al (1988) note that in 1969 there 548 IPOs raising $5m or less; from 1973‐1975 there were only 81. 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As the sector began to professionalise and grow, in 1974 another hurdle emerged as Congress enacted a new law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, covering pension fund management, banning fund managers from investing in funding opportunities that a ‘prudent man’ would find too risky (see Gompers et al 1998 for a more in‐depth discussion). Managers of pension funds were banned from investing in venture capital or other high‐risk assets, and those who violated the provision became personally  liable  for any resulting  losses. This was of great concern  to  the VC  industry, where  the newly‐formed NVCA  lobbied  intensely  for the passage to be relaxed (Lazonick 2008 p. 11). The resulting change in the ERISA laws, and the fight against subsequent proposed changes a few years later, created an enormous market for the high‐risk, high‐reward services that VCs offered.   
4.2.3 The VC sector in a post­ERISA world With  the  ERISA  policy  changes,  the  nature  and  composition  of  the  VC  industry began to shift rapidly. Whereas family investors had made up 32.2% of the funds provided  to  the  sector  in 1978, by 1984  they made up 13.4%. At  the  same  time, pension  funds rose  from 14.8% to 35.5% of  the  investment  (Florida and Kenney 1987a). Venture capital fundraising grew enormously with the change of the ERISA rule. Whereas 1978 saw VCs raise around $200 million, by 1982 that number had jumped to well over $7 billion (ibid). This enormous expansion of funds available for  investment  distorted  the  market  in  two  ways:  first  in  terms  of  the  time horizons for investment, and secondly in terms of capital available.  While the VC sector grew significantly, LPs began to form with the aim of executing equity  deals  explicitly  for  non‐venture  funding  opportunities.  This  period  of sectoral  transformation  led  to  the  divergence  of  the  sector  into  two  forms, identified  by  Bygrave  and  Timmons  (1992,  p.  31)  as  “classic”  and  “merchant” venture  capital.    “Classic”  VC  was  the  traditional,  small‐firm  focused  practice  of investing in firms with the potential for exceptional growth, as had been developed by  AR&D  and  the  founding  fathers  of  Silicon  Valley.    “Merchant”  VC  focused  on asset‐based  and  lower‐risk  ventures,  and  tended  to  make  deals  involving management buy‐outs  (MBOs, widely  known at  the  time  as  leveraged buy‐outs), 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management buy‐ins (MBIs) and other variations.   The potential  for high returns with lower risk in this “merchant” model of VC soon became apparent to investors, and it quickly superseded the “classic” VC sector. The single partnership raised in 1987  by Kohlberg,  Kravis  and Roberts,  at  $5.6bn, was  almost  twice  the  $3.97bn raised  by  the  entire  VC  sector  in  the  same  year  (Fenn  et  al  p.  22‐24).  Gompers (1994)  shows  that  from  1980  to  1988,  seed  and  start  up  investments  dropped from 25% of total investments to 12.5%, while leveraged buyouts rose from 0% to 20%.    Despite the growth of the “merchant” VC sector, there was also substantial growth in  the amount of  funds  flowing  into  “classic” VCs as well.   The  result of  this was heavily  distorted  competition  within  the  sectors  receiving  VC  investment.  Consequently this created gluts of  funding that were beyond what the number of firms on  the market could bear,  leading  to underwhelming returns. Sahlman and Stevenson  (1986) describe  the  role  of  venture  capitalists  in  the Winchester  disk drive  industry,  into which  VCs  invested  $400 million.  This  resulted  in  a  bubble, with twelve publicly traded disk drive firms with a combined market value of $5.4 billion and a price‐per‐earnings ratio of almost 50. Unsurprisingly, the bubble soon collapsed  and  intense  competition  among  those  that  survived  led  to  a  98% decrease  in  income  (ibid  p.  22).  This  bubble  phenomenon  was  repeated  most famously  in  the  cycle  from  1998‐2001  when  the  sector  reached  an  incredible bubble, as documented in Lerner (2002).  
4.2.4 Models of VC in the US: Beyond Silicon Valley The  growth  and  increasing  professionalisation  of  the  US  venture  capital  sector discussed above saw it transition from a handful of disparate investors into a large, highly capitalised and politically organised sector.  However it would be fallacious to assume that the story of Silicon Valley is synonymous with the rest of the sector.  Venture  capital  in  the  US  has  been  and  indeed  remains  highly  regionalised  (see Powell  et  al  2002).    While  the  ‘US  VC  sector’  is  widely  characterised  as  being particularly dynamic and successful, in many cases the dynamism attributed to the US sector as a whole actually relates to a generalisation of the case of Silicon Valley 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to the entire national sector.  However it is not necessarily accurate to characterise the dynamism seen in Silicon Valley as ubiquitous throughout the US sector.    There  is,  in  fact,  evidence  of  considerable  heterogeneity  among  the  sector.    For instance Route 128 has been argued controversially  to have a different model of VC  by  Saxenian  (1994).    In  her  study  of  Silicon  Valley  and  Route  128,  Saxenian identifies  a  culture  of  conservatism  and  risk  aversion  in  the  Boston  area, exacerbated by older and less technically knowledgeable investors (ibid p. 64), and a  “[lack of]  internal cohesion or strong  ties  to  local  industry”  (ibid p. 65‐66).   By contrast, these were strong in Silicon Valley, which fuelled the highly fluid labour markets  discussed  in  the  next  section.      The  conservative  business  culture  in Boston  has  been  argued  to  lead  to  a  phenomenon  identified  in Owen‐Smith  and Powell  (2005)  and Porter  et  al  (2005) where biotechnology  firms  in Boston will target  known and  identifiable markets, while  Silicon Valley  firms will  “swing  for the  fences”    (ibid  p.  263).      Similar  variation  between  the  Boston  and  northern California models of VC and firm support have been discussed in Bresnahan et al (2001) and Owen‐Smith and Powell (2004).  Beyond the most commonly studied sectors in California and Boston, Florida and Kenney  (1987a)  and  Powell  et  al  (2002)  discuss  other  regional  VC  centres, including  those  in  Chicago  and  Texas,  which  have  thrived  while  largely  serving local needs. For  instance,  the Chicago sector was  largely driven by  funds directly linked to financial institutions such as Allstate Insurance and First National Bank of Chicago, rather than independent outfits, which impacted the investment patterns in  VC  in  the  area  (see  Bylinsky  1976  p.  26‐7).    Relatively  little  is  known  about specific  differences  in  practice  in  these  non‐Silicon  Valley  or  Route  128  VCs, however the limited evidence available implies that their operations are impacted by considerably different organisational contexts.   If  we  consider  these  variations,  the  extent  of  which  remains  rather  unclear (particularly given the tendency among academics to use VC data aggregated from across  the  US),  it  is  important  to  identify  what  is  meant  in  this  discussion  of venture capital in the US.  While VC in the US is most often identified with Silicon 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Valley,  it  is clear  that Silicon Valley does not represent  the entirety of  the sector.  However, given the widespread perception that the two are synonymous and this case’s contextual role in the broader study, further discussion will broadly focus on the  assumption  that  the  US  VC  sector  is  broadly  coherent,  taking  its  lead  from Silicon Valley and, to a lesser extent, Route 128.  This is fitting as much policy work in  the UK (and  in  the US) makes similar assumptions, although  it  is  important  to make clear that these assumptions are not truly reflective of the sector as a whole.  This section has discussed the extent to which the emergence of VC in both Boston and  Silicon  Valley  represented  a  co‐evolutionary,  incremental  process  involving not only VC but firms and policy.  It has also argued that regional variations make it difficult to identify a coherent US VC sector, and instead it uses a model based upon the broad perceptions of Silicon Valley and Route 128 as being representative.   In light of this framework, the next section will address networks, which have served as a key driver of the co‐evolutionary development of our understanding of VC in the US.   





4.3.1 Network effects on demand: Labour volatility VCs have also been able to extract value from networks via the fluid labour market in these areas. Whether due to technology (Carnoy and Castells 1998) or network effects  (Saxenian  1994  p.  54‐55),  labour  markets,  particularly  in  Silicon  Valley, have been noted for their fluidity. Key to this fluidity is a high velocity with which employees  move  among  firms,  creating  strong  network  effects  (Benner  2002). Saxenian (1998, p. 24‐8) discusses the role that informal social networks played in driving  learning  and  information  sharing  in  this  context.  These  very  flexible networks  meant  that,  in  the  words  of  one  engineer  “….it  wasn’t  that  big  a catastrophe to quit your job on Friday and have another job on Monday” (Hanson 1982,  quoted  in  Saxenian  1998  p.  26).  This  also  facilitated  the  willingness  of workers to take risks – if something didn’t work out they would just find another job  elsewhere  (McKenna  1989).  Further,  VCs  took  advantage  of  this  in  their personnel  policies,  using  their  existing  networks  to  identify  candidates  for employment (Greenwood and Steier 1995, Hellman and Puri 2000).   
4.3.2 Network effects on demand: Sector specificity Following from the original groups of firms and institutional relationships, effects of  sectoral  lineage have emerged. The effects of  lineage among  the employees of Fairchild Semiconductor – or  ‘Fairchildren’  –  are  significant. Castilla  et  al  (2001) perform  a  social  network  analysis  on  the  semiconductor  sector  in  Silicon  Valley and  find  empirical  results  that  support  this  assertion:  five  of  the  founders  of Fairchild each had more  than ten  links  to other  founders of semiconductor  firms (p.  226‐9).  These  initial  network  effects  have  led  to  a  strong  degree  of  sector specificity;  the  success  of  Silicon  Valley  and  Route  128  has  largely  come  in  a limited  number  of  sectors9,  namely  ICT  (see  Saxenian  1998)  and  biotechnology (Owen‐Smith and Powell 2004, Powell et al 2002). This is due in large parts to the benefits  of  sector  specialisation;  traditional  finance  theory,  which  tends  to overlook firm‐specific capabilities, would call for distribution of risks by investing in a range of sectors. But a number of studies, including Bygrave (1987, 1989) and                                                         9 More recently there has been evidence of increasing specialisation in ‘cleantech’ – low‐carbon or renewable energy technologies – but this area is thus far relatively unexplored. 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Norton  and  Tenenbaum  (1993),  have  found  that  for  VCs  intense  specialisation helps to better manage risks. This and other work (see Megginson 2002, Diller and Kaserer  2005,  Kaserer  and  Diller  2008)  suggest  that  knowledge  specialisation allows VCs to make better investments due to a clear understanding of the sector. This  specialisation allows networks  to maintain  flexibility, one of  the key  factors for  the  success of Silicon Valley, with  this division of  labour  further allowing  the sectors to survive external shocks to the market (Saxenian 1994).   
4.3.3 Network effects on demand: Universities The spillover impact of universities on clusters (and thus into networks) in these areas  has  been  widely  documented.  Gibbons  (2001  p.  213‐215)  identifies  three ways  in  which  universities  (in  Gibbons’s  case  Stanford)  support  networks:  by increasing technical advantage, educating entry‐level professionals, and providing continual  education. The development of  technical  advantage  is naturally helped by  the presence of multiple world‐class  universities  in  one  small  area  (Stanford, UC‐Berkeley and UCSF in Silicon Valley (see Jong 2006), and MIT and Harvard  in Boston  (see Etzkowitz 2002)).  In  this way  success begets  itself;  the high  level of investment by the US government into its science base (see Dosi et al 2007) comes to  be  directed more  toward  top  universities with  top  faculty  (Zucker  and Darby 1996). These  faculty members’ own entrepreneurial efforts (see Kenney and Goe 2004) add value to the firms in which they participate (Zucker et al 1997). Further, university graduates provide human capital  in  the  form of  recent graduates who are then recruited by local firms (Cohen and Fields 2000, p. 5). Universities further honed  those  links  by  involvement  in  the  sectors  themselves,  such  as  Stanford’s Honors Program in the 1970s, which allowed area engineers to study for advanced degrees at flexible hours10 (Saxenian 1994 p. 66‐7), creating closer links between the  university  and  industry,  and  bringing  university  research  closer  to commercialisation.                                                             10  Saxenian  (1994  p.  67)  relates  one  Xerox  executive’s  experience  giving  a  seminar  at  the  Xerox PARC  facility  that was widely  attended  by  Stanford  faculty. When  giving  a  seminar  at  the  Xerox facility near Boston, he found that no academics were present because they were not invited. 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4.3.4 Network effects on demand: VC and support activity participation Venture  capitalists,  given  their  key  position  within  the  broader  networks  (see Castilla et  al 2000), have developed skills  to  interact with and  take advantage of these  networks.  In  this  way  Florida  and  Kenney  (2000)  suggest  that  VC participation in networks, particularly within Silicon Valley, has driven demand for capital by virtue of their participation. This leads to a situation where VCs are co‐located with  the  firms  they back  (see  Lerner  1995a,  Stuart  and  Sorensen 2001), which  works  for  both  parties  because  the  firms  get  access  to  VCs  and  VCs centralise  their  operations  (although  Powell  et  al  2002  suggest  that  as  time  has progressed  and  funds  have  gotten  larger,  VCs  have  become  more  likely  to distribute  their  funds  in  other  clusters  as  well).  In  addition,  those  VCs who  are more networked  than  their  rivals  are more  likely  to  be  able  to  successfully  exit, even when one controls  for experience (Hochberg et al 2005);  this suggests  that, well‐connected but inexperienced VCs are more likely to be successful than more experienced  VCs with  fewer  connections.    In  this  way  they  are  able  to  leverage their  networks  to  accumulate  skills  in  the  organisation.  This  view has  also  been suggested in relation to syndication by Brander et al (2002).  Networks  were  further  developed  by  the  emergence  of  financing  and  other support  structures.  Seeley  Brown  and Duguid  (2000)  and Atwell  (2000)  discuss the  impact of shared communities of practice among these support bodies, citing accountants  in  particular.  Similar  importance  (although  with  rather  different conclusions)  is  found  for  the distribution of  resources among Silicon Valley  legal firms in Phillips (2003), and for commercial banks, consultants and other support roles in Kenney and von Burg (1999) and Dean (2000).   
4.4  US government involvement in the emergence of the VC sector  While  the US government has played a crucial  role  in  the development of  the VC sector,  its role has  in some ways been rather  inconspicuous. Rather than directly intervening  in  the  operations  of  the  VC  sector,  policies  have  generally  sought  to support  it  in more  indirect ways. This has been done using supply‐ and demand‐
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side policies, which have influenced the market but still allowed the VC sector itself to generally develop in a market‐driven, rather than government‐driven, manner.  
4.4.1 Supply­side policies supporting US VC: The SBIC’s two incarnations From  its  outset,  the  founders  of  ARD  and  the  early  East  Coast  VC  sector  had  a strong unity of ethic in its investment philosophy. Underlying the AR&D rationale for providing funds to industry was the desire to prevent government intervention in the sector (Reiner 1989 p. 342). However the growth of the sector had begun to stagnate by the late 1950s, and the threat of Sputnik led the VC industry (such as it was  at  the  time)  to  work  with  the  government  to  design  the  Small  Business Investment  Act  of  1958,  which  created  Small  Business  Investment  Companies (SBICs) (Fenn et al 1997 p. 11‐12), which allowed companies to match private with public  funds, and then deduct  losses against ordinary  income instead of counting them as capital losses (Reiner 1989 p. 279, 290‐306). The programme proliferated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, before tailing off in the mid and late 1960s. Hsu and Kenney (2005) quote a Boston VC as saying that the venture capitalists of the day  saw  the  programme  as  completely  unnecessary  –  VC  firms  had  plenty  of undistributed  capital  available  but  the  SBIC  was  injecting  large  amounts  of untrained,  inexperienced  capital  that  would  ‘crowd  out’  proper  investments11. However,  as  discussed  in  Section  4.2  it  did  help  to  drive  the  creation  of  the  US domestic VC sector. In this way the scheme, it played a key role in the development and institutionalisation of the VC sector.  The  impact  of  the  programme  was  mixed.  The  cheap  influx  of  US  government‐backed  capital made  SBICs  very  popular,  and  several  had  very  large  IPOs,  often earning more  in  an  IPO  than  the  complete  holdings  of  the  existing  non‐SBIC  VC firms  at  the  time  (Liles  1977 p.  122).  But  the  boom  in  SBICs,  spurred  on by  the bullish stock market (ibid) and general  investor optimism in the potential of  this new investment vehicle, soon began to run aground. The programme had several flaws, outlined in Fenn et al (1997 p. 12‐13): first, SBICs were not strictly limited to providing equity,  so some merely provided debt  to profitable  firms; second,  they                                                         
11 This foreshadowed later arguments about the ‘crowding out’ of private funds by public investments, studied by Cumming and Macintosh (2006) and Leleux and Surlemont (2003), among others. 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attracted  individual,  and  not  institutional  investors,  who  in  many  cases  were unaware of  the  risks;  and  finally  the  scheme did not  attract  the best  investment managers.  In  1966  an  outgoing  official  at  the  Small  Business  Administration declared  that  the SBA was  likely  to  lose $18m because of  “dubious practices and self dealing”  (Liles 1977 p. 124). The official  reckoned  that 232 of  the 700 SBICs were ‘problem companies’ (ibid). This tarnished the reputation of the scheme, and following a vigorous round of auditing, many firms left the market, with the size of the market dropping by more than two‐thirds in 1966 to 1977as VCs adopted the LP model  (Hsu  and Kenney 2005 p.  26‐27,  Fenn  et  al  p.  13). Despite  the widely held negative connotations of the programme, Reiner (ibid p. 280‐282) argues that the  SBIC  programme,  though  not  purely  successful  in  creating  technology investments  (which  only  made  up  3.5%  of  all  investments),  introduced institutional  investors to venture capital.  It also facilitated the adoption of the LP organisational  structure,  and  the  subsequently  the  professionalisation  of  the sector.  The  scandal was not  the end of  the  scheme.  It was  later  transformed  into a new programme with more controls that matched capital from the private sector with government  funds,  allowing  these  organisations  to  give  both  loans  and  equity investments,  reducing  investors’  risk  profiles  (Brewer  et  al  1996b).  SBICs  were able to fund their activities by issuing SBA‐backed debentures, which is beneficial for SBICs that made debt investments. However it was more troublesome for those who used equity, as it created cash flow problems when SBICs attempted to service their debt (Brewer et al 1996a). Unlike VC, which had a strong skew toward the IT and biotechnology sectors (Lerner 1999 p. F78), SBICs served a broader range of the US industrial base, with 46% of investments made between 1983‐1992 being in  manufacturing,  17%  in  services,  and  8.5%  in  communications  and  transport (Brewer  et  al  1996b  p.  10).  Of  all  investments  in  this  period,  only  2.7%  were earmarked for R&D activities (ibid p. 9). The scheme also focuses on areas of the US  that  are not  typically  served by equity  investors, with 26% of  investments  in 2007 being made in low‐income areas (NASBIC 2009). 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4.4.2  Demand­side  policies  supporting  US  VC:  SBIR,  ATP,  and  the  private 
accumulation of public rewards of research In  addition  to  this  support  for  the  VC  sector  and  its  supply  of  capital,  the  US government has invested considerably in schemes that direct public funds to small firms in a range of ways, helping these firms to grow (Pavitt 1998).  In doing this the  government  serves  to  drive  demand  for  capital  by  helping  firms  survive  the ‘valley  of  death’  (see  Aurswald  and  Branscomb  2003)  in  which  small  firms exploiting  new  technologies  may  struggle.  There  have  been  several  schemes designed  to  explicitly  support  small  firms  such  as  SBIR  and  ATP  (for  a  more complete list see Lerner 1999 p. 287‐289), while others have indirectly supported these firms by appropriating to firms the returns of public investment.  One  key  scheme  behind  US  government  support  for  small  technology  firms  has been  the  Small  Business  Innovation  Research  scheme  (see  Coooper  2003  for  a summary).  The  scheme  requires  that  all  federal  agencies  with  significant  R&D spending set aside a set percentage (1.25% originally, later 2.5%) of their funds to be  awarded  to  small  firms  (ibid  p.  294).  Lerner  (1999)  shows  that  SBIR‐backed firms were more likely to receive VC, but this was only the case for firms that were already  located  in  technology clusters  such as Silicon Valley, a  finding supported by  Gans  and  Stern  (2003).  The  existence  of  the  schemes  has  been  found  by Audretsch  et  al  (2002a)  to  be  linked  to  the  formation  of  new  firms  and  the decisions by scientists and engineers to enter the private sector.   Given  the general  success of  the SBIR  scheme  in  supporting  firms,  the Advanced Technology  Program  (ATP)  sought  to  provide  specific,  targeted  research  that would  have  both  technological  as  well  as  business  potential.  The  scheme  was founded  in  1990  as  a  public‐private  partnership  where  firms  with  new technologies would  approach  the US  government  and  request  funding  to  exploit new technologies with technological and business potential (Hill 1998 p. 143‐158). Unique in the approach to ATP is that while it seeks to address market failure (and Hall et al 2001 p. 91 suggest this is the case),  it also explicitly considers spillover effects  of  investments  as  a  criterion  for  evaluation  (Mansfield  1996,  Jaffe  1998). These  effects  do  not  just  include  market  spillovers  but  also  seek  to  encourage knowledge  and  networked  spillover  effects  as  well  (Jaffe  1996  p.3).  Further, 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Feldman  and  Kelley  (2001)  find  that  firms  receiving  ATP  funds  actively  seek  to share  findings  and  are  engaged  in  networks.  Darby  et  al  (2003)  find  that  the scheme has  led to an  increase  in patenting among recipients of  funding, and find that it is crucial for early stage firms seeking to exploit technology.  In  addition  to  these,  the  US  has  invested  significantly  in  R&D  performed  by universities and private firms (see Dosi et al 2006). An element of the high levels of investment has been the appropriation of returns to government‐backed research by  the  private  sector.  Measures  such  as  the  Bayh‐Dole  Act  have  sought  to  give universities  rights  to  the  intellectual  property  they  develop,  with  the  aim  of encouraging commercialisation of technologies derived at universities. The success of  these measures  has  been widely  questioned  on  grounds  of  effectiveness  (see Mowery et al 2001 and Mowery et al 2002) and usefulness  to  the private  sector (Florida  2000),  not  to  mention  concerns  about  the  impact  on  the  quality  and directionality  of  university  research  (see  Mowery  and  Nelson  2004  and  Shane 2002).  However despite these concerns the push to allow private returns to public investment  has  remained  a  crucial  element  of  the  US  national  science  and technology policy12.  Another  key  element  contributing  to  the  technological  growth,  and  indeed indirectly to demand for capital from small firms, is the ongoing US investment in military  R&D.    The  US  defence  system  has  historically  been  based  on  highly complex  systems  that  are  more  backward‐  than  forward‐looking  (see  Kaldor 1982).    These  complex  systems  have  created  demand  for  very  specialised technologies,  and  these needs were often  catered,  especially  in  the  early days of Silicon  Valley,  by  small  technology  firms  (such  as  Fairchild  Semiconductor,  as discussed  earlier)  (Nelson 1982 pp.  323‐4).    In  so  doing, military R&D has  been argued  to  have  driven  many  of  the  major  technological  breakthroughs  (for instance  computers  and  the  internet)  from which  private  US  firms were  able  to ultimately appropriate returns from military investments (von Tunzelmann 1995 p.  245‐6).    The high  level  of military  investment  in R&D,  by driving  government                                                         12 See Mowery and Sampat 2004 for an argument that the US model of technology transfer may be of limited usefulness in other OECD countries 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investment  in  technology,  has  led  to  a  variety  of  spillover  effects  (for  instance labour and training),  leading some (see Cypher 1987) to argue that military R&D has in a way served as its own de facto industrial policy.  These measures have all contributed to the backing of small firms, and have played an active role in driving small firm creation and growth. In this way even if the US government did not play an explicitly active role in the recent development of the VC  sector,  it may be understood  to  have been providing  the  support  that  allows firms to be ready for VC.   
4.5  Institutional factors and markets for exit in the US  The US  system has  thrived  in  large part because  there have been  successful  exit opportunities to VC‐backed firms (Megginson 2002, Black and Gilson 1998). This is widely  ascribed  to  the  success  of  the  NASDAQ  market,  although  this  section suggests there are underlying institutional factors behind this market success.  
4.5.1 The US federal systems and markets for verification One  defining  feature  of  the  US  government  is  its  federal  system,  which constitutionally  reserves  the powers  to  regulate businesses  to  states,  leaving  the federal  government  only  with  the  right  to  regulate  interstate  commerce (Lowenstein 1988, p. 100‐101). Bush (2005) argues that this has led to a number of unintended knock‐on effects. Among them the federal system has created a ‘race to  the  bottom’  among  states  competing  to  provide  the  weakest  business regulations, so as to attract more corporate headquarters and taxation; this battle has  historically  been  ‘won’  by  Delaware,  which  has  very  weak  regulations  on business and corporate governance (see Cary 1974).  Beyond this, Bush (2005, p. 11) describes how the federal system has limited the scope  of  the  US  government  to  regulate  fraudulent  activity within  the  firm  –  in order  for  someone  to  be  found  guilty  they  most  be  proved  to  have  both misrepresented  a  material  fact  and  demonstrated  fraudulent  conduct,  and  both must  be  linked  to  a  firm’s  resulting  share  price  (ibid).  The  result  of  this,  Bush 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argues,  is  a  market  where  managers  have  significantly  greater  scope  for  self‐serving action whilst still being within the bounds of the  law (ibid p. 14‐15). The US Supreme Court has endorsed a view that views poor management as “a risk that any investor takes” (Court of the Eastern District of Virginia 2004, quoted in Bush 2005 p. 17).   This  caveat  emptor‐based  legal  approach  creates  information  asymmetries between shareholders and management, whose activity is unconstrained as long as it does not defraud secondary markets. These information asymmetries are unique and  inform  the  US  markets.  Given  that  any  manager  may  have  self‐serving intentions,  we  would  expect  to  see  markets  for  knowledge  about  firms  and managers  to emerge. The success of venture capitalists on markets  like NASDAQ may also be explained  in  this  light, as VCs are able  to use their own reputational capital to bear in validating the quality of firms they bring to market (see Brav and Gompers 1997), driving the high valuations that lead to successful exits.  
4.5.2 NASDAQ and its success NASDAQ has benefited from specific locational and situational advantages as well, which has facilitated the emergence of exit markets for venture capital.  Prior to the foundation of NASDAQ the main options for firms wishing to make a public share offering were either the NYSE or one of the regional stock exchanges (of which  the Chicago exchange was  the most well‐known)  (Geisst 2002 p. 165).  The 1960s had seen a rise in over the counter (OTC) trading, but this had been rife with  fraud  in  the hyperactive  stock markets  of  that  decade  (which had  similarly facilitated the growth of the first iteration of the SBIC scheme).    In 1971 the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) launched the NASD Automatic Quotation (NASDAQ) system, which provided real‐time quotes for OTC stocks  (Ingbretsen  2002  p.  61).    The market  grew  slowly  though  the  1970s  but experienced enormous growth as a new class of high‐tech companies came up for IPOs,  and  the  coffers  of  institutional  investors  swelled  (ibid  p.  92‐3).    With profitable  new  firms  coming  forward  (and  firms purchases  in management  buy‐
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outs  being  re‐floated)  and  investors  eagerly  seeking  the  next  big  investment, NASDAQ  flourished  as  it  became  clear  that  the  market  could  sustain  reputable firms.    These  large‐scale  successes  enabled  the  development  of  NASDAQ’s reputation, which then enabled additional benefits to emerge, as growth facilitated division  of  labour  and  specialisation  in  technology‐specific  areas,  allowing NASDAQ  to  expand  on  its  first‐mover  advantage,  providing  (at  least  in  good economic conditions) the prospect of successful exit for VC investments (Lazonick 2008, p. 13‐14).   Following the downturn of the early 1990s, NASDAQ soon became the epicentre of the dot‐com bubble of the mid to late 1990s.   Enough value was attributed to the technology‐based  firms  listing  on  NASDAQ  that  aggregate  household  net  worth grew by $3 trillion in the fourth quarter of 1999 (Ingbretsen 2002 p. 223).  By the time  of  the  corresponding  collapse  of  the market  (although Pastor  and Veronesi 2006 argue that what was seen in NASDAQ in the late 1990s was not necessarily a bubble).  NASDAQ  had  become  somewhat  stigmatised  for  its  role  in  the  hype.  Despite  this,  its  IPO  market  did  remain  moderately  successful  through  the  mid 2000s until the economic downturn at the end of the decade.  Despite its associations with the dot com boom, NASDAQ’s success also came from a number of other factors that complemented the firms being backed by VCs.    Its electronic trading network means that without a headquarters, there were no local geographical biases towards the East Coast, which was positive for the West Coast‐based Silicon Valley  (see Reiner 1989 p.  392).  In  addition,  because NASDAQ  is  a risk‐orientated market within a nation with large internal markets,  investors and fund managers see greater growth opportunities. The large size of the market for firms  seeking  IPOs  therefore  facilitates  multiple  large  returns,  creating  scale economies within the market for investment (Ingbretsen 2002 p. 153).   In this way we can see that the markets for VC‐backed firms were strongly aided both  by  the  unusual  corporate  governance  structure  of  the  US,  which  seems  to have  facilitated  risk,  as well  as  the NASDAQ market, which  due  to  the  economic circumstances  of  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s was  able  to  grow  and  develop 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differentiated  knowledge  resources  that  further  allowed  division  of  labour  in technical  knowledge,  allowing  for  fairer  valuations  of  technology‐based  firms (albeit  coupled  with  overpricing  that  is  characteristic  of  NASDAQ  and  enabled valuable VC exits, Gompers and Lerner 2003).  
4.6 Framing VC in the US: A capabilities perspective  The  thesis  has  already  discussed  the  widespread  use  of  the  principal‐agent approach  in  the VC sector. This approach  is useful  in  framing many of  the major economic  relationships  in which VCs engage. However  this  thesis  seeks  to  argue that a model based solely on principal‐agent approaches is  insufficient to explain the  role  played  by  venture  capitalists.  One  topic  which  a  principal‐agent/contracting view is not immediately able to explain relates to organisational capabilities.  Here  we  seek  to  identify  capabilities  and  dynamic  capabilities  that have characterised the success of the US VC sector.   This analysis draws upon the discussion of capabilities in Section 2.5, and adopts Eisenhardt  and  Martin’s  (2000)  definition  of  capabilities  (or  routines,  or  non‐dynamic  capabilities)  as  being  prevalent  in  moderately  dynamic markets;  while dynamic capabilities are real, identifiable core processes that are simple and tacit and enable competition and success in changing markets. If we accept that venture capitalists add value to firms beyond an agency/contracting‐based model, we may begin to flesh out a newer understanding of the role of VC in light of capabilities. Our  historical  discussion  suits  a  capabilities  perspective  in  that  both  the  Boston and  Silicon  Valley  VC  clusters  had  their  roots  in  one  (AR&D)  or  a  few  (Kleiner Perkins,  Rock,  etc)  VC  firms.  The  diffusion  of  human  capital  from  those  original firms  throughout  the  sector would  support  an  argument  that  there  are  common capabilities  found  throughout  the  sector.  In  light  of  this,  the  remainder  of  this section presents capabilities, drawn from the literature, that seem to be crucial for VCs’ success.  
Capabilities  for  screening  and  managing  agency  risk:  Although  this  is  a  core function  of  the  VC  sector,  the  process  of  screening  has  been  identified  to  be 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idiosyncratic  (Macmillan  et  al  1986)  and  at  least  somewhat  tacit  (Kirsch  et  al 2009).  Similarly,  although  agency  risk  is  not  the  entirety  of  the  VC‐firm relationship,  the  management  of  risks  associated  with  principal‐agent  issues remain important (see Gompers 1995, Amit et al 1998). In particular, structuring deals and learning from them remains a challenge (as with the experiences of the Fairchild employees who lost their equity stakes in the firm, Lecuyer 2000 p. 170). Although these capabilities may be common throughout the sector,  their absence or poor application will have consequences for the firms they back. Despite this, it is  unclear  the  extent  to  which  these  would  represent  capabilities  or  dynamic capabilities, given their more complex, analytical nature.  
Dynamic  capabilities  for  extracting  value  from  networks:  the  chapter  has  already discussed the importance of networks in the generation of demand for capital (as suggested in Florida and Kenney 1987a). Given the importance of proximity for VC investment, we  see  clustering  and  agglomeration  effects  in  the  areas where  VCs are  concentrated  (Lerner  1995,  Sorenson  and  Stuart  2001).  In  these  areas members of networks are able to use the networks, stemming from a fluid labour market  (Carnoy  et  al  2007)  as  a  tool  to  gain  information on  reputational  capital (Saxenian 1994) and  to  identify managerial  talent  (Greenwood and Steier 1995). Further,  the  suggestion  that  network  position  may  be  as  important  or  more important  than  experience  in  a  sector  (Hochberg  et  al  2005)  reinforces  the primacy of networks in the US sector. Further, one interpretation of the results in Brander et al (2002) would be that the ability to exploit networks  is also key for the assembly of the knowledge resources required for firm growth. In light of this, the importance of networks, and VCs’ abilities to exploit them, must be considered a dynamic capability in the VC sector.  
Dynamic  capabilities  for  organisational  learning:  Discussions  by  VC  practitioners (see Hambrecht 1984, Kleiner 1989) suggest that the skills practiced by VCs are a craft that is learned. While these skills may be gained by individuals (and the result in  Sapienza  et  al  1996  suggesting  that  experience  is  linked  to  value  addition), learning  through  organisations  and  through  sectors  also  seems  to  be  important. The ability to learn, and then operationalise, those experiences in screening (Stuart 
 76 
and  Sorensen  2001  p.  1157)  and  value  addition  (Sapienza  et  al  1996)  enable success, especially by incorporating networks, as discussed above.  
Dynamic capabilities for exploiting economies of scale: In making their investments, venture capitalists also rely on their own generated economies of scale and scope. Because of institutional investors’ willingness to back large VC funds (Florida and Kenney  2000  p.  141),  the  fixed  costs  of  investing  in  the  sector  (screening  and monitoring,  as  above)  drive  a  growth  in  minimum  efficient  investment  size  as funds  expand  (Murray  1999).  This  means  that  rather  than  guaranteeing  a  firm $2m, a VC will guarantee a firm $15m, as long as it meets its targets; the additional funds provide the firm with the capital to grow and expand and cut its search costs when  the  initial  tranche  of  funding  runs  out.  Further,  the  large  size  of  the investments means that VCs have more incentives to provide greater value‐added services (as  in Cumming 2004 and Section 4.3.4)  to  the  firms they back, creating economies  of  scope  in  value  addition.  Further,  if  we  accept  an  explanation  of economies  of  scale  as  a  driver  behind  fund  size,  demand‐side  government intervention (such as SBIR and ATP) becomes even more important as it provides firms with the funding to grow to the level where they may catch the attention of VCs. In addition, there also exist opportunities for exploiting economies of scale via the large size of the US market, which enables rapid firm growth and thus higher valuation of IPOs.  
Dynamic  capabilities  for  assembling  of  complementary  assets  to  create  high  value 
firms13: Perhaps the most important of the dynamic capabilities developed by VCs in the US comes from the ability of VCs to identify and combine resources, and use them  for  growth.  They may  acquire  these  assets  in  a  number  of  ways:  through syndication (as suggested by Brander et al 2002); through changes in management –  typically  involving  replacing  the  founder  with  a  CEO  with  commensurate experience (Hellman 2002b); or through seats on the board (Lerner 1995), which then grants access to the makings of the firm’s strategy (Fried et al 1998).  
                                                        13 This idea originally came from Ed Steinmueller, whose insights are gratefully appreciated. 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The  skills  VCs  bring  onboard with  them  facilitate  a  ‘rush  to  professionalisation’. Kaplan and Stromberg (2000) found that 64% of VCs studied played direct roles in the  shaping  of  the  management  team.  Hellman  and  Puri  (2000)  showed  that, controlling  for  selection  bias,  VC‐backed  firms  were  more  likely  to  hire  a  vice president of sales than non‐VC firms. Assembling these skills requires the ability to utilise  and  extract  assets  from personal networks  (Powell  et  al  1997,  Stuart  and Sorensen  2001;  Steier  and  Greenwood  1995).  Once  these  skills  are  brought together, VC‐backed firms bring their products to market faster than those without similar backing (Hellman and Puri 2000a).  Because of the rapidly changing market environment, successful VCs must be able to make quick, simple judgments about the assets that best allow them to build a high‐growth, IPO‐ready firm. Given the dynamic market in which VC‐backed firms operate, the assets VCs will be assembling in order to bring a firm to IPO will likely vary over time. Consequently the ability to adapt to these changes will prove to be important  both  for  the  success  of  individual  investments  and  the  venture capitalist’s  portfolio  and  future  activities.      The  resulting  implication  is  that  this dynamic  capability  represents  the  core  of  the  VC‐firm  relationship,  in  that  it represents  the  overlap  of  the  capabilities  and  resources  of  the  VC  and  the  firm.  These  dynamic  capabilities  ensure  that  VCs  are  able  to  move  from  ‘picking’ winners to ‘growing’ them; and by taking these ‘winners’ to IPO allow VCs are able to generate the returns that have driven the success of the US sector.    
4.6  Conclusion  This  chapter  has  discussed  the  emergence  of  venture  capital  in  the  US  and presented several factors that have played key roles in the success of the US sector that are not easily explicable under  the principal‐agent  framework.  It has  shown the evolution of venture capital as an organisational  form and has presented and has  discussed  the  background  for  the  emergence  of  the  US  VC  sector.  It  has discussed  the  role  the  US  government  has  played  in  fostering  both  supply  and demand for VC activity. It has alternately identified key capabilities that have been 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5.1  Introduction  The previous chapter presented a qualitative discussion  for one of  the  two cases used  to  answer  the  research  question.    The  chapter  identified  networks, government  policy,  means  to  exit,  and  especially  capabilities  and  dynamic capabilities  that  have  allowed  the  US  sector  to  grow  and  succeed.  This  chapter provides  a  qualitative  and  historical  examination  of  the  second  case,  addressing issues surrounding the financing of small  firms in the UK. The chapter will argue that the ‘equity gap’ in small firm funding identified in the early 1930s has become a ‘boundary object’, and that the UK has gone through changing interpretations of what  the  gap  means.  The  perception  of  the  gap  as  a  market  failure  has  been addressed  by  policymakers  by  government‐backed  institutions,  tax  incentive‐based  schemes,  and  more  recently  by  increasingly  nuanced  uses  of  public  and private capital together. The chapter also examines the development of the private UK VC  sector,  proposing  a  capabilities  explanation  of  the  sector’s  evolution.  The chapter  will  discuss  the  emergence  of  secondary  markets  and  their  role  in  the challenges facing the VC and small firm finance. It will conclude by comparing and contrasting  the  cases  of  the  UK  and  US,  drawing  some  conclusions  from  these historical comparisons for further examination in the following chapter.  Section 5.2 will  provide  a  history  of  the  changing perspectives  of  the  equity  gap from  its  origins  to  the  present  day.  Section 5.3 will  profile  the VC  sector  and  its emergence,  and  Section  5.4  will  discuss  the  challenges  of  exit.  Section  5.5  will conclude the chapter and frame the quantitative discussion in Chapter 6. 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5.2  The ‘equity gap’ as a boundary object  
5.2.1 The Macmillan Gap and its context The  relationship  between  finance  and  industry  in  the  UK  has  historically  been rather  uneasy14.  In  the nineteenth  century banks had  typically maintained  close, cultivated relationships with the firms they backed. However in the 1870s a wave of  bank  failures  (due  in  part  to  too‐close  relationships)  triggered  a  massive amalgamation  trend  among  banks  (Ross  1990  p.  53).  From  1886  to  1914  the number of joint‐stock banks in the UK dropped from 109 to 38 (Checkland 1975, p. 532), and by 1917 five clearing banks held two‐thirds of the resources of the entire banking system (Pollard 1992 p. 26‐27). Although evidence  is  limited,  it appears that  the  newly  centralised  banks  reined  in  the  local  banking  officials’  authority, making loan policies more consistent and stringent (see Ziegler 1997 p. 190‐191). Lavington  (1921,  ch.  31‐33)  documented  that  that  the  banks  actively  avoided equity  or  long‐term  debt  deals  for  industry,  favouring  instead  short‐term investment.  However Michie  (1981)  argues  that  risky  ventures  still managed  to find funding, even in the absence of other means of investments.  These  changes,  and  the  ongoing  trend  toward  ‘rationalisation’,  or  increased coordination of industry, particularly among declining sectors (Pollard 1992 p. 53) led  to  the  identification  of  a  need  for  a  thorough  re‐examination  of  the  UK’s economic  system.  The  resulting  Committee  on  Finance  and  Industry,  chaired  by Lord Hugh Macmillan, had a high profile (its members  included  J.M. Keynes) and broad remit (see Skidelksy 1992 p. 343‐362). The committee took evidence from a broad  range  of  participants  in  the  economy,  including  both  financiers  and industrialists  (ibid).  The  committee  was  largely  focused  on  national  issues  of industry  and monetary policy. However,  ironically  its most  substantial  historical impact would come from its passing reference to small firm finance, which was not a main area of focus:                                                           14  Historians  have  debated  whether  financial  institutions’  refusal  to  provide  funds  for  new equipment was  a  cause  of  the  decline  of  the UK’s  economic  competitiveness  in  the  late  19th  and early 20th century (see Payne 1978 and McCloskey and Sandberg 1971 p. 105‐106). Whether this reluctance to invest in new stock was a result of conservatism or a lack of high‐return investment opportunities (Michael 1981 p.158‐160) is unclear. 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“It  has  been  represented  to  us  that  great  difficulty  is  experienced  by  the smaller  and medium‐sized  businesses  in  raising  the  capital which  they may from time to time require, even when the security offered is perfectly sound. To provide adequate machinery for raising long‐dated capital in amounts not sufficiently large for a public issue, i.e. amounts ranging from small sums up to say  £200,000  or more,  always  presents  difficulties.  The  expense  of  a  public issue is too great in proportion to the capital raised, and therefore it is difficult to interest the ordinary investor by the usual method” (Macmillan report para. 404)  This finding was not surprising. The banks had suggested in their statements that they avoided any long‐term loans for capital investments by firms (see Hyde 1930 Q889). And yet the extent and nature of this gap in funding (known at the time as the  ‘Macmillan  gap’  and  later  as  the  ‘equity  gap’  or  ‘funding  gap’)  has  remained rather  unclear, with  later  historiography debating  its  existence  and  context. One interpretation proposed by Michie  (1990) was  that  the Macmillan gap  “was only incidentally  the  problem  of  financing  new  manufacturing  enterprise.  More importantly,  it  was  the  question  of  what  to  do  with  long‐established  and  once‐successful  firms  that  could  no  longer  generate  profits,  had  exhausted  their reserves and were a poor risk  for  further  lending”  (p. 105). Ross (1990 p.52‐68) suggested  that  the gap clearly existed but  that banks obfuscated  the committee’s efforts to characterise the provision of banking services.   Measuring  the demand  for  capital  is  difficult,  and  the  counterfactual  difficulty  in characterising investments that did not happen is particularly challenging (Ziegler 1997 p. 190‐191). Despite this, the emergence of the Macmillan gap as identified in the report seems to suggest some shift in the supply‐demand profile of firms in the period leading up to the late 1920s. Balogh (1950 p. 450) argued that technological change was driving greater economies of scale, driving down prices and increasing the minimum efficient size for firms. The resulting increase in demand for capital goods  (which  banks wouldn’t  fund)  led  to  the  gap  situation  forming  (ibid).  This suggestion  is  supported  by  data  in  Henderson  (1949)  that  suggest  firms  in  the 1930s  increasingly  attempted  to  list  on  the  new  issues market  at  the minimum amount for listing, or less (p. 65).  Although the reality of whether any funding gap existed may be unclear ex post, the findings of the Macmillan Committee were eagerly received in the City by investors 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who  hoped  to  exploit  untapped markets.  Three  institutions  entered  the  market shortly after the publication of the results: Credit for Industry Ltd (part of the Bank of  England‐backed  United  Dominions  Trust);  Charterhouse  Industrial Development Co. (backed by investment trusts,  insurance companies and banks); and  Leadenhall  Securities  Corp.  (backed  by  a merchant  bank)  (Thomas  1978  p. 119‐120). Charterhouse was part of an  investment group that had been dormant since  the  stock  market  crash  but  identified  a  market  opportunity  with  the Macmillan  Gap  (Ross  1997  p.  212).  It  made  investments  between  £10,000‐£100,000  for  expansion  of  existing  businesses  (Thomas  1978  p.  120).  It  found much  interest  but  limited  quality;  in  its  first  week  of  business  Charterhouse received  9000  applications  for  funding,  but  it  only  identified  twelve  of  these  as worth  additional  investigation  (Dennett  1979  p.  40).  Despite  this  entry  into  the market, William Piercy, future first chairman of ICFC, had noted in the late 1930s that  the  market  had  not  been  fully  addressed  and  would  require  a  more comprehensive, government‐backed effort (Coopey and Clark 1995 p. 13).  
5.2.2  Addressing  the  Equity  Gap  with  Institutions:  ICFC  and  its  relations, 
1945­1979 With  the  publication  of  the  Macmillan  Committee’s  report  and  the contemporaneous  financial  collapse,  the  banking  system  proceeded  to  lend  less than  before,  cutting  lending  from  55‐60%  of  deposits  to  40%  as  the  depression wiped  out  banks’  industrial  lending  portfolios  (Pollard  1992  p.  117).  This continued  throughout  the  rest  of  the  1930s  (ibid),  as  the  war  years  saw  much tighter controls on banking activity and minimal lending (ibid p. 176), the situation remained strained, with lending limited. Indeed, Scott and Newton (2007 p. 17‐23) suggest  the  banks  actively  sought  to maintain  their monopolies  by  undermining any  attempt  to  provide  funds  to  small  firms.    Private  investors  were  also discouraged from investing in industry due to the increases in taxes (Frost 1954, p. 196)  In this setting the founding of the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation (ICFC)  in  1946  was  designed  to  address  these  gaps  in  funding  for  small  firms. Although the clearing banks were the main shareholders  in the corporation, they 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entered  into  the  arrangement  only  reluctantly15,  and  agreed  to  the  formation primarily as a means of preventing direct government intervention. By agreeing to be shareholders in ICFC, banks seemingly were trying to establish ICFC as a buffer between themselves and the government (Lonsdale 1995 p. 45).   However despite their hostility banks still were not actively providing debt capital to  small  firms.  As  the  process  of  reconversion  of  assets  to  civilian  purposes  and Keynesian nationalisation developed, more emphasis was placed on ICFC and FCI (Finance  Corporation  for  Industry),  which  were  now  seen  as  key  sources  for capital  for  UK  firms  (Coopey  1994  p.  263‐265).  From  the  policymakers’ perspective, the role of ICFC and FCI were to provide “temporary or longer period finance  for  industrial  business  with  a  view  to  their  quick  rehabilitation  in  the national  interest,  thereby  assisting  in  the  maintenance  and  increase  of employment” (Sir  John Anderson, HoC Debates, Vol. 407, Col. 644). The role they were to play was then cast in the light of the supply of capital only. If the goal was to  supply  capital  to quickly  grow business  (or,  in  the  case of  FCI,  finance British reconversion to civilian activity (Hicks and Houghton 1958 p. 149)) and thus the overall economy, it was necessary for ICFC and FCI to take action quickly and not be  overly  selective.  FCI  obliged,  accepting  a  vast  majority  of  the  one  hundred applications it received in its first eleven years, distributing £150m in loans (Hicks and Houghton 1958, p. 153), whilst ICFC, engaged in political struggles, distributed its capital similarly eagerly, with consequently high losses (Coopey and Clark 1995 p. 37‐45).   For ICFC and FCI, their roles as providers of capital to business and their business models  came  together  as  the  higher‐risk  sources  of  capital  for  small  firms.  The ICFC  business  model  in  particular  eventually  grew  to  be  based  around  the provision  of  a  combination  of  debt  and  equity  to  firms  –  ICFC would  provide  as much  debt  as  a  firm  could  be  expected  to  service,  and  equity  for  any  funds required  beyond  that  (Coopey  and  Clark  1995  p.  210).  This  hybrid  debt/equity structure  allowed  ICFC  to  reap  the  benefits  of  equity  while  maintaining  the                                                         15 Lonsdale  (1995 p. 45) mentions  that  some banks actively  refused  to provide  referrals  to  ICFC, seeking to undermine  its business before  it grew; one bank provided only one referral  to  ICFC  in two years. 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security of  collateral. At  the same  time,  it maintained a strict non‐interventionist ideology and sought not to interfere with the activities of owner‐managers (ibid p. 211). If the problem was supply of capital, it was not within the aegis of ICFC to do anything else.  This approach  to  the  funding gap – debt/equity  combinations –  successfully met the need of the companies in question whilst also ensuring that ICFC and FCI both maintained  their  independence without  resorting  to  additional  fundraising.  This forced  them  to  develop  strong  search  and  informational  abilities  to  identify potential investments, realising that, in the words of one senior official in 1955, it    “cannot  accept more  than  a  certain  amount  of  risk,  for  even  though  by  the nature of its business it has many eggs in many different baskets, one cannot… assume  that  the  risk  run…  is  predictable  and  therefore  not  risky  in  the aggregate. For many of the things which may endanger one egg will endanger them all.” (Tew 1955, p. 224).   The risk assessment process focused on extensive due diligence and consultation with prospective investments (ibid p. 225‐228), and investment in firms that were already profitable.   
5.2.2.1 The Radcliffe and Bolton Reports The  topics  covered  in  the  Macmillan  Report  were  followed  up  thirty  years afterward  in  the  work  of  a  new  committee,  chaired  by  Lord  Radcliffe,  with  the same remit as the Macmillan committee (Kaldor 1960 p. 14). As with the previous committee  the Radcliffe group  looked primarily at  issues of monetary policy and the  link  between  finance  and  the  economy.  The  final  report  of  the  group, while unanimous (ibid), received mixed reactions (see Gurley 1960, who referred to its discussion  of  monetary  policy  as  an  ‘honourable  failure’  p.  700).  The  Radcliffe Report’s discussion of the Macmillan gap was more favourable. It deemed ICFC to have  largely  filled  the  gap  (Radcliffe  Report  1959  para  827),  although  it  also criticised  banks  for  decreasing  lending  to  small  firms  as  ICFC  grew  (ibid).  It suggested that the £200,000 ceiling for ICFC was too low and should be linked to “the  lowest  practicable  amount  for  a market  issue”  (ibid para 956),  allowing  for future  declines  in  the  value  of  money  (Thomas  1978  p.  123).  Finally  it 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recommended the creation of an institution to selectively finance the development of new technologies (Radcliffe Report para 827). This was manifested in 1962 with the establishment of Technical Development Capital Ltd (TDC). Partially owned by ICFC  and  financial  institutions,  TDC  was  slow  in  making  investments  and  was bought entirely by  ICFC  in 1968  to be part of  ICFC’s portfolio  (Coopey and Clark 1995 p. 85‐86).  By 1968 ongoing struggles of small firms led to increasing concern about the state of small  firms  in  the economy and an official enquiry, chaired by  J.E. Bolton, was established. The Bolton Report argued that ICFC was generally filling its intended role (Bolton Report 1971 para 151) but that banks were still being conservative in their lending, and small firms had little access to the stock exchange, despite their increasing  capital  needs  (ibid  para  155‐156).  It  also  identified  significant information  asymmetries  between  firms  and  banks  and  other  institutions  (ibid para  128).  Ultimately,  the  report  concluded  that  it  seemed  unlikely  the  decline experienced in the small firm sector would continue. Therefore it did not advocate instituting policy measures to specifically support small  firms (ibid para 159 and Storey 1982 p. 9‐10). However it did advocate policies to create more small firms to  serve  as  a  ‘seedbed’  for  future  firm  growth  (Bolton  Report  1971  para  85, Beesley and Hamilton 1984)  
5.2.2.2 Small firms in the 1970s: National Enterprise Board and the Wilson Report ICFC  had  since  grown  to  be  a  substantial  provider  of  capital,  growing  from  five branches in 1958 to eighteen in 1973, when it merged with FCI (Coopey and Clark 1995  p.  233‐5).  Renamed  Finance  for  Industry,  the  new  entity  subsequently received  a  cash  infusion  of  £1  billion  from  financial  institutions  to  continue  its work (Capie and Collins 1992 p. 66). The newly merged venture16  targeted firms with  high  growth  potential,  but  began  to  run  the  risk,  identified  in  the  Bolton Report,  of  ‘creaming  off’  the  best  investments;  in  other  words,  it  was  meeting demand for capital, but only the ‘best’ demand. Later evidence presented in Storey and Wynarczyk  (1985,  p.  15)  supported  this,  finding  that mean  profitability  for ICFC/3i firms (15.9%) was twice that of a sample of Northern manufacturing firms                                                         16 Referred to henceforth as its later name of 3i to ensure consistency 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(8.5%).  This  made  ICFC/3i  very  successful,  but  made  other  potential  investors ambivalent  about  entering  the market  because  of  fears  that  ICFC/3i was  simply ‘creaming’ off the best investments (Bates 1971 p. 169‐171).  The  cash  infusion  for  ICFC/3i  also  brought  the  organisation  into  an  unsettled political  situation.  The  new  organisation  was  feared  by  those  on  the  left  of  the Labour  Party  to  be  a  pre‐emption  of  their  planned  National  Enterprise  Board (NEB),  which was  intended  to  be  a  replacement  for  capitalism  in which  central government would own and oversee provision of  finance (Lonsdale 1997 p. 110, Coopey and Clark 1995 p. 124‐127). When the NEB was ultimately formed it had a range  of  (sometimes  conflicting)  aims  and  motives,  among  them  providing industrial finance for SMEs beyond ICFC/3i (Lonsdale 1997 p. 110). The small firm investment activity of the NEB was ultimately rather limited; it supported several early  computer  companies  (for  instance  Insac  and  Nexos,  which  lost  £6.9m  and £34m  respectively)  but  remained  ultimately  overshadowed  by  other  financial institutions and the changing political climate (ibid p. 115‐128).  The issue of small firm finance came to the fore again with the Wilson Committee of  1976.  Although  the  final  report  (released  shortly  before  the  Conservative election victory in 1979) did not explicitly advocate a political mandate,  it serves as a marker of transition between Labour ideas (for  instance, an implied support for a National  Investment Bank (Wilson Report 1979 para 948, Capie and Collins 1992  p.  71‐2)  and  ideas  that  would  be  adopted  by  the  new  government.  The Conservative  election  victory  in  a  way  represented  the  end  of  an  era  in  which institutions were created to address policy problems; and the beginning of an era in which policies were designed to encourage the private sector to take particular actions.  
 
5.2.3  Using  markets  to  address  the  equity  gap:  Intervention  in  the 
Conservative Governments, 1979­1997  
5.2.3.1 The Business Start­up Scheme and Business Expansion Scheme The new Conservative  government pushed  forward several  schemes designed  to support  investment  in  small  firms  (including  the  Small  Firm  Loan  Guarantee 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Scheme, in line with Wilson’s recommendations (Cowling and Clay 1995 p. 142)). The  Business  Start‐up  Scheme  was  designed  to  provide  tax  relief  (at  investors’ marginal  rate,  usually  60%)  for  investments  in  small  firms  that  had  been  in existence  for  less  than  five  years,  with  up  to  50%  of  the  share  capital  in  any company  qualifying  for  relief  (Lonsdale  1995  p.  70),  in  a  manner  that  would encourage people to start their own businesses (Westhead and Storey 1996 p. 15). In  this way,  it was  intended  that market  forces would  do  the  job  of  distributing capital that a central institution would fill under the Labour plans.  The BSS  scheme’s  simple design proved  to be  set  up  for  failure. One  investment organised within the scheme, Electra Risk Capital, invested £8m under the scheme in  32  technology  companies,  of which  only  one made  a  profit  and  the  rest were liquidated  or  sold  for  considerable  losses  (ibid  p.  71‐2).  After  such  high‐profile failures,  the BSS scheme managed  to only raise £15m,  instead of  the £100m that had been expected (ibid).   Given that BSS was a novel form of government intervention with markets for the UK (i.e. incentivising private investment in otherwise undesirable areas), its lack of success  is  unsurprising.  The  successor  to  the  BSS17,  the  Business  Expansion Scheme  (BES)  took  onboard  some  of  the  flaws  of  BSS  when  it  was  unveiled  in 1983.  The  plan’s  stated  aim  was  “to  provide  income  tax  relief  for  genuinely additional  outside  equity  investment by  individuals  in  certain  types of  unquoted UK trading companies” (Miller 1993 np). It offered heavy tax breaks of up to 60% to consumer investors on investments in small firms. The investments had to be in ordinary shares, and the amount that could be invested in one year was limited to £20,000, although this was later boosted to £40,000 (Harrison and Mason 1989 p. 149).  Firms were not  allowed  to  be  listed  on  the  London  Stock Exchange  or  the new Unlisted Securities Market, but could be listed on the third‐tier OFEX market (ibid).                                                         17 The Business Start‐up Scheme of the early 1980s should not be mistaken for the scheme of the same name that ran in the early 1990s. The latter scheme was originally known as the Enterprise Allowance Scheme (EAS), and provided a  temporary subsidy  for unemployed  individuals who set up their own businesses, allowing them to claim unemployment benefit for one year after starting their business (Robson 1998 p. 202). The scheme was (confusingly) renamed the Business Start‐up Scheme in 1991. 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The  BES  scheme  proved  to  be  very  successful  –  in  the  five  year  period  from FY 1984 – FY 1988, over £720 million was invested in over 2500 firms18, which was significantly more  than was  raised  by  institutional  VC  in  a  roughly  similar  time period (Harrison and Mason 1989 p. 151). However there were serious structural flaws in the programme. Hall (1989 p. 51‐2) identified several issues, including the generally  large  size  of  investments;  a  strong  regional  bias  (42%  of  investments were made in the South East); and delays in the processing of tax rebates. However the chief problem was that while consumers embraced the tax benefits of the BES, their  appetite  for  risk  was  extremely  low,  resulting  in  a  boom  in  BES  funds specialising  in  asset‐based  investments  such  as  nursing  homes  and  hotels (Lonsdale  1995  p.  72).  Even  after  rule  changes  in  1984,  similar  concerns  still remained.  Directors  of  BES  backed  firms  could  not  be  paid  for  their  services, raising  concerns  that  this  would  prevent  firms  from  bringing  on  high‐quality boards (Willcock and Tharpar 1993 p. 6).  Beyond  this,  most  BES  investments  were  made  in  the  three‐month  period immediately preceding the end of the tax year, skewing the seasonal availability of capital  (Mason  and  Harrison  1989  p.  154)  (and  suggesting  window‐dressing behaviour, as in Lakonishok et al 1991). Investments had grown larger and more concentrated as the scheme developed (see Hoptof 1987 p. 24). In his 1988 Budget address,  Chancellor  Nigel  Lawson  suggested  that  the  private  VC  market  was meeting  demand  at  the  higher  end  of  the  market  and  announced  a  maximum investment size of £0.5, but also announced plans to allow the use of BES funds to buy property investments for rented accommodation (HC Deb 15 March 1998 cc. 993‐1016). This move was portrayed by the government as a means to drive down rents and make housing more affordable, while  the Labour opposition decried  it, including the MP Gordon Brown:   Since  the scheme was set up  in 1983 –  it was originally  intended  to provide tax concessions for high‐risk investment in high technology industry to create jobs  –  Ministers  have  had  to  come  to  the  House  at  least  twice  to  say  that,                                                         18 Hall (1989) p. 51 suggests that 61% of investments in the first year were made in electronics, but corroborating  evidence  for  this  figure  cannot  be  found  and  other  evidence  suggests  this may  be erroneous. 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because  of  the  increasing  dependence  on  property  and  fixed  assets,  they intend to change the terms of the scheme … Today, they appear to have turned full  circle.  Instead  of  saying  that  they  will  limit  the  dependence  of  BES companies on property,  they are saying  that privately  rented companies can be 100% dependent on property assets. (HC Deb 9 May 1988, cc. 43)  The  introduction  of  the  property  element  shifted  the  focus  of  the  scheme,  and investment  in  small  firms  fell  subsequently  as  £8b was  spent  on  private  rented accommodation  from  1988‐1993  (Simmons  1994  p.  19).  In  its  later  years  the scheme took advantage of a ‘loanback’ loophole that allowed investors to exit their BES  investments  (which  they  were  mandated  to  hold  for  five  years)  after  six months, using the loans held against the capital assets of the fund (McConnell 1993 np). This  loophole, and  increasing opposition to the measure, saw the scheme be wound  down  in  1993,  but  only  after  £650m  had  been  invested  in  its  final  year (ibid).   The  BES  scheme,  by  its  end,  had  metamorphosed  from  a  scheme  designed  to support  self‐employment  and  small  firms  to  one  that  was  almost  exclusively oriented  around  property  investment.  It  had  been  successful  to  an  extent  in directing capital  toward the small  firms sector, but  its risk‐averse nature did not align the supply of capital with the incentives expected by investors, and ultimately it moved  far  from  its original  intent  and was adapted  to meet other policy aims. Further, it had spawned an industry entirely based upon servicing BES, and upon the winding up of  the scheme  the parts of  the sector collapsed under decreasing property prices and the lack of suitability of subsequent schemes (see Cole 1993 p. 30, Macerlean 1994 p. 2)  With the winding‐up of the BES scheme, pressure grew on the Major government to  introduce  a  new  scheme  to  supply  government  backing  to  small  firms.  It responded by announcing two new schemes in December 1993, which effectively split  the  idealised  functions  of  the  BES:  the  Enterprise  Investment  Scheme  was designed  to  support  investors  in  early  stage  companies,  and  the Venture Capital Trust  scheme  was  intended  to  draw  upon  the  capital  markets  to  provide  tax‐efficient incentives for investors to back small firms (Wilcock and Thapar 1993 p. 6).  This  represented  an  advance  in  the  understanding  of  the  supply  of  capital: 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rather  than  assuming  that  markets  would  naturally  fund  small  firms,  it acknowledged segmentation in the demand for capital among small firms.   
5.2.3.2  The  Enterprise  Investment  Scheme  and  Venture  Capital  Trust  schemes: 
Refining supply around the market The end of the BES scheme facilitated the introduction of two transitional schemes that  represented  refinements  in  the  policy  aims  set  forth  in  the  BES.  The  EIS scheme  was  explicitly  designed  to  support  investments  by  individuals  in  small firms,  whilst  circumventing  the  ability  for  these  investments  to  be  managed  by funds (Councell 1993 p. 12). EIS was intended to boost ‘angel’ investment with its bureaucracy  and  numerous  other  challenges.  In  his  1993  Budget  statement, Chancellor Kenneth Clarke presented  the  terms of  the new  scheme:  up‐front  tax relief would be 20%, but any losses would qualify for income tax and capital gains tax relief, with all capital gains being free of capital gains tax. Investors could invest up to £100,000 annually (HC Deb 30 Nov 1993 vol 233 cc937‐938). The design of this programme was initially disappointing to the City, and few expressed interest in developing investment vehicles for the scheme, even BES specialist investment trust firms such as Johnson Fry (Councell 1993 p. 12). Yet this disappointment for consumer  investors  represented  (rather  perversely)  a  boon  for  firms.  The  EIS scheme’s design meant  that  the  tax benefits were not upfront  (20% relief versus 40% in BES), although losses were eligible for relief and CGT was avoided on any capital  gains.  This  made  the  terms  much  less  favourable  for  all  but  the  most dedicated  investors  –  those  who  were  willing  to  accept  any  losses  at  all. Recognising  this, Clarke acknowledged  that  limited scope of  the  scheme’s appeal would likely result  in a maximum annual cost of £50m (HC Deb 30 Nov 1993 vol 233 cc938).  The scheme itself ultimately did find a limited but eventually expanding audience. Its  cost  in  the  first  and  second years was only £10m and 15m  (HC Deb 24 April 1996 vol 276 cc158‐9w) However government expenditure on the scheme grew to £278m  in  1998‐1999  and  £662m  in  2000‐2001  (HC  Deb  24  July  2002  vol  389 c1184w).  This  growth may  be  attributed  to  increases  in  the maximum  limits  of investment  from  the  initial  period,  and  to  a  shortening  of  the  length  of  time investors were required to maintain holdings (Cowling et al 2008 p. 4). 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The  EIS  scheme  has  been maintained  now  for  over  fifteen  years,  and  there  has been a small but rigorous pool of  literature regarding  the success of  the scheme. Boyns et al (2003) evaluated the scheme and found that EIS had been successful in attracting  investors who would not otherwise have  invested  in EIS‐backed  firms (ibid par 4.4.7‐8), and the funds attracted enabled firms to make investments and attract  external  skills  they  might  not  have  otherwise  been  possible  (ibid  par 5.10.1‐2).  A  later  examination  of  the  economic  impact  of  EIS  suggested  that  the scheme  was  associated  with  increased  building  of  fixed  assets  and  general capacity,  although  the  costs  per  economic  outcome  (i.e.  each  job  created)  were relatively high (Cowling et al 2008 p. 49).  By  incorporating  back‐end  tax  benefits  and  avoiding  investments  in  capital‐intensive  sectors,  EIS  refined  the  core  idea  of  the BSS/BES model  into  a  scheme that achieved  its aims whilst  still  leaving  room  for  innovation and creativity19.  It serves as a contrast to the Venture Capital Trust programme, EIS’s sister scheme, which  incorporated  more  of  the  BES’s  consumer‐facing  aspects,  and  inherited more of the risks and political debate engendered by the BES.  The intention to create a VCT scheme was announced in the Budget in late 1993, but whereas EIS was announced immediately within the Budget, the VCT scheme was  to  be  based  around  a  consultation  process.  The  consultation  document was released in March 1994, and called for tax‐free dividends and capital gains for the scheme, while fund managers could only award £1m per year to any firm, and any firm  receiving  aid  could  only  have  £10m  in  assets  (Bethell  1994  np.).  The consultation  document  was  criticised  by  the  investment  trust  sector  upon  its release, arguing that the administrative costs of running such a fund would be too high,  the  horizons  required  to  hold  investments  would  be  too  long,  and  that  it would be “impossible to make money of such small deals” (ibid). At a consultation meeting  in  June  1994,  the  lines  of  conflict  were  clear:  Inland  Revenue  and  the Treasury  wanted  the  scheme  to  directly  focus  on  the  equity  gap,  which  they                                                         19 For example,  the EIS scheme has been used as an alternative to signing to record  labels by up‐and‐coming bands, who  issue shares under EIS entitling shareholders  to portions of  the rights  to band’s albums, touring and merchandise (Meeke 2009 p. 10) 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identified  at  £500,000‐£1m  (Tulloch  1994  np).  They  held  that  there were many firms  already handling deals  of  £1‐2 million,  and  that  the proposed VCT  scheme would not have a significant effect competing against private firms and 3i (which was by  then  in  the process  shedding  its  links  to  the banks via  its  IPO). This was countered by  the BVCA and Association  for  Investment Trust Companies  (AITC), who argued that the small size of the firms would not attract significant  levels of investment with such low returns (The Independent, 1994 p. 26) and that the only way the scheme could succeed would be for the minimum level of investment to be increased  to  £3m, with  a  requirement  that  20%  of  investments  be  for  less  than £1m (Tulloch 1994 np.).   This discussion represented the conflicting intents of the investment trust sector, which  was  clearly  focused  on  tax‐efficient  relief,  and  government  attempts  to address  the  funding gap.  It also posed a philosophical question  for  the Treasury: was  it better  to have a widely successful programme that only  targeted the need peripherally,  or  a  less‐successful  programme  that  specifically  addressed  the perceived equity gap? The presence of a significant number of funds making deals above £1m and  the  reluctance of  investment  trusts  to make smaller  investments typifies some challenges facing policymakers.  Ultimately  the  chancellor  addressed  the  BVCA  and  AITC  concerns  in  a  different means  than  expected,  by  adding  benefits  for  potential  consumer  investors:  20% up‐front tax relief and CGT relief on reinvested funds, whilst maintaining the lower investment  limits  (HC Deb 29 November 2004 vol 250 c1099).  In  this  speech he took  pains  to  “not  describe  tax  reliefs  of  this  kind  to  stimulate  investment  in business and enterprise as  tax  loopholes, which  they are usually  identified as by the Opposition”  (ibid). Whereas  the BES might have been considered a  loophole, the VCT scheme, it was claimed, was not intended to operate in the same way.  Response  to  the  scheme  was  positive,  although  upon  publication  of  the  bill Jonathan Blake, director of the BVCA, commented “We would be very surprised if the sum of £2.5b  [the  initial  target  for  fundraising announced by  the Chancellor] were raised in the first three years. There are probably an insufficient number of 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decent  investments  to  make  that  possible”  (Miller  1995  np).  The  scepticism,  as well as a delay in finalisation of the rules, meant that the VCT scheme began with a slow start, only raising £50m among three funds in its first few months, and with only another eight funds being launched in the year following (Fox 1996 np).  The  scheme  did  slowly  begin  to  catch  on,  with  more  fund  managers  launching funds  and  the  sector  slowly  beginning  to  accumulate  critical  mass.  The  Labour victory in 1997 saw a generally similar level of support for the VCT scheme, with the exception of newly tightened rules on asset‐backed investments made by VCTs (The  Times  1997,  np).  The  first  few  years  of  the  VCT  scheme  had  seen  several solely  asset‐backed  schemes,  including  the  Downing  Protected  and  Baronsmead families  of  funds,  which  used  multiple  VCTs  to  pool  funds  for  asset‐backed investments including hotels and nursing homes.  This would prove to be the greatest longstanding issue facing the VCT scheme: by opening  the  scheme  to  consumers,  its  designers  had  consigned  the  investment profiles of many of the firms to as many low‐risk  investments as possible. Unlike institutional  investors,  individuals’  appetite  for  high‐risk  ventures  is  low, especially  considering  the  VCT  scheme’s  billing  as  a  high‐risk  scheme  solely because  it  was  untested.  By  naturally  incentivising  conservative  investment patterns,  it was  filling  a  gap  in  capital,  but  not  capital  involving  higher  levels  of risk.  Chapter  6  contains  detailed  analysis  of  the  investment  patterns  of  the  VCT schemes.  
5.2.3.3 Other supply­side schemes 1980­1997 While the BSS, BES, EIS and VCT schemes were the most high‐profile supply‐side schemes, there were several other schemes put in place to supply capital to firms. This section briefly discusses them and their effectiveness.  The Wilson Report of 1979, in addition to its call for more equity‐based support for firms, argued for the creation of a scheme to guarantee loans, on the ground that commercial competition wasn’t strong enough, and that the public return and jobs creation  from  small  firms  was  great  enough  to  justify  intervention  (Wilson 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Committee  1979).  Almost  immediately  afterward,  a  scheme was  put  in  place  to address this gap. The Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS, also known as the Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme) used government funds to guarantee loans to firms that did not have the requisite  level of assets. The National Audit Office described the LGS as an attempt to bridge the equity gap between banks and firms (Cowling and Clay  1995  p.  142).  It  is worth  noting  the  identification  of  the  equity  gap  in  this context,  which  was  not  in  line  with  other  definitions  of  the  equity  gap  (i.e., involving lack of equity) discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Regardless, the terms of the LGS were repeatedly altered (six times in twelve years) and the scheme had relatively little adoption, despite the benefits offered to firms (ibid p.143, 148).  Another set of programmes introduced in the early 1990s that were relevant to the supply  of  capital  to  small  firms  were  the  SMART  and  LINK  schemes,  which provided  grants  firms  to  support  R&D,  feasibility  and  market  development (Abramovsky et al 2004 p. 12). These schemes have been extensively assessed (see ibid, Malik et al 2006, p.208), with the general consensus being that they provide very  beneficial  certification  for  small  firms  activities  (Malik  et  al  p.  212)  and provide  support  for  things  that  might  not  otherwise  be  commercialised  (ibid p.211). Aspects of this scheme will be discussed later in the chapter.  
5.2.3.4 Emergence of demand­side policy interventions: 1979­1997  The initial phases of  the Tory small  firm policies were generally oriented toward promoting new firm formation. At the same time there was a sharp increase in firm formation,  and  although  a  directly  causal  link  between  firm  formation  in  this period  and  the  range  of  government  policies  is  unclear  (see  Mason  1989  for  a review), the policy environment was conducive for small firms. In the case of BSS and BES, the precise role of the capital that was being directed to firms was rather unclear.  If  the  intent was  to direct  funds  to new  firms,  then  large  institutionally‐managed  funds may  not  have  been  ideal  options  to  allocate  the  funds,  although they  might  have  been  more  suited  for  more  established,  growing  firms.  The distinction  between  the  targeting  of  these  funds  became  clearer  after  the establishment of the EIS and VCT schemes. These served to fill the needs for very 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early  stage  capital  via  EIS,  whilst  allowing  more  established  firms  access  to market‐mediated funds via VCT.   At the same time, a shift was underway in government attitude toward small firm policy  away  from  new  firm  formation  and  toward  support  for  existing  firms.  In 1990 the new small business minister, Tim Eggar, disavowed the equity gap as a model for government intervention. Instead he argued for a skills‐based approach that would see small firms acquiring knowledge and resources through networks and transactions with other firms (Oates 1990, p.72‐74). Eggar and his successor, Baroness Denton, began to establish policies to grow existing firms by developing human capital and facilitating firm growth by mixing skills provision with funding (Rock  1992,  p.  13).  The  resulting  policies  included  Training  and  Enterprise Councils  scheme,  locally  run,  government‐backed  organisations  that  were designed to be local providers of training and enterprise development (Hill 1990 p. 58‐62). This  scheme was  followed  in 1994 by  the Business Links  scheme, which was  intended  to  provide  ‘one  stop’  hubs  for  access  to  funding  (especially  angel investors) and general business support  services  (Rock 1994, p.30‐34). This was unique  in  considering  funding  as  part  of  an  integrated business  support  agenda, rather than an issue to be considered on its own.  By the time of the Labour electoral victory in 1997, the Tory model of government intervention  in  the  supply  of  capital  via  tax  breaks  and  the  development  of capabilities within firms was well established. The new Labour government would come to approach both supply and demand issues for small firms in a new light.  
5.2.4 The new focus on technology based firms and small  firm policy under 
New Labour, 1997­present By the mid‐1990s, the success of US high‐tech firms was becoming more apparent and interest began to grow in how the UK was helping its small technology‐based firms to develop. In 1996 the Bank of England released a report on the topic that marked a gradual shift in the policy dialogue beyond the original Tory distinction between  entrepreneurial  start‐ups  (via  the  EIS  scheme)  and  firms  ready  for growth (via the VCT scheme). The Bank’s report was the first of three released in a six  month  period  in  1996‐1997  by  the  Bank,  the  CBI,  and  the  Lords  Select 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Committee on Science and Technology. If the EIS and VCT recognised a distinction between  these  two  types  of  demand,  this  trio  of  reports  acknowledged  a  third type: demand for capital from small technology‐based firms.  
5.2.4.1 The 1996/7 reports on small firms The Bank’s  report was published  in October 1996,  and was based on  surveys  of technology‐based  firms  and  consultation  with  stakeholders  from  the  sector.  It examined  both  supply  and  demand  side  elements  of  small  firm  finance.  In examining suppliers of  funding,  it praised angels as untapped resources (Bank of England  1996  p.  28‐9)  but  criticised  the  tendency  of  the  UK  venture  capital industry to lapse into MBO investment (ibid). It found that firms perceived venture capitalists,  as  well  as  banks,  to  not  understand  technology  enough  to  make  a judgment about their businesses (ibid p. 42). While welcoming the VCT scheme in principle,  it was  concerned  about  a  lack  of  interest  in  technology  among VCTs20 and the limited time horizon of investments (ibid p. 62).  Despite the attention to supply side issues, the report paid particular attention to the development of demand‐side policies  in addition  to supply‐side ones.  In  fact, ten of  the seventeen  final  recommendations  involved  the development of human capital in some way, with specific emphasis on building human capital and further developing entrepreneurs’ networks.  A  few  months  after  the  Bank’s  report,  the  CBI  released  its  contribution  to  the discussion.  At  the  beginning  stages  of  the  research  the  Bank  and  the  CBI  had agreed to focus on the relevant areas of their respective interest, so the Bank had focused on the financial system while the CBI focused on management and training issues, as well as corporate relations (Piper and Lund 1997 p. 210). The resulting report, Tech Stars, found that managers of small technology firms typically had the technical but not managerial  skills  required  to grow  their  funds  (CBI 1997 p. 3). The  CBI  report  mirrored  the  Bank’s  findings  by  arguing  that  firms  or  sectors identified as having high growth potential should receive particular support from                                                         20  Of  the  twelve  VCTs  in  existence  at  the  time,  only  two  had  expressed  interest  in  backing technology firms. 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Business Links, and advocated ‘Business Boost’ programmes that would explicitly aid  these  firms  in  raising  the  funds  and  attracting  the  managerial  talent  they required (ibid p. 4).  Following  on  from  the  Bank  and  CBI  reports,  the  two  institutions  organised  a conference  in March 1996 with  the Royal  Society,  seeking  to discuss  and debate the  findings  of  the  resulting  papers  that  had  been  proposed.  The  conference, documented  in  Piper  and  Lund  (1996  p.  211‐212),  resulted  in  the  adoption  of three  key  points:  recognising  the  importance  of  angel  investors;  recognising  the inherent  challenges  associated with  convincing  institutional  investors  to  commit funds to small  firms either directly or via venture capital; and a concern that  the VCT programme might be diverted from its original aims to become a vehicle for low‐risk investments only.   The CBI  report was  followed shortly  thereafter by  the  report of  the Lords Select Committee  on  Science Technology.  The Committee was welcoming  to  the Bank’s explanation  that  the  lack  of  suitable  seed  and  growth  capital was  reflective  of  a market  failure. Given  this, much of  the committee’s conclusions reflected supply‐side  issues.  The  final  results  and  recommendations  identify  some  key  issues, including the cost of due diligence21, the capital gains tax status of entrepreneurs, and include a high level of concern that the VCT scheme was being used for asset‐backed  investments  rather  than  for  riskier  ventures  (House of  Lords 1997 p.14‐16).   
5.2.4.2 Beyond markets and incentives: Small firms policy under New Labour The  subsequent  general  election  saw  a  Labour  government  enter  power  for  the first  time  in  nearly  two  decades.  The  New  Labour  agenda  rejected  the  previous Labour aims of government  institutions to control  the economy (which had been                                                         21  One  fascinating  note  which  was  identified  by  the  Lords  and  seems  to  have  never  been significantly followed up was a report received by the Committee that the ‘Big Six’ accounting firms were acting in concert to “impose standard terms on venture capital firms to limit their liability on venture capital due diligence work. This… could result in fundamental changes in current practice which would  restrict  the  venture  capital  available  to  UK  companies”  (House  of  Lords  1997  par. 2.25).  The  committee  did  not  take  evidence  on  the  subject  and  this  issue  of  accounting  firms’ relationship  to  the  practice  of  due  diligence  is  an  area  of  significant  interest  and  possible  future work. 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advanced  in  the  context  of  this  debate  as  late  as  the  early  1990s),  and  focused instead  on  developing  a  new  ‘knowledge  economy’.  The  book  Promoting 
Prosperity, published by the Commission on Public Policy and British Business (an affiliate  of  the  Labour‐associated  think  tank  the  Institute  for  Public  Policy Research, served as a vision statement for the future of the British economy. This document  identified  networks  as  a  key  feature  to  develop  in  the  economy.  It suggested  networks  would  allow  individual  actors  to  help  each  other  develop, while  the  government would  provide  skills  and  capacity  building  (IPPR 1997,  p. 124‐127). The document and others from IPPR in the period (see Gavron 1998 and Blair  1998)  adopts  the  language  of  the  Bank,  CBI  and  Lords  reports,  whilst adopting  and  highlighting  a  rejection  of  the  funding  gap  framework  (whilst acknowledging the challenges  facing technology‐based firms)  in  favour of a skills and  knowledge‐based  understanding  of  business  underperformance  (Gavron 1998).   Following the Labour victory in 1997, the first new policy directives came in late 1998  with  the  publication  of  two  key  documents,  the  Williams  Report,  which evaluated  existing  Treasury  programmes,  and  the  DTI  White  Paper  on Competitiveness, which outlined the New Labour agenda for the economy.  The first main policy document from the Labour government on the topic of small firm  finance  was  the  Williams  Report,  published  in  November  1998,  which primarily focused on the mechanics of Treasury policy. It called for changes in the capital  gains  tax  to  incentivise  long‐term  holdings, with  CGT  burdens  falling  the longer an investment is held (Williams Report 1998, p. 3‐4). It also identified that the risks facing technology‐based firms were indeed higher than most other firms, and that therefore incentives would need to be drawn up appropriately. Given this, it  proposed  the  creation  of  a  second  tier  of  VCTs,  ‘technology  VCTs’  for  which investors would receive 40% tax breaks rather than the normal 20%, in return for more high‐risk investments (ibid p.4‐5). In addition to these it urged the creation of  tax‐favourable  options  for  executives  of  small  high‐tech  firms  to  be  paid with equity  in  the  firm.  Despite  the  generally  wide  acceptance  of  these recommendations, few of the recommendations found their way into actual policy. 
 99 
 The White Paper built on the themes of capabilities, collaboration and competition put forward in the IPPR Promoting Prosperity (IPPR 1997a) document. The White Paper very clearly laid out an agenda identifying the  ‘knowledge economy’ as the key area for strategic focus, suggesting that as economies became internationalised and  labour  costs  fell,  sustainable  competitive  advantage  would  only  come  from knowledge‐based value addition (DTI 1998).  Key to this vision was the role of entrepreneurial firms. As suggested by the IPPR document,  the  White  Paper  called  for  stronger  roles  for  the  Business  Links network.  To  meet  this,  it  called  for  the  creation  of  more  firms22  (specifically referring  to  the Scottish Secretary of State’s plan  to  create 100,000 new  firms  in Scotland  (DTI  1999  par.  2.18)).  It  also  called  for  the  creation  of  regional development  agencies,  which  would  serve  a  mediating  role  between  national government and the local authorities, which had previously been in charge of their own  economic  development.  The  proposed  creation  of  RDAs  mirrored  another IPPR report (IPPR 1997b) that proposed an increased role for regions.  However  the key contribution of  the White Paper  to  the discussion of small  firm finance was the announcement of a £150m Enterprise Fund. This fund would seek to boost British  competitiveness  and promote  entrepreneurship,  but  rather  than addressing the funding gap as a unitary issue, it adopted the principles of the 1996 and  1997  reports  by  the  Bank  of  England,  CBI  and  Lords  by  seeking  to  address sectoral, locational, and other specific aspects deemed as needing investment. The four areas  identified  in  the White Paper  for  investment were: a national VC  fund for  early‐stage,  high  tech  businesses;  regional  VC  funds  that  would  use  local knowledge to boost VC; support for the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme; and additional  joint  public‐private  financing  initiatives  (DTI  1998  par.  2.24).  The following subsection will discuss  the  implementation of  the  first  two schemes,  in the  form  of  the  Regional  Venture  Capital  Fund  scheme  and  a  series  of  other  VC funds oriented on high‐tech firms.                                                         22  This  was  an  unusual  move  that  was  immediately  reminiscent  of  the  Thatcher  government’s policy, but in fact was reflective of Labour’s aims of using entrepreneurship as a means of bridging social gaps, as outlined in Joseph 2000. 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5.2.4.3 Regional Venture Capital Funds One of the key ideas coming from the White Paper was the notion of government‐backed regional venture capital  funds, but  this was not at all,  in  fact, a new  idea. The  first  clearly  defined  regional  VC  funds  dated  to  1985  (Hamilton 1997,  p.  2), although  in  this way  they were  often  started  by  the  pension  funds  of  individual councils  and  in  some  cases  large  companies.  They  generally  repeated  the  3i business model in the regions, employing 3i‐trained staff who would then continue to ply their trade once leaving the organisation.   The  early  1990s  had  seen  the  emergence  of  several  large  regional  VC  operators (Hamilton  1997,  p.2).  The  first  large  VC  fund  along  these  lines  was  Northern Venture Managers,  whose  fund,  launched  in  1989,  was  enormously  successful  – after  initially  seeking  £10m,  it  was massively  oversubscribed  and  closed with  a pool of £15.4m, drawing  its  funds  from  investors  from London, Scotland and  the North  East  and  North  West  (Hobson  1990).  NVM’s  managing  director,  Michael Denny, remarked at the time23 that he had had no problems raising funds for the first  NVM  fund,  which  made  investments  between  £200,000  and  £2m,  with  an average  investment  size  of  £700,000  (ibid).  In  this  period  the  deal  sizes  varied enormously, from a few thousand to several million. The Midland Enterprise Fund, jointly  backed  by  the  newly‐created  East Midlands  Enterprise  RDA  and Midland Bank, funded a range from £5,000 to £175,000 (Harris 1992 np.).   Although Government‐funded regional schemes had been mooted for a number of years  (Woodcock  1991  p.  25)  and  the  European  Investment  Bank  had  already begun to  invest  in some funds (Campbell 1998 p. 10),  the White Paper  identified this as an area of priority. When the plans were finally announced in January 1999, they  called  for £35‐50m, which would primarily be used  to  ‘prime  the pump’ by leveraging government  funds to demonstrate to  investors that early stage capital investments could indeed be profitable. (Campbell 1999 p. 15).                                                           23 The NVM fund benefitted from raising funds at the peak of the market in 1989, shortly before the recession of 1990‐1992 and the subsequent challenges for VC/PE firms in raising funds. 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Following the announcement of the RVCF scheme, several RDAs sought to directly run  the  new  RVCFs  in  their  regions,  with  maximum  investments  of  up  to  £5m (Wighton  1999  p.  8).  This  was  strenuously  opposed  by  the  private  VC  sector, including 3i, which made threats to shutter branches of its nationwide network if such terms, particularly the maximum deal value, were to be introduced; it argued for a maximum RVCF investment of £250,000 (ibid).  
5.2.4.4 University Challenge Funds and Early Growth Funds In addition to the regional aspect of VC provision, the government pressed forward with a series of other new funds that would back VC investment in other specific areas. The principle behind  the University Challenge Fund scheme – government funds  to  back  government  spinouts  ‐ was  announced  by Gordon Brown  in  1998 (Brown  1998,  p.  16).  Universities,  on  their  own  or  in  consortia,  would  bid  to receive  funds  to create UCFs dedicated  to  funding  the commercialisation of  their technologies  (Green 1999 p. 1). The  initial  £50m pool was expanded  to £65m  in the  Chancellor’s  speech  the  following  year  (Brown 1999 p.  16),  and  designed  to provide early stage VC between £5,000 and £250,000 (Hall 2003 p. 5). The scheme was praised  for  the  creation of many new university  spin‐out  firms,  as 175 new spin‐outs  were  created  in  2001,  and  the  University  of  Sheffield  and  Sheffield Hallam University announced plans to create 90 new spinouts between themselves from 2002‐2004 (Gibson 2002 p. 18).  This  enthusiasm  soon  began  to  appear  to  be  its  own  boom‐bust  cycle  as  the formation of spinouts began to slow amid concerns about the viability of the firms created and backed by the UCFs. The Lambert Report of 2004 expressed significant concern about the viability of spin‐outs (Lambert 2004, p. 5). Meanwhile, funders and  some  university  executives  were  also  becoming  increasingly  sceptical,  after the failure of several high profile UCF‐backed firms. (Guthrie 2004 p. 1).  Another  scheme  announced  in  2002  was  the  Early  Growth  Fund,  which  was targeted at  firms  seeking  less  than £100,000  (Rigby 2003, p.  2). With  funding of only  £20m,  the  scale  of  the  fund was modest,  with  that  funding  divided  for  the 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creation  of  other,  more  regional  funds,  such  as  the  London  Seed  Capital  fund, which operated with £4.8m (Pickard 2002 p. 2, Blitz 2004, p. 3)  
5.2.4.5 ‘Investment Readiness’ and the growth of new demand­side policy While efforts  to provide  funding to small  firms continued through the 2000s,  the focus in the early 1990s on filling managerial and skills gaps became a greater part of policy, with the Business Links scheme expanded and linked in with the RDAs. The idea of a skills gap, in its initial permutation, referred to a lack of managerial skills. The 2000 pre‐Budget statement took the idea forward, identifying a lack of firms  that were  ‘investment  ready’  and  thus  able  to  receive  the newly  enhanced access to equity investments (HM Treasury 2000, par. 3.63). When the details were specified  in  later  documents  (see  HMT/SBS  2001),  the  investment  readiness problem  was  framed  in  terms  of  firms  not  knowing  the  equity  opportunities available  to  them,  not  knowing  how  to  make  their  business  plans  pleasing  to investors, and a general aversion to use of equity for fear of losing control of their business.  This policy  framework was criticised by Mason and Harrison  (2001 p. 664‐665), who  argued  that  the  government’s  framework  ignored  the  issue  of  investability, specifically  whether  firms  had  good  business  plans  and  represented  good investments  to  external  funders.  Mason  and  Harrison  proposed  a  five‐step investment readiness programme to address the problem (p. 666‐668). Later they drew on the experience of the LINC Scotland programme, which provided services to  assist  firms  that  were  having  difficulty  raising  funding  by  leveraging  the knowledge and  financial  resources of  the business angel  community  (Mason and Harrison 2004).  This has been followed by an increased awareness of demand‐side issues for small firms,  to  the  point  that  the  chair  of  the  BVCA  in  2006  advocated  demand‐side approaches to policy rather than a focus on the equity gap (Skypala 2006 p. 4). 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5.2.5 Toward a risk­reward model: Policy frameworks 2000­2009 Policy  developments  since  the  1998 White  Paper  have  continued  to  accept  the notion  of  an  equity  gap.  The  2003 Bridging  the  Finance  Gap  white  paper  (HMT 2003) provides data that point to  finance decreasing as a barrier to growth from 1991‐1999  (ibid  par  2.3). However  it  suggests  that  the  equity  gap  has  persisted and  possibly  grown  (see  para  2.20),  and  discusses  more  recent  qualitative evidence (drawn from Henderson 2000) that  find that  the equity gap (or at  least the perception of an equity gap) remains, and that the UK is unique in having the phenomenon (ibid para 2.21‐2.24). It also refers to the importance of demand‐side measures (as in Mason and Harrison 2001).  The  main  contribution  of  the  Bridging  the  Finance  Gap  paper  is  its recommendation  of  the  adoption  of  the  US  SBIC  business  model  as  a  means  to address  the  funding  gap  by  changing  the  risk‐reward  profile  of  early  stage investment. This was implemented in the creation of the Enterprise Capital Funds scheme  in  2004.  As  with  SBICs,  the  ECFs  would  make  investments  between £250,000‐£2m  and  be  run  by  private  funds.  These  would  need  to  raise  private money,  alongside which  the  government would  contribute  funds  as  a  less‐than‐equal  partner,  much  as  in  the  RVCF  scheme  (Moules  2003  p.  10).  Despite  the announcement  in  2004, Brown waited until  after  the  2005  election  to  introduce ECFs (Guthrie 2005 p. 5), touting them as an alternative to government support for MG Rover when  that  company collapsed  (Eaglesham 2005 p. 4). The ECF model, drawing again upon the public‐private fund model, represented another step in the further development of the provision of capital to small firms from the state.   This emphasis on manipulating the risk profile of investments has represented the most  recent  phase  of  the  evolution  of  the  UK  government’s  approach  to  the institution of the equity gap. By adopting an approach that is driven by the private sector  but  uses  the  government  to  carry  parts  of  the  risk,  the  government  is attempting  to  support  the  industry  and  fill  the  perceived  gaps.  The  following section will  shift our attention  to  the emergence and development of  the private VC sector in the UK. 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5.3  The emergence of the UK venture capital sector: A capabilities­
based interpretation  As discussed in Section 4.3, venture capital as an institution exists only when there is  some  party  willing  to  provide  VCs  with  funds  to  invest.  In  the  UK  the relationship  with  institutional  investors  has  historically  been,  if  not  strained, certainly  more  complex  than  the  US.  The  following  subsections  will  discuss  the emergence  of  the  UK  VC  sector  and  the  relationship  between  ICFC/3i  and  the nascent sector, which the section will argue played a crucial role in the evolution of the broader UK VC/PE sector.    
5.3.1 Venture capital pre­1979 While the UK VC sector is generally attributed to have been founded in earnest in the early 1980s, the prevailing view in the late 1970s was that the era of venture capital had come and gone. Meade (1977, p. 663) refers to “venture capital fever” in the early 1970 that had now subsided into long‐term decline, and Rowley (1976, p. 19) refers in retrospect to 1965 as the “heyday of the venture capital era”. The venture  capital discussed here was  in many ways  similar  to  the US model of VC, with  different  aims  (high  capital  gains)  than  the  then‐prevalent  ICFC  (which sought regular profitable income).   Among  the  highest  profile  of  the  1960s  venture  capital  firms  was  European Enterprises Development (EED), which was established in 1964 in Luxembourg as a venture capitalist for the whole of Europe (Meade 1977, p. 668). Funding for EED was provided by American, British, and European banks, and the president was an executive  from ARD. As with ARD, EED’s business model was based upon capital gains  following on  from sales of  its  investee  firms; however  the general  lack of a liquid secondary market  in Europe meant  that exit was much more difficult,  and when the economic situation in 1976 led banks to  limit corporate overdrafts,  the firm was rendered dormant (Rowley 1976, p. 19).   Beyond EED, a number of UK‐based venture investment firms were established in the mid‐1960s,  although  general  indications  suggest  that  returns  were  typically 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quite  poor.  Spiegelberg  (1973)  profiles  Spey  Investments,  which was  formed  to invest institutional funds in small firms. With funding from some of the most high‐profile UK pension funds, the fund raised £50m and dispersed it relatively quickly, but  a  number  of  investments  failed  and  the  group was  sent  into  a  tailspin  that resulted in the resignation of the founders and the withdrawal of all investors and the failure of the company. Despite this and numerous other cases (see additional discussion in Meade 1976 p. 667‐670), the institutional structure was such that the US model clearly did not work. The lack of exit opportunities provided a structural barrier, and by the late 1970s, the rise in interest rates (from 10% in 1970 to 16% in 1976, ibid) meant that there was little chance that venture capital investments could match these returns24.  These initial funds were largely hampered by difficulties exporting the US business model  to  the UK, which  lacked  a  liquid,  technology‐friendly market  on which  to make easy exit. However, the Conservative victory of 1979 breathed new life into the market, and saw it come back in new forms, in which it thrived.  
5.3.2 ICFC and the staffing of the UK VC industry The  previous  chapter  has  shown  that  the  roots  of  venture  capital  industries  are established  via  the  routines  of  original,  pioneer  VC  firms.  AR&D,  Fairchild  and other early VC and high tech firms played key roles in the diffusion of VC‐related skills through the US. Such a role may similarly be ascribed to ICFC/3i, which came from a different perspective but had a similarly  influential effect on the  industry. ICFC had from its early history maintained a strictly noninterventionist philosophy with its investments; it was understood that the role of ICFC was to provide funds, not  advise managers  on how  to  run  their  businesses  (Coopey  and Clark 1995 p. 210).  3i  philosophies  and  skills  were  shared  as  staff  went  through  a  rigorous training  programme,  such  that  3i  became  known  as  the  “university  of  venture capital” in the 1970s that would generate “a new kind of investment banker” (ibid p.  175).  These  skills  were  based  on  the  rigorous  screening  procedures  for 
                                                        24  For  instance,  ARD’s  highest  IRR  was  18.5%  (and  even  this  was  significantly  skewed  by  its investment  in DEC),  and even a majority of US  funds  in  this  general  time period did not provide returns above 10%. (New Enterprise Systems 1970, quoted in Meade 1976, p. 667). 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identifying  the  targeted  high  growth,  high  profit  firms  and  the  management  of risks associated with these investments.   As the VC sector began to emerge, facilitated by the new government and the new USM  market  (Lonsdale  1997  p.  124),  3i  entered  into  the  VC  market  in  1980. However with a large and well‐trained workforce, 3i was a prime target for other firms, who would poach salaried 3i staff with offers of increased responsibility and performance‐based  remuneration  (Coopey  and  Clark  p.  175‐6).  By  1984  loss  of personnel was  so  great  that  3i  also  adopted  a  performance‐based  compensation scheme to keep up with its rivals in the VC sector (ibid).   
5.3.3 Specialisation in the UK VC sector, 1979­present The entry of 3i into the VC market came as the sector was going through a period of rapid growth, from £20m in 1979 to over £2b in 1994 (ibid p. 129). In its rush to replicate  the  success  of  the  US  VC  sector, many  VC  outfits  launched  early  stage, technology  specialist  funds  (Murray  and  Lott  1995  p.  290‐1).  Despite  the move toward  US‐styled  investment,  certain  3i‐linked  attitudes  about  value  addition remained: one 3i investor was quoted on the topic of venture capital: “if you graft a professional  manager  on  to  a  would‐be  entrepreneur,  the  result  is  likely  to  be disaster – unless the professional manager has entrepreneurial insights himself, in which  case  he  is much more  likely  to want  to  start  up  in  business  on  his  own” (Gleeson 1980 p. 18).   The results of  this  rush  to early stage  technology  firms were mixed. Some  funds, such as  the biosciences specialist Abingworth (which was only partially based  in the UK, but saw only two of its initial 19 UK investments fail) were very successful (Lonsdale 1997 p. 126). Others, such as Electra Risk Capital (of which only two of its 27 investments didn’t fail), were less fortunate (ibid p. 128).   With many investments struggling and half of VC‐backed firms failing (Fleet 1984 p. 21), the market began to transition to embrace new opportunities in ‘merchant’ VC. The market  for management buy‐outs  (MBOs)  expanded  rapidly  in  the  early 1980s,  taking  advantage  of  several  aligning  circumstances:  changes  in  the 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structures of over‐diversified  large  firms,  and plentiful debt  capital  (Wright et  al 1991); as well as the Conservative government’s enthusiasm for privatising assets that had previously been held publicly (Wright et al 2000 p. 153‐155).   The  founding  of  the  British  Venture  Capital  Association  marked  the  increased professionalization of the industry, with the term ‘venture capital’ being used as a catchall  for both  ‘classic’  and  ‘merchant’ VC  confounded  the  issue  further,  as  the BVCA was the representative body for both VC and MBO forms of investment. As a result of  this,  the average  size of UK  investments made by BVCA members more than quadrupled from 1984‐1994 (BVCA 1984, 1994). At  the same time, start‐up investments fell from nearly 18% of all investments in 1984 to 3% in 1994, whilst MBO/MBI deals grew from 21% to 67% in the same period (ibid,).   As the MBO sector continued to grow (see Wright et al 2000), the remaining early stage VCs faced a change  in priorities, especially  in  light of  the recession. Murray and Lott (1995) discuss results of a 1991 survey suggesting that, even disregarding MBO  and  late‐stage  investors,  generalist  VCs  still  perceived  technology‐based firms as higher risk and expected higher internal rates of return from technology‐based firms. They also found that a majority of generalist VCs had backgrounds in finance  or  other  industries  but  not  in  technology,  while  almost  half  of  VCs  had backgrounds in technology (p. 294). In addition they found that technology‐based firms were more hands‐on than generalist firms, although recessionary pressures made both more likely to be directly involved in the firms they backed (ibid p. 294‐5).  The VC sector came back to the forefront in the late 1990s with the dot‐com boom, which despite being largely a US phenomenon also had knock‐on effects in the UK (the frenzy was such that one estimate suggested that that £150b had been wiped off the value of non‐technology FTSE stocks as they had been abandoned in favour of technology‐oriented shares, Waples 2000 p. 3). The boom saw overenthusiastic investment  in dot‐com firms that subsequently  failed. While  the Murray and Lott survey  took place  in  the midst  of  a  recession,  the  survey  in  Lockett  et  al  (2002) took place at  the peak of  the VC market  in 1999.  It  found an  increasing blurring 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between  technology  and  generalist  investments  (ibid  p.  1028)  as  generalists moved into technology‐based ventures, even when generalist VCs didn’t have the backgrounds to fully assess the technology (ibid p. 1029).   This move  into  technology‐based ventures proved  to be  ill‐judged as  the market for technology‐based, and especially dot‐com firms began to collapse in early 2000 with high‐profile failures of firms such as Boo.com (see Hunt 2000 p. 14). However as  the  market  was  showing  signs  of  downturn  in  May  2000,  a  survey  of  VCs showed 60% planned on  increasing their  investments  in  internet ventures  in the following six months (Griffiths 2000 p. 14). The resulting  further collapse  in dot‐com  businesses  (Andrews  2000  p.  23)  began  another  shake  out  period  in  the sector (Daniel and Skapinker 2001, p. 21).  In  recent  years  the  VC  sector  has  seen  shifting  markets,  with  the  influx  of additional private funds (often in the form of VCTs). Data (see DTI SBS 2005, para 4.3) suggest that the VC sector has shifted position, with the majority of private VC funds  being  specialised,  while  most  partially  or  wholly  government  supported funds were generalist. With  increasing  returns  from  the private  equity  sector, 3i finally dropped its poorly‐performing VC business (Arnold 2009 p. 15).  
5.3.4 Funding VC: Pressures on institutional investment Pension  funds  dominate  the  UK’s  institutional  investment  landscape,  with  a significant concentration of UK workers’ savings. (It also makes the emergence of EIS  also  important,  as  it  provides  tax  relief  to  explicitly  support  individual capitalism.) Pension funds make up a bigger share of investors in the broader UK VC  sector25  than  any  other  form  of  institutional  investors,  including  banks  and insurance companies (Mayer et al 2005 p. 591).   However, despite making up such a large share of the market, Clare et al (2009 p. 11‐13) find that UK pension fund managers  are  largely  unable  to  time  the  market  and  are  unable  to  provide  the value enhancement (in terms of timing the market, for instance) that they claim to offer.                                                         25 Mayer et al (2005) base their data on BVCA reports, which reflect not just VC but MBO and other equity based deals as well. Henceforth any discussion of the ‘broader UK VC sector’ will reflect this same extended definition. 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Beyond this, the market has several other distortions as well: whereas in the early 1990s no fund manager in the US had a greater share of the pension market than 3.8%  (Lakonishok  et  al  1991),  in  the  UK  five  pension  fund managers  controlled 80% of the UK pension market in 1998 (Lambert 1998, p. 44‐45). Beyond this, UK pension funds judge their performance not on absolute terms but relative to their peers, creating significant herding effects as  firms  try  to maintain customers and gain new ones rather than increase fees (Blake et al 1998 p. 459‐460). One effect of this herding meant that when UK pension fund managers were not investing in VC, it  was  ignored  by  much  of  the  sector.    Consequently,  North  American  pension funds, seeking to diversify their portfolios, came to the UK and invested in UK VC funds, making up 47% of the funds raised by UK VCs from 1997‐2001 (Mason and Harrison 2002 p. 435).  The difficulties for venture capitalists in raising funds from institutional investors was highlighted in the Myners Report of 2001, which examined the entirety of the UK  institutional  investment  sector.  It  identified  several  factors  that  were undermining  UK  investors  from  backing  VC.  It  found  that  insurance  funds were constrained  by  admissibility  rules  as  to  which  classes  of  investments  can  be counted  in  the  solvency  margins.  VC  and  other  unsecured  investments  were limited  to  10%  of  investments,  as  opposed  to  the  20%  seen  in  the  US  (Myners 2001 par 9.24‐9.26). It found that that the test that assets be ‘readily realisable’ – able to be sold within seven working days for not less than 97.5% of their market value – also discriminated against venture capital, although the FSA later agreed to consider concessions (par 9.29‐9.32). Myners pointed out that the US pension fund sector invested more in the UK VC/PE sector than UK pension funds and outlined a series  of  measures  to  boost  investor  confidence  and  investment  in  the  sector.  Blake  (2003)  discusses  the  shift  engendered  by  the  Myners  report  whereby liabilities  became  increasingly  important  as  means  of  classifying  and  grading assets and potential investments.  This was meant to be a positive result for the UK venture capital sector, although subsequent data (see BVCA 2006) would suggest this may not have necessarily been the case. 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One policy outcome of the Myners Report was the creation of a High Tech Fund of Funds,  a public‐private  fund  that would  stimulate  institutional  investment  in  the UK VC sector and lead to continued institutional investment in the sector (Clarysse et al 2009 p. 21‐22). The government contributed £20m with an additional £106m raised  from  institutional  investors.  Despite  the  size  and  profile  of  the  fund, relatively little is known about it and its success, and it remains an appealing topic for further study.  This  section has  shown how  the  institutional  investment  sector,  and particularly pensions, are extremely concentrated in the UK and how the rise of the MBO has led both to confusion as well as to the abandonment of VC‐style investing in favour of PE. Such behaviour has produced better returns, and the ‘herd mentality’ of the UK  pension  fund  managers  has  not  incentivised  significant  investment  in  the sector.  Indeed,  by  the  late  1990s US pension  funds were  playing  as  significant  a role  in backing  the UK VC sector as  the domestic  institutional  investor  sector.  In light  of  this,  the  sector  has  fragmented  in  several  ways,  with  different  actors seeking to fill different parts of the market. One key reason behind the widespread lack of very strong returns  in  the UK has been  the challenge of  finding good exit opportunities. The following chapter will discuss this challenge in historical terms.  
5.4  Opportunities for exit for UK VC investments  The  success  of  a  venture  capitalist,  particularly  in  the  eyes  of  an  institutional investor, will  be dictated by his  or  her  ability  to  bring  firms  to  exit  successfully. Although  there are several  forms of exit  (see Cumming 2003  for a  typology),  the IPO  is  traditionally  perceived  to  be  both  the most  profitable  and  the most  high‐profile means of exit. The ability to bring firms to IPO, as argued in Chapter 4, has been  developed  in  the US  as  a  dynamic  capability  that  requires  the  assembly  of various  complementary  assets.  At  the  same  time  it  requires  the  presence  of  an equity market  with  an  appetite  for  IPOs.  The  UK  has  tried  to  develop  domestic secondary markets for VC, but as this section will show, there have been significant political considerations to the design of these markets, especially for the prevailing AIM market. 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5.4.1 IPOs and firm exit pre­1979 The first attempts to create a UK VC sector in the late 1960s and early 1970s were seriously hindered by the inability of VCs to exit their investments (Meade 1977 p. 767).  This  was  largely  due  to  the  structure  of  the  London  Stock  Exchange;  the consolidation  of  the  regional  stock markets  into  the  LSE  in  1974  had  particular impact on small firms as it closed off immediate access to capital (Michie 1999 p. 501‐502). The LSE board acknowledged the flaws of its handling of small firms in 1974 (ibid p. 531), and announced plans in 1978 for the creation of a new market specifically directed toward small firms (ibid p. 571).   
5.4.2 The Unlisted Securities Market (USM) Plans  to  introduce  a  new Unlisted  Securities Market moved  forward with  a  new Conservative government  rising  to power. The LSE (in  its unitary role as market and  regulator)  was  especially  fearful  of  encouraging  speculation  on  young ventures  (Michie  1999  p.  571‐572).  At  the  same  time,  ICFC/FFI/3i‐backed investments were beginning  to present a market  for a small cap market (Coopey and Clark 1995 p. 199, 275). The plans for the new USM called for it to be open to any  firm  that  had  been  in  existence  for  three  years,  with  five  years’  financial statements  required  if  the  firm had been  in business  that  long  (Hutchinson et  al 1988 p. 11). With no underwriters involved, costs were lowered.  In  its  initial  years,  the USM was  quite  successful,  driven  in  early  years  by MBOs from the burgeoning VC/PE sector (Wright et al 2000 p. 150). Approximately 200 firms  were  listed  on  the  market,  with  an  average  market  value  at  flotation  of approximately £10m, compared  to  the average value of  firms  floated on  the LSE, which was £38m  (Hutchinson et  al  1988 p.  12).  In 1985,  its  peak year,  89  firms listed on the market, raising £300m (Independent 1991, p. 25). Indeed, in terms of identifying high‐growth  small  firms,  the USM was widely  found  to  be  successful, with  the  firms  listed  on USM having higher  growth  rates  and  gearing  and  lower liquidity  than  peers  at  the  same  time  (Hutchinson  et  al  1988  p.  17).  More immediately,  the  USM  beat  the  FT  All‐Share  index  in  terms  of  performance  by 19.5% in 1987 (Speck 1989, p. 1). 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However  this  trend  began  to  decline  with  the  weakening  economy  of  the  late 1980s. As  the  takeover market expanded, more MBOs started  to  list on  the Main Market  instead  of  the  USM  (Wright  et  al  2000  p.  150).  The  USM’s  performance against the All‐Share index fell from ‐3.5% in 1988 to ‐15% in 1989. This economic downturn  facilitated a decline  in USM admissions  in  the early 1990s, going  for a period of nearly a year  in 1990‐1991 with no  listings  (Independent 1991, p. 25) and with only four listings from 1994‐1995, raising a total of £1.4m. (Hellier 1995, p.  21).  Linking with  this was  the  fact  that  due  to  changes  in  EU  regulations  the listing requirements for USM and the LSE were by this point relatively similar, and firms seeking to go public were choosing to go ‘all the way’ and offer shares on the main board (The Economist 1993, p. 82).  The USM showed that a secondary market to the LSE could work, and the recession of  the  early  1990s  cleared  the  way  for  a  new  market  to  be  created  (and  for complementary policy opportunities with the dropping of BES in favour of the EIS and  VCT  schemes).  The  following  section  will  discuss  the  very  different conceptions for what ultimately became AIM.  
5.4.3 AIM and the politics of market creation The announcement of  the closure of  the USM was widely  criticised,  as  the  initial intent  seemed  for  the market  to  not  be  replaced  (Thapar  1993  p.  27).  The  LSE climbed down from this position in 1993, appointing a working group to examine the  issues  of  a  secondary  market.  With  membership  composed  of  the representatives  of  the  VC  and  stock  market  communities,  the  committee  was divided between  two opposing  visions  of  the market  need  (Kay 1994,  p.  2).  The stock  market‐oriented  perspective,  which  had  the  backing  of  the  government, envisioned the new market as a mini‐LSE that would replicate the USM’s function as a generalist market at smaller valuations (Thapar 1994a p. 1).   This interpretation of the need for a direct descendent of USM was challenged by some in the VC sector, who sought to create a new, technology‐focused market that would be modelled on NASDAQ. The listing of British Bio‐technology on the LSE in 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1993 only proceeded once  the LSE waived  rules  requiring  firm profitability,  and this,  along  with  defections  of  UK  firms  to  NASDAQ  led  to  calls  for  a  pan‐EU technology‐focused  market  (The  Economist,  1993b  p.  74).  The  defection  of  UK technology firms to the NASDAQ market was increasing, and there were concerns that the UK would begin to lose out (Baker 1996 p. 7)  The  consultation  document  was  published  in  September  1993,  albeit  without strong  backing  of  the  rest  of  the  group.  It  called  for  a  new  market,  called  the Enterprise  Market,  which  would  be  a  part  of  the  LSE  but  have  a  separate management structure (Thapar 1993 p. 27). It would loosen restrictions on firms that could list, even allowing firms with minimal trading history to list (ibid).  The plan was  considered  at  the LSE board’s meeting  in December 1993,  but  the board  chose  not  to  implement  the  plan,  instead  opting  to  carry  out  additional market  research  (Hamilton 1993 p.2).  This was  roundly  criticised  and  seen  as  a stalling  technique  (Thapar  1994b  p.  20),  and  in  January  1994  Ronald  Cohen, chairman of VC group Apax Partners, criticised the LSE decision not to publish the committee’s report. Cohen announced an intention to create an alternative to the LSE’s  plans,  one  that  would  be  based  upon  “entrepreneurially  managed  growth companies” (Kay 1994, p. 2) that would seek to replicate NASDAQ.  After  further perceived stalling from the LSE (Thapar 1994 p.1),  it announced its plans  for  the  new  market:  there  would  be  none  (Waples  1994  p.  4).  Instead  it presented  a  seven‐point  plan  to  eliminate  the need  for  an  exchange,  turning  the existing  lightly‐regulated  535.2  market  into  a  more  established  share  trading facility with  less disclosure required  than  for USM (ibid). The response was very negative,  with  CISCO,  the  City  small  firms  interest  group,  protesting  loudly  and advocating the ongoing discussions about creating a pan‐European exchange (Kay 1994 p. 2).  This  resulted  in  the  drafting  of  yet  anther  consultative  proposal  in  September 1994.  This  proposed  the  creation  of  a  new  market  to  be  called  AIM  –  the Alternative  Investment  Market.  As  an  evolution  of  the  existing  4.2  market,  it 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provided a market setting but also a lighter touch of regulation (Hamilton 1994 p. 1). Firms would be required to disclose dealings in its own stock (as well as similar matters)  but  would  not  require  a  broker  or  advisor,  and  would  have  limited suitability  requirements  to  listing  (Goodway  1994  p.  3).  The  figures  in  the prospectus would  therefore  be  the  responsibility  of  the  firm’s  directors.  If  there was fraudulent activity at work,  it was assumed that the financial media, and not immediate advisors, would detect and report it.  The response to the paper was mixed. Some in the City praised  it as a great  leap forward, while others were critical of  the  lack of a  role  for brokers and advisors (Kay 1994b, p.3). The initial paper was followed up in February 1995 by another consultation  document.  This  revised  document  maintained  the  lack  of  specific suitability  or  trading  requirements,  but  did  call  for  firms  to  have  a  nominated broker and advisor  (which  could be  the  same  firm), who would oversee  the due diligence  required  (Whitebloom  1995  p.  15).  Yet  the  list  of  acceptable  advisors, once  published,  did  not  immediately  stir  widespread  confidence  as  many prominent  brokers  and  advisors  chose  not  to  participate.  Indeed,  some  brokers offered all‐inclusive listing on AIM for £50,000, leading to some widespread fears that due diligence would be heavily lacking in the new market (Stevenson 1995, p. 27).   AIM began an aggressive marketing campaign, which saw its representatives carry out 29 road shows across Britain, attended by 1900 people, and had received 700 inquiries about  listing  (Goodway 1995 p. 5). Despite  this,  fears  intensified as  the opening date of the market approached, as only eleven firms were registered to be a  part  of  the  market  from  its  first  day  (Hellier  1995,  p  21).  This  nervous  start (compounded  by  fears  that  the  market  would  be  open  to  fraud)  was  soon overcome  by  a  fairly  rapid  growth: within  four weeks  the market  had  grown  to eighteen  firms,  with  41  approved  advisors  and  capitalisation  of  the  market growing  from  £82m  to  £183m  (Pangalos  1995b).  While  this  growth  was  not immediately  replicated,  the  market  did  continue  to  grow,  albeit  without  the support  of  large  institutional  investors.  These  investors  were  waiting  for  the market to get to a size whereupon liquidity would be generated, while the market 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was waiting for more investors to buy in to its potential. At the same time, advisors were concerned that high tech firms were seeking AIM listing based on hopelessly high expectations for the valuations their firms would receive. This, combined with the  risk  profile  for  the  market  itself  and  the  concerns  about  fraud,  led  some advisors to avoid high tech sectors altogether (Stevenson 1995b p. 14).  
5.4.4 AIM IPO size and performance  Ultimately  these  initial  fears  proved  to  be  unfounded,  as  institutional  investors’ attitudes  changed  and  more  firms  flocked  onto  the  market,  with  the  number reaching 100in October 1995. The number continued to rise, boosted in part by the introduction  of  the  VCT  scheme.  AIM  has  since  become  a  widely  flourishing market, with over 3000 admissions raising £62.6b as of July 2009.  Despite  AIM’s  enormous  success,  concerns  have  been  raised  that  AIM  does  not meet  the  capital needs of  the broader UK VC  sector. There  remains a  contingent (the same that argued against the creation of AIM in its current form) that argues that Europe needs its own technology specialist market. From this perspective (see Abbanat  2004  and  Clarysse  et  al  2009  par  3.1.1),  AIM  lacks  the  technology specialisation seen in NASDAQ and as such does not offer the favourable valuation, liquidity, and overall enhanced exit opportunities found by NASDAQ.  The data and literature surrounding the success of AIM demonstrates some of the unusual  characteristics  of  the  market.  As  a  market,  it  is  dominated  by  a  few sectors: twenty‐three of the top fifty firms in July 2009 are in mining, oil and gas, or  other  natural  resource‐oriented  sectors.  In  the  same  period  technology  firms (defined here as software, hardware, and biotech) made up roughly 9% of market capitalisation, significantly lower than that found in NASDAQ.  Beyond  this,  AIM  has  been  identified  as  the  first  market  where  operational performance of  firms  increases,  rather  than decreases,  after  IPO  (Khurshed et  al 2005). In other words, listing on AIM does not adversely affect firms’ performance, but firms continue to grow after listing. AIM firms use the market as a means for 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growth26 and not purely as an end point, after which performance decreases (as is the case on the LSE Official List and virtually all other markets). This is positive for firms that use AIM to access capital, but suggests that AIM is less likely to overprice shares,  which would  enable  VCs  to  generate  high  returns  such  as  those  seen  in NASDAQ.  Given  that  the  literature  (see  Chahine  et  al  2007  p.  525‐526)  suggests AIM  investments  are  not  as  underpriced  as  other  European  shares,  one  must wonder whether these valuations are inaccurate or perhaps reflecting institutional differences  in  the  markets  for  risk,  in  line  with  Bush’s  (2005)  argument  about markets for risk in the US and UK as discussed in the previous chapter.   
5.4.5 Exits and returns to VC As  suggested  elsewhere  in  this  chapter,  the  availability  of  exit  opportunities  for investments in the UK has been relatively limited, although there is relatively little direct data on the subject. In a survey of VCs, Murray (1994) found that trade sales were  generally  the  preferred  means  of  exit  for  investments,  followed  by management  buy  backs,  IPO  and  sale  to  developmental  capitalist  (p.70).  He suggested  that  beyond  the  initial  equity  gap  there  was  a  ‘second’  gap  at  an expansion stage, and that the drive toward trade sales might be due to this second gap (ibid p. 73).   If firms do not seek the large‐scale IPO exits, it is somewhat unsurprising that that performance of early‐stage investments is lower than that of other schemes. Given the  expected  balance  that  a  handful  of  high‐value  exits  will  provide  very  high returns, covering and exceeding other losses, it would appear that a move toward trade sales would take the edge off these investments. Burgel (2000) suggests that the  IRRs  for  early  stage  and  technology  based  firms  are  well  below  those  that would be expected by industry (see the high IRR expectations of VCs in Murray and Lott 1995 and Lockett et al 2002). Data in Bank of England (2001) further shows that  the performance of  funds has been generally  lower  than MBO deals  (and as size of MBO deals increase, so does the difference) (para 3.5‐3.11).                                                          26  This  has  been  taken  to  extreme  levels  by  some  biotechnology  firms  that  have  gone  without significant  VC  funding  for  their  first  three  years  and  then  listed  on  AIM  with  very  small  IPOs, effectively cutting VCs out of the process (Critical I 2006 p.4) 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Despite this, there has been a general lack of quality exit data on VC investments. This  will  be  addressed  in  the  Chapter  6,  which  will  discuss  exit  patterns  in government backed schemes, including VCT and the post‐1998 schemes.  
5.5  Supply­demand relationships, exits and capabilities in the UK VC 
sector  This chapter has sought to explore in some degree of detail the dynamics affecting the  development  of  the  UK  venture  capital  sector.  It  has  argued  that  the  main relationships that define what we know as VC have each been dysfunctional, with the aggregate result being that few of the conditions to truly replicate the success of  the  US  have  been  present  in  the  UK.  This  section  will  further  discuss  these arguments and will link them to the previous chapter’s discussion of capabilities in the VC sector.  
5.5.1 Supply­demand relationships, policy and risk capital The relationship between VCs and firms has been characterised extensively by the notion of  the  ‘equity gap’,  the  idea  that  there  is a gap  in  funds available  to  small firms.   From the identification of the Macmillan Gap in 1931, the government has played an active  role  in  the area of  small  firm  finance, and  the emergence of  the UK’s VC sector. Indeed, the ‘equity gap’ has played a dominant, almost monolithic role in the policy discussions surrounding the UK VC sector. This role is amenable to the interpretation of the notion of the boundary object, as discussed in Section 3.2.3.  A  boundary  object  (see  Star  and  Griesemer  1989)  is  a  concept  that  is universally acknowledged and is broadly actionable, but is actually interpreted to mean different things to different actors. For instance in the case of the equity gap the  initial discussion  in the Macmillan report reflected,  implicitly  if not explicitly, Keynes’s views on uncertainty. From this perspective the uncertainty surrounding small  firms was  so  significant  that  intervention was  required  to bridge  that  gap. This  view  was  generally  accepted  throughout  the  next  fifty  years,  until  the Conservative  government  of  1979.  From  the  Thatcherite  view  (and  the  views  of subsequent  governments),  the  equity  gap  was  less  indicative  of  market uncertainty,  and  instead  more  similar  to  a  market  failure.  Consequently,  it  was 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perceived, the best way to address that failure was by incentivising investment in small firms, so as to make the market work more efficiently.  This has resulted in a contiguous understanding of the equity gap as a key policy issue, but the framing and explanation of the problem, and the means by which to address it, have changed over time. The initial approach sought to address the gap by  filling  it  with  a  quasi‐governmental  institution,  ICFC,  reflecting  broader Keynsian  concerns  and  attitudes  of  the  time.  The move  toward  a market‐failure oriented understanding of the issues was reflected in a view that the best way to address that failure was by incentivising investment in small firms, so as to make the market work more efficiently. However, these schemes, such as the BES, were generally recognised to be rather less successful in addressing these funding gaps. The later VCT scheme sought to close the loopholes, but was again widely criticised for underwriting investments that did not reflect the nature of the equity gap.   More  recent  policies  have  begun  to  demonstrate  nuance  in  examining  issues surrounding small  firm finance. Rather  than assuming  that directing  funds  into a general  area  (such  as  small  firms) will  address  the problem,  they have begun  to address  specific  areas  for  funding.  However  even  still  these  policies  generally reflect an issue underlying the entire equity gap rationale,  in that it assumes that the  challenges  small  firms  face  in  obtaining  funding  are  due  to  the  supply  of capital. Such a supply‐side approach ignores the prospect that the flow may not be in  the  supply  of  capital,  but  instead  in  the  demand  for  capital.  Despite  some measures  aimed  at  increasing  demand  and  encouraging  firm  survival  (including schemes in the early 1990s such as Business Links, and the early 2000s investment readiness platform, see Mason and Harrison 2001), much of the policy effort in the UK has focused on addressing provision of capital, rather than ensuring that there are sufficient firms to receive and successfully use this capital.   At  the  same  time,  the  government  has  generally  had  little  interaction  with  the private VC sector, and some of the most successful firms have had little interaction with  government  policies  designed  to  boost  the  supply  of  capital.  This  arguably 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creates a ‘tiered’ system in which the best investments get picked up by top firms, whilst government‐backed funds support  firms that are of  inferior quality but do have  some  growth  potential27.  This  itself  creates  even  more  distortions  in  the market, as supply of private capital, supply of public capital and demand for funds all intermingle.  The  relationship between VCs and  the  limited partners who  fund  them has been similarly  strained.  The  UK’s  institutional  investors  are  dominated  by  a  small number  of  fund  managers  who  assess  their  performance  not  in  real  terms  but against each other, creating significant herd‐mentality problems in that when one avoids VC, the others do as well. In this way the VC sector struggles because of its poor returns in comparison to private equity deals, as well as the proximity of the VC sector to PE (in that VC and PE are often considered to be the same industry). As a result, the sector is squeezed in terms of available cash, again into haves and have‐nots.  One reason  for  this  squeeze  is  the absence of an effective means of exit  from VC investments,  and  this  relationship,  between  firms  and markets,  is  also  strained. The AIM market was  founded with  the  intent  of  providing  a  second‐tier market that would benefit smaller, riskier firms, and it has thrived, although at an unusual price.  It has become one of the few,  if not the only secondary market to thrive in economic downturns and to be a market that truly facilitates growth as a means to growth rather than an endpoint, which damages the prospects for exit for VCs, and consequently  leads  to  the  trade  sale  becoming  the  dominant  form  of  exit  in  the sector.  These distortions have impacted the development of the VC sector, but as yet this section  has  not  discussed  the  activities  of  UK  VCs  themselves.  The  following subsection will discuss the capabilities that these circumstances have engendered.  
                                                        27 This is the explanation of the funding gap historically used by Ray Oakey: that the funding gap is not about the top 10% of firms, but is instead about the 20% of good‐but‐not‐great firms below the 10% that would be funded anyway. (Personal communication). 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5.5.2  A  capabilities­based  perspective  on  the  history  of  the  equity  gap  and 
the UK VC sector 
 Considering the discussion in the previous chapter of the role of capabilities within that framework,  it may be useful to apply a similar capabilities‐based framework to  explain  the  history  of  the  UK  VC  chapter.  Here  we  again  adopt  a  realist  and skills‐based perspective in explaining the development of the sector in the UK.  The roots of venture capital  industries seem to be established via the routines  in original,  pioneer VC  firms. AR&D, Fairchild  and other  initial VC  firms played key roles in the diffusion of VC‐related skills through the US. Such a role may similarly be ascribed to ICFC/3i, which came from a different perspective but had a similarly influential  effect  on  the  industry.  3i’s  explicitly  non‐interventionist  screening policy  viewed  the  investor  purely  as  a  distributor  of  funds,  with  no  place  for editorialising about the management of the fund (Coopey and Clark 1995 p. 210). When the VC sector emerged, 3i employees, being well‐trained at the ‘university of venture capital’, distributed their skills throughout the sector (ibid p. 175‐6).   These capabilities and routines were focused on screening and management of risk (ibid p. 210). The new VC sector, stocked with ICFC alumni, sought to apply these capabilities  in  technology‐specialised  funds,  but  found  their  (financial  and accounting‐based)  skills  did  not  directly  match  the  skills  required  to  deal  with risky technology‐oriented firms. As a result some new VC funds succeeded, while others  were  less  successful  (Lonsdale  1997  p.  122).  In  this  period  two  other opportunities  emerged  that  were  more  suited  to  the  ICFC‐based  style  of investment. The emerging markets  for MBOs were  less  risky  than early  stage VC and  the  need  for  screening  and  risk  management  in  the  market  for  managers (Wright et al 2000) were more suited to the ICFC style of investment. Further, the introduction of the Business Expansion Scheme provided another means of market entry, which was  focused more on conservative  investment and compliance with tax rules. Given consumers’ aversion to risk, BES firms were more likely to avoid the  risks  associated  with  high‐tech  investment  and  again  play  to  the  ICFC strengths.  
 121 
This  resulted  in a  fragmentation of  the  sector, with  the MBOs splitting  into  their own de facto sector whilst the VC sector persevered, albeit with its own divisions. Generalists  in  the  sector  typically  maintained  screening  approaches,  whilst specialists  built  up  knowledge  around  particular  sectors  and  added  value associated  with  their  technical  knowledge  (Murray  and  Lott  1995  p.  290).  The government  scheme‐oriented part of  the VC sector  continued with BES and  then on  with  the  VCT  scheme.  The  dot‐com  boom  saw  large  numbers  of  generalists investing into technology based sectors (Lockett et al 2002), and taking significant losses as their technology gambles didn’t pay (Lonsdale 1997 p. 122).  The resulting situation is one where a limited number of high‐quality, specialist VC firms make value‐added  investments. They do this on a broad geographical scale and  retain  their  top  staff  using  carried  interest;  in  the words  of  one  VC:  “when someone  joins our  firm, we congratulate them on taking the  last  job of  their  life” (Stephen  Bunting,  personal  communication).  The  generalist  market  for  VC  has decreased as the targeted hybrid institutional investment market has grown (DTI SBS 2005 para 3.09‐3.14).  This interpretation, in which the ‘middle’ of the VC market falls away as specialists and  hybrid  funds  emerge,  would  suggest  that  the  lack  of  exit  opportunities represents a significant problem facing the sector, matching Murray’s suggestion of multiple gaps (1994).   
5.6  Conclusion  This chapter has made several arguments about the emergence of the UK market for  risk capital.  It has discussed  the emergence and evolution of  the  ‘equity gap’, arguing  that  the  notion  of  an  equity  gap  has  become  a  boundary  object  that  is widely  acknowledged  but  means  different  things  to  different  actors.  The ‘Macmillan’ gap was initially understood as a structural flaw in the economy, which led  to  the  creation  of  ICFC  as  a  national  institution  to  address  the  gap.  The Conservative governments attempted to use market  forces  to address  the gap by 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incentivising  consumer  investment  into  these  areas,  but  this  approach  was exploited  in unintended ways because of  tax  incentives. The Labour government has since embraced a more targeted approach to the issue by inducing institutional investors  to back  the  sector,  first  attempting  to demonstrate  that  investments  in the equity gap could be profitable. When this approach was unsuccessful following the  collapse  of  the  dot‐com market  a  new  policy  view  emerged  that  focused  on shifting institutional investors’ risk‐reward profile by creating more hybrid public‐private funds to fill these gaps.   The  chapter  then  discusses  the  emergence  of  the  private  UK  VC  sector  and  the means for exit, suggesting that both have been strongly impacted, either directly or indirectly by policies present and past. In particular it calls attention to the issue of firm exit; existing evidence suggests that the struggles of the sector to raise funds and grow have been in large part due to poor returns to early stage investments. These returns may be linked to the lack of exit opportunities, which combine with funding pressures to limit VCs to seeking trade sale exits (Murray 2001).  The chapter then presents a capabilities‐based interpretation of the case of the UK, suggesting  that  the  training  and  routines  established  in  ICFC/3i  were  spread through  the  VC  sector  in  the  early  80s.  These  screening  and  investment management  capabilities  were  better  suited  to  the  MBO  market,  leading  to  the growth of that sector and the decrease of the VC sector. ‘Classic’ US‐style VC played a  much  smaller  role,  with  fewer  capabilities  and  economies  of  scale,  and diminished  means  of  exit.  The  result  was  that  those  firms  with  specialised knowledge  and  capabilities  became  successful  in  the  VC  sector,  while  others (typically generalists) left the sector.  This  chapter  has  provided  an  alternate  interpretation  for  understanding  the relationship  between  policy  and  the  emergence  of  the  UK  VC  sector.    However while  this  chapter  has  drawn  its  conclusions  from  historical  and  qualitative analysis,  the  following  chapter  will  present  detailed  quantitative  analysis  of  the Venture Capital Trust scheme and several other key government equity schemes.  The  conclusions  drawn  from  this  analysis  will  provide  support  for  the 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6.1  Introduction  The previous chapter provided a detailed examination of the role of policy  in the development  in  the  UK  venture  capital  sector.    Drawing  upon  historical  and qualitative  evidence  it  provided  an  argument  that  the  equity  gap  framework served as a  ‘boundary object’  that mischaracterised both supply and demand  for capital.    It  also  argued  that  the  development  of  the  private  UK  VC  sector  was hampered  by  the  absence  of  effective  means  of  exit  from  VC  investments,  and finally proposed a capabilities‐based interpretation of the emergence of VC in the UK.  This  chapter  seeks  to  provide  an  in‐depth  quantitative  exploration  of  several themes identified in the previous chapter.    It does so by drawing upon data from the  Venture  Capital  Trust  (VCT)  scheme,  as  well  as  several  policy  initiatives stemming from the 1998 White Paper on Competitiveness.  These cases, while not representative of the UK VC sector as a whole, are ‘crucial’ cases, analysis of which will provide a unique perspective of the relationship of policy to small firm finance in  the  UK.    Analysis  of  these  cases  will  then  provide  insights  that  could  not  be generated by standard analysis of private VC alone.  This chapter seeks to provide empirical support for these initial conclusions, using new  and  proprietary  datasets  that  cover  data  on  government  interventions targeted  at  small  and  growing  firms  from  1995  to  2008.  These  datasets  include data  on  unique  investment‐level  data  for  the  venture  capital  trust  (VCT) programme,  followed  by  investment‐level  data  examining  investments  made  by several schemes stemming from the   Section 6.2 will discuss these schemes and their selection and review the current empirical  literature  on  the  topic.  Section  6.3  will  discuss  the  framing  of  the research questions for the chapter, and the methodological issues. The quantitative 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analysis  adopts  Cumming’s  (2007)  methodology  for  examining  the  relative effectiveness of government schemes in directing funds to small firms. Section 6.4 will  discuss  the  collection  of  the  data  and  provide  general  descriptive  data examining  the  VCT  and  post‐1998  datasets.  Sections  6.5‐6.8  will  each  discuss analysis and results of research questions set forth in section 6.3, and Section 6.9 will summarise and conclude.   
6.2  VCTs and post­1998 schemes: Selection, characteristics and 
relevant empirical literature   The quantitative analysis in this thesis focuses on one flagship equity scheme, the Venture Capital Trust  (VCT)  scheme,  and a  series of  smaller  government‐backed programmes created in the wake of the 1998 Competitiveness White Paper.   The decision  to  focus  on  the  VCT  and  post‐1998  schemes  reflects  the  important  and active public role  in the sector  identified in the previous chapter.     The supposed existence of an equity gap has been the driver of public policy toward small  firm finance,  which  Chapter  5  argued  has  had  path‐dependent  consequences  for  the later evolution of the sector.  Consequently given the considerable impact of public policy in this area, analysis of these schemes over an extended period serves as a rational extension of these arguments.  In this way we may view the VCT and post‐1998 schemes described below as  ‘crucial’  cases.   While  they are not necessarily representative of the entire universe of UK venture capital, they have unique and compelling characteristics that give them particular explanatory power, especially in  the context of  the cases above. This section discusses  these schemes and their relevance  to  the broader  issues  tackled  in  the  thesis.   Section 6.2.1 describes  the VCT  scheme,  Section  6.2.2  describes  the  post‐1998  schemes,  and  Section  6.2.3 provides a brief review of empirical literature surrounding these schemes.  
6.2.1 The design and characteristics of the Venture Capital Trust scheme The  analysis  of  the  VCT  scheme  in  following  sections will  in many ways  reflect particular characteristics of the scheme’s design.  This section therefore describes the structure of the scheme and how its design has changed over time. 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2008  Funds: VAT no longer charged on management fees. (Lodge 2008 p. 15)  These restrictions necessarily changed the behaviour of the fund managers.  After initial  attempts  to  invest  in  very  conservative  asset‐backed  schemes  were circumvented  by  rules  changes,  some  VCTs  followed  strategies  of  qualifying  yet very  conservative  investments,  while  more  followed  approaches  of  generalist investing.    Given  the  relatively  low  ceiling  of  investment  size,  many  funds attempted  to  generate  economies  of  scale  by  operating  more  than  one  fund, sharing management teams and joining with other managed VCTs to make larger investments.  For instance, one fund manager operates four funds, and frequently makes £4m investments in firms, using £1m from each fund under its control. 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Consequently it is necessarily to clarify the explanatory power of analysis derived from the VCT scheme  in relation  to  the conventional UK private VC sector.   Both tend  to  operate  across  a  range  of  investment  types  (including  both  ‘classic’  and ‘merchant’ VC‐style investments), and both are run privately by fund management professionals.  Indeed, in some cases VCTs are run by the same fund managers who also  operate  conventional  VC  funds.    However  the  tax  efficient  characteristics, consumer  investors  and  restrictions  on  investment  seen  in  the  VCT  scheme  are quite  different  from  the  growth  focus  and  institutional  investors  in  private  VC. Consequently,  it  is  important  to  interpret  findings  regarding  VCTs  as  having common elements with VC but not being purely  representative of  the VC  sector.  VCTs are equity  investments made by professional  specialists  in  small  cap  firms, and the dataset discussed in section 6.4 gives potential for unique insights, but the analysis of the VCT sector should not be confused with a comprehensive analysis of the broader UK VC sector.   
6.2.2 The design and characteristics of the post­1998 schemes In addition to the VCT scheme, this chapter also analyses the raft of equity schemes introduced  after  the  1998  Competitiveness  White  Paper.    While  the  political context  of  these  schemes  was  discussed  in  Chapter  5,  it  is  remains  particularly relevant  to  also  consider  the  more  specific  details  of  the  schemes  that  will  be analysed subsequently.  The Regional Venture Capital Fund  (RVCF)  scheme was developed as part of  the response to the 1998 White Paper.   Its aim was to spur innovation and economic growth in the English regions.  Tenders were opened for private fund managers to run  RVCFs  in  each  of  the  nine  regions,  in  consultation  with  the  local  Regional Development  Agency.    Successful  bidders  then  launched  a  closed‐end  ten‐year fund under a limited partnership agreement.  Of the nine funds, four were awarded to the same fund manager, YFM (DTI 2006b).   The maximum investment size was £250,000, with the potential for a follow‐on investment of £250,000.  Restrictions on  size  and  sector  were  also  used,  as  in  the  VCT  scheme  (though  for  RVCF  the ceiling on firm size was higher). 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The Early Growth Fund (EGF),  introduced at  the same time as  the RVCF scheme, sought to provide capital to smaller firms to facilitate growth.   Similarly privately managed, EGFs included both regional specialist and national funds.   Investments under this scheme had fewer restrictions than RVCF or VCT investments, but the maximum investment size was £100,000, without the potential for follow‐on (DTI 2006a).  The University Challenge Fund (UCF) was launched in 1999 around the provision of  seed  capital  to  facilitate  university  spin‐outs.    Universities  generally  launched consortia  to bid  to  receive  these  funds, which  then provided seed  funding worth between £5,000‐250,000 to any spin‐outs coming from the universities in a given consortium (Hall 2003 p.5).     Overall nineteen funds representing 59 universities were created, with the collective investment in the nineteen funds was £60 million (DTI 2006c).   Funding for spin‐outs receiving investment was typically  limited to small, seed amounts.  The Enterprise  Capital  Fund  (ECF),  as mentioned  in  Section 5.2.5,  represented  a change  in  policy,  with  a  move  toward  a  ‘hybrid’  fund  approach  where  the government  was  one  of  many  partners  and  the  focus  was  on  modifying  the risk/reward  ratio  for  private  investors.    Firms  eligible  for  ECF  funding  could receive up to £2 million.  Some restrictions on sector were implemented, but these typically reflected state aid concerns rather  than asset‐backed sectors, as seen  in the VCT sector (BIS 2008).  Finally the data includes equity investments made by the national governments of Wales, Scotland and Northern  Ireland.   Many of  these  investments were made  in organisations  based  around  the  premise  of  local  economic  development,  but  in general  these  did  not  come  under  the  aegis  of  particular,  government‐identified schemes.  The one exception is the Scottish Co‐Investments Fund, which provided matching capital for equity investments made in Scottish firm by private investors. 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As with the discussion of VCTs, it is also important to note that these schemes are not necessarily  synonymous with  the private  venture  capital  sector.   Again  even though  some  of  these  schemes  are  privately  run  by  professional  VCs,  the restrictions  on  investments  (and  particularly  issues  such  as  follow‐on  funding) mean that these do not necessarily make for pure examples of UK venture capital.   
6.2.3 Empirical literature on the VCT and post­1998 schemes Despite the prominence, cost and perceived importance to the UK economy, there is relatively  little academic  literature on the VCT and post‐1998 programmes. To date they have primarily been the target of government‐backed evaluations, many of  which  have  not  been  published  academically.  This  section  will  discuss  the findings of the existing literature, and identify the gaps that this chapter seeks to fill.  The  VCT  programme  (and  its  sister  EIS)  had  been  discussed  in  several  policy documents  that  led  ultimately  to  the  publication  of  the  1998  White  Paper  on Competitiveness.  Several of  these  reports,  including  the Bank of England  (1997), House  of  Lords  (1998),  and  Williams  (1998)  reports,  were  critical  of  the exploitation of the VCT scheme by fund managers whose offerings complied with the letter but not spirit of the scheme, largely by making asset‐backed investments rather than ones that involved any significant risk. These assertions were generally expressed without any quantitative evidence.  The  first  major  study  of  the  VCT  and  EIS  schemes  was  published  in  2003  in  a report by Boyns et al (2003). The report was a wide‐ranging evaluation of all facets of  the  two  programmes,  based  on  survey  questionnaires  distributed  to  VCT  and EIS  investors  (with  approximately  500  and  1000  responses,  respectively); telephone  interviews  with  approximately  75  investors  in  each  scheme; questionnaire‐based  interviews  with  279  VCT‐  and  500  EIS‐backed  firms (including  50  in‐depth  interviews  with  firms  from  each  scheme);  and approximately  150  interviews with  investment  advisors  who  referred  clients  to one  of  the  schemes.  The  goals  of  the  study  were  to  assess  the  impact  of  the schemes of availability of finance to small firms; to learn how the firms in question 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had used the funding, and the effect the funding had had on their performance; and to  assess  the broader  economic  impact  and  cost  effectiveness of  the  schemes on the funds in question.   The results of the analysis suggested that the schemes had positive effects. Boyns et  al  found  that  both  schemes had been  successful  in  achieving  their  aims.  They estimated from survey data that 70‐85% of firms receiving VCT backing would not received external backing had the VCT scheme not been in place (2003, par. 8.3.1). At the same time, some of the firms that received VCT funding could have received funds  from  elsewhere  (par  5.3.1‐2),  so  it  called  into  question  whether  the  VCT scheme  was  truly  filling  a  ‘funding  gap’.  Similarly,  whereas  EIS‐backed  firms tended to use their  funds to support expansion, VCT firms were found to use the money raised to support MBOs and MBIs (par. 8.3.3). The economic benefits of the scheme were found to be that for every £1m invested, VCT‐backed firms increased sales turnover by £0.6m and added 9 staff (par. 5.7.26).  This  report  was  followed  by  a  legal  and  finance  analysis  of  the  scheme  in (Cumming  2003).  This  was  less  a  full  assessment  of  VCT  performance  than  a description of the legal circumstances under which they exist, followed by a brief and simple quantitative analysis of fund performance. This work also fed into later comparisons  (Cumming  and Macintosh  2003,  2007)  of  the  VCT  scheme  and  the Canadian Labour‐Sponsored Venture Capital Companies (LSVCC) scheme28.   The  most  recent  evaluation  of  the  VCT  and  EIS  schemes  (Cowling  et  al  2008) provides a rigorous econometric analysis of the performance of firms receiving EIS and  VCT  funding.  Using  HMRC  data  on  firms  that  received  funding  from  both schemes, Cowling et al constructed a matched‐pair sample against a control of over 80,000 other firms and then used the resulting panel data to analyse the impact of the  schemes.  The  study  concludes  that  both  schemes  (EIS  in  particular)  build                                                         28 The LSVCC scheme operates on a similar business model to VCTs except they are formally linked to unions, which are  responsible  for  their management. Cumming and Macintosh  (2006)  identify ‘crowding out’  effects among LSVCCs, which offer better  terms and  fewer  conditions  to  the  firms they back,  subsequently  attracting  firms  that would otherwise have  received backing by  ‘proper’ VCs. Whether such a phenomenon may be identified as an effect of the VCT scheme is an area for further research. 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capacity  in  the  firms  that  receive  investment,  facilitating  fixed  asset formation(p.33‐34)  and  encouraging  growth  (p.  37),  although  it  also  finds  the effect  sizes  for  these  two  interventions  to  be  expensive  and  comparatively  quite small  (p.  51).  It  also  found  that  firms  backed  by  EIS  or  VCT  (but  not  both)  had lower survival rates than those firms that did not have government backing at all (p.42).   The post‐1998 have had comparatively less evaluation, though this has in part due to  the  later beginnings of  the scheme.   The best review to date was  the study by Nightingale et al (2009), which replicated the methodology of Cowling et al (2008) but  applied  it  to  the  range  of  government  interventions  after  EIS  and  VCT, specifically RVCF, EGF, ECF, UCF and the national schemes of Scotland and Wales. Nightingale et al found that these schemes had generally been successful in general capacity building, but again at a high cost: of the 782 recipient firms, the additional number of jobs created by under the schemes was 1,407, meaning approximately 1.8 additional  jobs per firm (ibid par 7.1).  It also found relatively  little  impact on profit  margins,  suggesting  that  a  ‘pump  priming’  effect,  in  which  high  returns would be generated with an  initial  amount of  funding, was not present  (ibid par 7.2). Ultimately the report found that these schemes typically had roughly similar capacity building effects  to  the VCT and EIS schemes, although again  these effect sizes were quite small. Further, it suggested that supply‐side interpretations of the failings of  the VC system were not well‐founded, as  there were significant  issues relating to the lack of demand for growth capital as well (ibid par 8, p. 20).  These studies have  identified general aspects of  these programmes, but have  left considerable  amounts  underexplored,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  topics discussed in Chapter 5.  In particular there has been little analysis of the success of these  schemes  (particularly  VCT)  in  meeting  their  intended  aims.  Similarly, characteristics of demand and particularly exit have not been addressed in these, despite  the  ongoing  rationale  behind  these  investments  that  they  would ‘demonstrate’ the profitability of small firms to investors.  We will now frame the background and terms of our quantitative investigation into these topics. 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6.3  Framing and method for quantitative analysis  The intent of this chapter is to provide detailed quantitative analysis of the success and characteristic of publicly‐backed equity investments in the UK since 1995.  In line with the review of literature above and the conclusions of Chapter 5, there are four  main  topics  that  will  be  addressed  empirically  here.  These  relate  to  the effectiveness of the VCT scheme in directing funds to early stage firms, particularly compared to later, more targeted schemes; the quality of the pool of  investments overall,  which  would  support  a  more  demand‐side  interpretation  of  the  ‘equity gap’  issues;  the nature and  type of  exits  available  to  investors;  and  the potential existence of different sets of capabilities in the UK VC sector. These issues and how they will be framed are discussed below.  
6.3.1  Research  question  I:  Effectiveness  of  schemes  in  directing  funds  to 
targeted firms As discussed in Chapter 5 and Section 6.2 above, many of the government policies directed toward small  firms have been oriented toward supply‐side  intervention. The studies discussing these schemes above contained insightful analysis of their impact  on  firms  and  the  broader  economy.  However,  these  are  in  many  cases based  on  a  key  assumption  that  the  schemes  in  question  are  successfully distributing  funds  to  the  firms  that  are  being  targeted  by  these  particular government  interventions.  If  this  assumption  (that  government’s  intended outcomes  are  being  perfectly  translated  into  the  desired  actual  investments)  is taken as true, the results of these studies would then directly measure the success of the schemes in question.  Yet it is not entirely clear that these programmes are directly fulfilling their initial purposes. As discussed  above,  official  reports  including  the Williams  (1998)  and Lords  (1997) expressed concern  that  the VCT scheme was  regressing  to  support asset‐backed investments, as had the BES scheme. Similar hints of scepticism have been  raised  about  the  RVCF  scheme  in  the  media  (Guthrie  2007  p.  9)  and Parliament (Lords HL5297,HL5298 2009). However these issues have not thus far been  examined  quantitatively.  It  is  therefore  of  crucial  interest  that,  beyond evaluation of just the economic impact of any particular programme, that we also 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consider  the  effectiveness  of  this  programme  as  a  delivery  mechanism  for  the funds to reach the intended recipient. This chapter seeks to redress that issue and fill  the  corresponding  gap  in  the  current  policy  understanding  by  analysing  the success  of  a  number  of  UK  government‐backed  schemes  in  dispersing  funds  to firms with the appropriate ‘target’ profile, i.e. early stage firms.   We will do this in two ways: first we will use descriptive data on the VCT sector to attempt  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  VCT  investments  attempted  to  flout rules to make more asset‐backed or protected investments.  Secondly, we will seek to determine if there were significant changes in investment patterns between VCTs and the post‐1998 schemes. The previous chapter argued that there was a subtle shift in the market failure rationale seen in the BES and VCT schemes with the introduction of the post‐1998 schemes. While the market failure rationale  was  maintained,  no  longer  were  consumer  investors  incentivised  to invest in small firms; instead the incentives were directed at institutional investors to  support  these  firms.  We  therefore  hypothesise  that  the  shift  away  from consumer‐based  investment and  toward  institutional‐based  investment will have resulted in a more successful distribution of funds to early stage firms.   
6.3.2 Research question II: Quality of firms as potential investments The  struggles  of  supply‐side  policy  approaches  and  the  role  of  networks  in  the generating demand  in  the case of  the US would  lead  to  the suggestion  that  there may  be  demand‐side  issues  in  the  provision  of  capital  for  small  firms.  This  is  a necessarily  tricky  issue  to  address  quantitatively  for  several  reasons.  First,  the issue of firm quality is subjective, and it is difficult to clearly categorise whether a firm that has not received investment is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ firm. Secondly there is a natural counterfactual issue present in these areas, which is related to the issue of quality  above;  it  is difficult  to  say how successful  a  ‘good’  firm would have been had  it  received  funding  that  was  not  forthcoming.  Finally  there  is  the  broader question of the method for determining the quality of firm. Given that the results in Nightingale et al (2009) suggest that there was little or no selection effect among 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firms  that  received  VC  investment  against  a  broad  pool  of  similar  randomly selected firms, there is an additional methodological challenge.  In order  to address  this,  the chapter will  look at broad  investment  trends across the  entirety  of  the  VCT  sector.  Given  the  size  and  scale  of  investments made  by funds  in  the  sector,  general  indications  of  returns  across  the  broad  sample  will allow us to draw initial conclusions that would support a demand‐side view. If the returns  are  generally  positive,  this  would  suggest  that  either  (if  VCTs  show  a selection  effect)  that  VCTs  are making  particularly  good  investments,  or  else  (if there  were  no  selection  effect)  there  are  many  good  investments,  and  VCTs stumble  upon  only  some  of  them.  Similarly  if  the  broad  returns  are middling  or poor,  this  would  suggest  that  either  VCTs  are  making  particularly  good  or  bad investments if there is a selection effect, or else, if not, the entire pool of firms from which they are selecting is limited in quality. Given that we see from Cowling et al (2008) and Nightingale et al (2009) that there is little selection effect for VCTs, this then  suggests  that  overall  results  may  be  interpreted  as  a  loose  proxy  for  firm quality. If VCT investments on the aggregate perform well, this suggests that there is quality among the available stock of firms. However if they do not perform well, it would suggest a lack of quality is present. This hypothesis will be tested with a series of descriptive analyses drawn from the VCT dataset.  
6.3.3 Research question III: Exit patterns of equity investments In  addition  to  demand‐side  challenges  for  small  firms,  there  are  also  issues surrounding  the  nature  and  availability  of  exits  for  small  firms,  as  discussed  in Section 5.4. The historical analysis has discussed the challenges in achieving large IPOs  in  the UK, and suggests  that AIM may not be successful  in developing  large IPOs  such  as  those  seen  under NASDAQ  in  the US.  This  area  is  crucial  in  that  it drives  returns,  which  then  dictate  further  investment  in  the  sector.  Mason  and Harrison  (2003)  discuss  the  intention  of  the  Regional  Venture  Capital  Fund scheme to “demonstrate to potential investors in early‐stage venture capital funds that  robust  returns  can  be made  by  funds  investing  in  the  equity  gap”  (p.  856). Further, Murray (1994) suggests  that  the  form of exit may be  linked  to a second equity  gap  where  investors  are  not  able  to  assemble  enough  money  to  fully 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develop a  firm, and must  therefore sell  their  stake. This  then results  in a vicious circle  where  lack  of  funds  drives  poor  returns,  which  then  dissuades  further investment.  Despite the immediate policy relevance of this area, there has been comparatively little  data  examining  exit  patterns within  investments  in  the UK.  Jeng  and Wells (2000) provide data  taken  from EVCA yearbooks which seems to  include VC and PE  deals  included  in  the  same  category  (the  data  suggest  that  45%  of  UK investments achieved exit via IPO in 1995, compared to 36% via trade sale in the same  year).  Murray  (1994)  discusses  a  survey  of  venture  capitalists  that  finds them generally preferring trade sales and MBOs as  forms of exit over IPO (p. 69‐71). However although the topic has received discussion, there has been room for additional,  more  contemporary  research.  The  research  question  in  this  section seeks  to  understand  whether  trade  sales  remain  the  primary  means  of  exit  for small  firms within  this  sample,  or  whether  other  forms  are more  prominent  or lucrative. The nature of the data mean that there will naturally be some selection biases  (particularly  for  the  post‐1998  dataset,  where  exits  may  not  have  been reported  by  Library  House  and  may  have  been  missed  by  subsequent corroborating examination), but the intent is to provide insight into the nature and value of exit for investors.  
6.3.4 Research question IV: Different capabilities in the UK equity investment 
sector One  suggestion  of  Chapter  5  was  that  the  UK  VC  sector  has  evolved  around different capabilities than those seen in the US. Further, it suggests that there have been  a  series  of  different  capabilities  that  have  evolved  within  the  VC  sector, namely with generalist VCs maintaining the screening and staging capabilities that were  initially  developed  in  ICFC,  while  technology‐specialist  VCs  maintain different capabilities and different skill sets.  Examining  these  capabilities  quantitatively  is  necessarily  difficult,  and  the  data used  in  this  chapter  is  not  entirely  suitable  for making  a  concrete  claim  on  this hypothesis.   However  in  light  of  this  there will  be  an  initial  exploration of  these 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topics using this dataset.  This provisional exploration will present some early data that may  be  interpreted  to  give  evidence  of  different  capabilities  present  in  the dataset used.   
6.3.5 Research methodology In  order  to  answer  these  research  questions  described  above we will  perform  a series of descriptive and econometric analyses on the data described in Section 6.4. Research questions I and III will be addressed following the same general method used  in  Cumming  (2007).  The  Cumming  paper  seeks  to  examine  the  likelihoods that  different  types  and  generations  of  Australian  Innovation  Investment  Funds programme, which is a hybrid public‐private VC scheme not dissimilar to several of  the  schemes  in  the  UK.  Similarly  to  the  research  question  discussed  above, Cumming seeks to evaluate not the overall economic impact of the IIF scheme but its  success  in meeting  its  overall  goals.  These  goals  are  achieved by  investing  in early‐stage  and high  tech  investments;  by  IIFs  screening, monitoring  and  adding value to their investments; and by exiting successfully (ibid p. 194).   This  is may be achieved by using a  logit model  to examine the  likelihood that an investment  will  be  made  by  a  particular  type  of  fund.  Logit  analysis  is  used  to predict  the  likelihood  of  a  dependent  variable  using  categorical  and  numerical predictor  variables.  For  instance,  logit  analysis  could  be  used  to  predict  the likelihood of a person having a heart attack using variables including gender, age, and  smoking.  Logit  analysis  is  commonly  used  in  the  social  sciences  (see Mood 2009  for  a  discussion  of  uses  and  misuses  of  the  technique  in  sociology).  The technique has also been used widely in the study of the venture capital sector, see Gompers and Lerner (1999), Kaplan et al (2002), and Baum et al (2004).  In  analysing  these  results  in  an  economic  sense,  care  must  be  taken  in  the interpretation;  we  are  not  seeking  to  explore  the  relative  probability  that  an investment will take place (such as if we were trying to determine risk factors for a heart  attack).  Greene  (2000  p.  815)  suggests  that  “the  parameters  of  the  logit model,  like  those  of  any  nonlinear  regression  model,  are  not  necessarily  the marginal  effect  we  are  accustomed  to  analysing.  In  order  to  gain  meaningful 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results  from  the  logit  equation  the marginal  effects  of  the model must  be  used, while  still  checking  the  significance  of  the  coefficient  (ibid  p.  815‐6).  These marginal effects allow us to determine the probability that the dependent variable is being observed as a direct result of the explanatory variable.  Cumming’s  approach  is  to  break  down  the  dataset’s  categorical  variables  for investment type and exit (as well as several other variables not used in this study) into a single binary variable (Cumming 2007 p. 211, 218‐220). For  instance for a variable  ‘Venture capital’  firms having received VC backing would be coded as  ‘1’ and  all  other  firms not having  received  the  same backing would be  coded as  ‘0’. This would then be used as a dependent variable against which other quantitative and  categorical  variables  may  be  considered.  Cumming  breaks  down  these categorical  characteristics  of  investments  into  binary  forms,  and  then  uses  the different types of IIF funds as the independent variables (ibid).   We  also  adopt  the  set  of  controls  used  by  Cumming.  There  are  several  controls used,  including  for  the  year  of  the  initial  investment,  and  a  binary  variable  that equals one for investments made in the years 1999 and 2000. This is to control for investments made in the peak of the dot‐com bubble. Finally we also use a control for overall market performance  in  the year of  investment. This  is done using  the Morgan Stanley Capital  Index  (MSCI)  for  the UK, which provides a general proxy for annual performance of equity markets  in a given country,  in the period given based largely on LSE performance.  The  advantage  of  adopting Cumming’s method  for  answering  questions  I  and  III comes from the similarity of data and purpose between the two topics. Cumming is seeking  to  identify  the relative  likelihood that a government backed  intervention will make  certain  types  of  investment,  which  is  common with  the  intent  of  this project. The nature of the data available (as discussed below) also suits this type of technique,  given  that  we  have  basic  information  about  the  firms  but  not necessarily  panel  or  time  series  data,  and  the  comparability  between  the  two datasets is limited by the data itself. 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6.4  Construction and descriptive variables for the datasets  
6.4.1 The VCT dataset: construction and specifics The VCT  scheme has  a  number  of  unusual  features  that  sets  it  apart  from other government backed schemes, but one that is perhaps the most unusual (and thus far under‐exploited)  is the requirement that all VCTs must  list themselves on the London  Stock  Exchange  as  a  condition  for  their  tax  accreditation.  This measure likely  seeks  to  prevent  fraudulent  activities  by  VCT  fund  managers  by  binding them into securities rules. At  the same time  listing on the LSE also brings with  it full  securities disclosure  requirements  for all VCTs, and  this has not  significantly been  significantly29  exploited  previously  by  academics  or  policymakers.  The dataset discussed in this section utilises these disclosure rules to create a unique and comprehensive database of investments made by the entire universe of VCTs from 1996‐2005/6.  The VCT dataset was  created by hand,  based on VCT  securities  filings harvested from  the  Thomson  One  database.  Funds were  identified  using  a  combination  of search  strings  and  existing  lists  of  VCTs  (from  sources  such  as  Trustnet). Ultimately  data  was  gathered  for  161  VCTs.  This  number  includes  funds  that completed initial securities filings but did not meet fundraising targets, as well as funds  that  changed names30. Once name changes,  aborted  listings and duplicates had been addressed, annual and interim reports for each VCT were accessed and downloaded  onto  a  central  location.  In  total,  1367 documents were  accessed.  At the  time  of  access  (March  2007),  virtually  all  reports  for  2005  were  available online, and many reports for 2006 were available as well. In a very small number of  instances  one  year’s  annual  report  or  interim  report  would  be  missing  or mislabelled,  and  other  annual  reports  and  information  sources  were  used  to triangulate missing data.                                                         29  The  website  Trustnet.com  seems  to  use  some  securities  filings  to  provide  tracking  and performance data on various investment trusts, but does not use it to track specific investments. 30 In the VCT sector it is common for funds to carry the branding of the fund manager, but because VCTs  are  independent  companies with  their  own  governance,  in  a  number  of  cases  VCT  boards have sacked and replaced the fund managers (thereby necessitating a corresponding name change) or  have  sought  to  rebrand  themselves  based  on  particular  sectors  or  focus  of  investment.  For instance,  the  Advent  2  VCT  changed management  teams  and  became  Foresight  4  VCT, while  the Matrix E‐Venture Fund VCT became Matrix Venture Fund VCT, and  then changed again  to Matrix Income and Growth 2 VCT. 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Once  the  documents  were  collected,  they  were  examined  and  investment  data were extracted  from each annual or  interim report  and  inputted  into a database using  Microsoft  Access.  The  variables  collected  included  VCT  name,  firm  name, date of  investment,  initial  level of  investment31,  listing  status of  the  firm,  type of deal, and sector of firm for all investments, and value of exit, year of exit, and type of  exit  (with  the  possibility  of  multiple  exits,  as  often  happened  for  actively‐managed  AIM  stocks)  for  investments  that  had  been  exited.  Exit  data  was  not always  clear  –  some  funds  made  their  exits  obvious,  while  others  were  very general  about  their  exits  (although  these  were  often  the  AIM‐specialist  funds which  actively  managed  portfolios).  After  coding  the  records  (particularly variables  for  investment  type32  and  exit  type)  were  then  verified  against  other records within the dataset and via firm literature, websites, and other information.   The variables coded include:  
Firm Name 
VCT name 
Sector33  ‐  The  sector  of  the  firm was  coded  using  the  ICB  classification  system, which  allowed  for more  nuanced  breakdown  of  technology‐based  sectors  (these are listed in Table 6.4.2 below). 
                                                        31  The  reporting  style  often made  it  difficult  to  identify whether  an  initial  investment was  being given out in tranches or whether follow‐on investments were being made. The distortion seems to be more due  to  tranche  funding  rather  than  follow‐on  investments,  so  initial  level  of  investment was judged to be the most representative level of funding received by the firm. 32  The  typology  for  investment  around  product  development  matches  that  used  in  Cumming (2007).  This  required  examining  individual  investments  and  coding  them  by  hand  based  on  the product development stage. Most annual reports had descriptions of new firms receiving funding, which made the process relatively straightforward. One complication was for services firms, which have different product development  issues and  thus do not directly map onto  this  framework.  In this case firm age was used as a proxy. 33 One methodological issue between the datasets used in this analysis related to the coding and use of sectoral data. The VCT sectoral data was based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) classification system used by the LSE and AIM, while the post‐1999 dataset was based on SIC codes. The ICB system used for the VCT database is reflective of a range of technology sectors, rather than the much more limited SIC codes for technology sectors, which often consider firms based around science or R&D activity as one category. This means that biotechnology, semiconductor design and some software companies may all be linked in the same category. This was an issue with the post‐1999 dataset, and it also affected the comparability of sectoral data variables between the VCT and post‐1999  datasets.  Consequently  apart  from  the  descriptive  variables  given  in  this  table  and 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Total Investment – This figure was recorded for the total of all  investments and follow in investments in a given firm made by a given VCT 




6.4.2 Descriptive overview of the VCT data The  complete  dataset  consists  of  97  unique  funds  (see  footnote  31  above  for further detail), ranging from those founded in 1995 to those established in 2006. Of  these  funds,  59  were  generalist,  27  were  AIM‐specialist;  and  11  were  sector specialist. The data set consists of approximately 4000 investments made by VCTs from 1995 to 2006. Because the data are taken from securities filings, there is time lag,  because  that  the  full  number of  investments  for 2006 was not  yet  available; however because of the increase in the tax credit for VCT investments from 2004‐2006, we can safely assume that the levels of VCT investments will be higher than in 2003‐2004. The investments are worth a total of £1.5 billion.   The dataset has been  formatted  into  two  ‘cuts’  –  one  that  is  based on  individual investments made  by  individual  VCTs  and  one  that  is  oriented  toward  the  firm level. The prior, whilst useful  for analysis of portfolio activity,  is  less appropriate for the scope of this analysis, but does provide some unique insight, so this section contains brief descriptive data for both ‘cuts’ of the VCT dataset, with emphasis on 
                                                                                                                                                                  similar subsequent tables, sectoral data is not included in these analyses. A major priority for future work will involve the harmonisation of the two datasets for sectoral data. 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the firm‐orientated dataset from which the analysis in subsequent sections will be based.  Table 6.4.2 below presents some initial descriptive data for the investments made. For  binary  variables,  marked  with  an  asterisk  (*),  the  mean  variable  gives  an indication  of  the  relative  commonality  of  the  characteristic  in  the  dataset;  for instance, a binary variable with a mean of 0.5 would indicate that half the cases in the dataset had the characteristic, and were thus equal to one, while the other half did not and were equal to zero. 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Table 6.4.2 Descriptive data for the VCT dataset   Mean  Std. Deviation Initial investment (000)  1080  979.177 Year of initial investment  2.00E3  2.842 VC investment*  .2238  .41692 MBO investment*  .1460  .31489 Shell investment*  .0492  .21627 AIM investment *  .3749  .48428 Expansion investment*  .2040  .40309 Computer hardware,    semiconductors, etc34*  .0389  .19339 Software and computer services*  .1585  .36532 Biotechnology and pharmaceuticals*  .0550  .22811 Electronics and electricals*  .0330  .17874 Media*  .0800  .27135 Write off*  .1152  .31936 Exit via MBO*  .0103  .10086 Exit via IPO*  .0117  .10775 Exit via Market*  .1284  .33465 Exit via sale to other firm*  .0990  .29883      







6.4.3 The Post­1998 funds dataset: Construction and specifics of the dataset The  other  dataset  used  here  consists  of  data  regarding  the  investments  of  the various  other  government‐backed  schemes  developed  in  the  1999,  including  the Regional  Venture  Capital  Funds,  Early  Growth  Funds  and  University  Challenge Funds;  the  Enterprise  Capital  Funds,  launched  in  2006,  and  regional  schemes  in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This section will discuss the collection and creation  of  this  dataset35  and  provide  initial  descriptive  data  and  some  initial analysis. 
                                                        35 This dataset was created as part of the project discussed in Nightingale et al (2009), although the dataset  used  here  is  more  refined  and  has  additional  data  not  included  in  the  Nightingale  et  al 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Whereas  the  VCT  dataset  discussed  in  the  previous  section  was  able  to  take advantage  of  unusual  disclosure  rules  to  generate  a  complete  dataset,  such measures  were  not  possible  for  the  funds  considered  here.  Instead  data  was collected  and  triangulated  from  a  number  of  sources.  The main  source  was  the Library  House  (LH)  database,  a  commercial  (albeit  now‐defunct)  database  that served as a clearinghouse for information about high growth entrepreneurial firms throughout  Europe.  The  LH  data was  gathered  by  LH  staff, who  contacted  firms and  funders regularly  to gain  information about  funding rounds, and would  then triangulate this data with industry contacts and other sources.   In  constructing  the  dataset,  each  individual  fund  backed  by  the  schemes  listed above was identified, and used to collect the corresponding LH investment records. These lists of  investments were then cross‐referenced and corroborated with the websites and publications of  the  fund  involved  in  the various  schemes  to ensure completeness.  If  fund  literature  gave  the  name  of  a  firm  as  having  received investment but the firm was not listed in the LH database, other sources were used to  replicate  the  data  provided  by  the  Library House.  After  extensive  verification and  cross‐referencing,  the  data  were  coded  and  entered  into  a  database.  The database  is  somewhat  different  in  its  orientation  to  the  VCT  dataset,  in  that  the VCT data is aggregated only by VCTs that provided funds to a given firm, whereas the LH‐derived data provides data on a firm’s entire funding history. Consequently, the  initial  amounts  invested  in  the  two  datasets  cannot  be  directly  compared, because  the  data  collection  for  each  variable  is  different.  For  instance,  in  cases where the same firm was included in both datasets, the VCT values for investment would be lower because they would not include other funding sources.  The variables collected in the post‐1998 dataset are generally similar to those for the VCT dataset (apart from the collection issues discussed above).  Variables that are  available  in  the  post‐1998  dataset  that  are  not  available  in  the  VCT  also includes the number of rounds of investment each firm is recorded as having made                                                                                                                                                                   paper.  It  includes all  investments  in Northern  Irish  firms,  as well  as  additional new variables  for angel investment. The analysis presented in this chapter is original. 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on Library House; whether a firm is a university spin‐out; and whether the CEO is a professor.  Descriptive data for these variables are available in Table 6.4.5.    
6.4.4 Descriptive data for the post­1998 dataset The  post‐1998  dataset  consists  of  779  firms.    Of  these  firms,  the  distribution  of investments among  schemes  is presented  in Table 6.4.4.   There are a number of interesting trends here.  The regional schemes were typically most often parties to larger investments, while the RVCF scheme, despite making the most investments, had the lowest mean value, suggesting that the firms receiving RVCF backing were least  likely  to  receive  larger  follow‐on  funding.    The  data  for  the  ECF  scheme, which  started  later,  is  less  complete,  which  provides  some  explanation  of  the outcome of these results.  
Table 6.4.4 Investments made by government­backed schemes in the post­
1998 dataset   Number Investments  Mean Investment Value (,000) 
Mean Number Investment Stages RVCF  240  911  1.63 EGF  139  1480  1.79 UCF  203  2353  2.15 ECF  40  3450  1.52 Wales  46  4261  1.91 Scotland  164  4850  2.31 N. Ireland  19  4664  1.93 Multiple  66  2003  3.03 Dataset Mean  114  2472  2.03  Additional  descriptive  values  for  the binary  variables  relating  to  investment  and exit  characteristics  is  provided  in  Table  6.4.5      As  we  can  see,  early  stage  ‘VC’ investment is the most common, followed by expansion funding.  MBOs seem to be 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less  common.    The most  common  form  of  exit  is  failure,  followed  by  trade  sale.  IPOs and MBOs are considerably less common.   
Table 6.4.5 Mean values for binary variables in post­1998 dataset   Mean  Std. Deviation RVCF*  .3081  .46200 Early Growth Fund*  .1784  .38312 University Challenge Fund*  .2606  .43924 Enterprise Capital Fund*  .0513  .22085 Scottish Funds*  .2105  .40794 Welsh Funds*  .0591  .23587 N Ireland Funds*  .0244  .15436 Multiple Funds*  .0847  .27865 University spinout*  .32  .469 CEO professor*  .0411  .19860 VC investment*  .5404  .49868 Expansion Investment*  .4519  .49800 MBO*  .0000  .00000 Total Invested (,000)  2472.46  7151.548 IPO Exit*  .0321  .17636 MBO Exit*  .0167  .12818 Out of business*  .09  .286 Tradesale_Exit*  .06  .243 Year of initial investment  2003.91  3.121  
6.4.5 The combined dataset The two datasets discussed in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.3 were merged into a common dataset.  In  cases  where  firms  were  common  among  the  two  datasets (approximately  30),  the  dates  and  stages  of  investments  were  compared;  if  the investments  were  made  in  the  same  year  and  at  the  same  stage  they  were considered to be part of the same round of investments and the data were merged. If  there  were  investments  in  the  same  firm  but  at  very  different  stages  in development  (for  instance,  an  early  stage  investment  made  by  a  University Challenge Fund in 2001 followed by an AIM flotation backed by VCTs in 2005), the 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two  investments  were  deemed  to  be  discrete  and  were  retained  as  separate entities.  The  variables  used  in  this  database  reflect  the  variables  in  the  previous  two datasets, and include:  
Early_Stage: This was used for firms that did not have their main product on the market  and were  using  their  investment  to  further  develop  and  invest  in  a  new product. 
Expansion_Capital:  This  was  used  for  firms  that  had  products  already  on  the market and were using the investments to fund further growth. 
MBO: A binary variable which equals 1 if the firm received its initial investment in support of a management buy‐out 
IPO: A binary variable which equals 1 if the investment was exited via some form of IPO 
Acquired: A binary variable which equals 1  if  the  investment was exited via  the sale of the firm to another firm 
Acquired_value: If available, the value of the final sale of the firm. 
MBO_exit:  A  binary  variable  which  equals  1  if  the  firm  underwent  an  MBO  in which the VCs sold their shares in the firm. 
Writeoff: A binary variable which equals 1 if the investment had been written off due to firm failure. 
RVCF:  A  binary  variable  which  equals  1  if  the  firm  received  investment  from  a Regional Venture Capital Fund. 
EGF:  A  binary  variable  which  equals  1  if  the  firm  received  investment  from  an Early Growth Fund. 
UCF:  A  binary  variable  which  equals  1  if  the  firm  received  investment  from  a University Challenge Fund. 
ECF:  A  binary  variable  which  equals  1  if  the  firm  received  investment  from  an Enterprise Capital Fund. 




Multiple: A binary variable which equals 1  if  the  firm  received  investment  from more than one fund  The merged dataset has 2141 entries. A fuller description of the data is presented in Table 6.4.6 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Table 6.4.6 Descriptive data for combined dataset          Mean  Std. Deviation  Investment (000)  1525.50  4159.340       Bubble year investment  .1471  .35432       ECF  .0131  .11364       EGF  .0532  .22458       Multiple Investments  .0308  .17289       Regional Funds  .0986  .29813       UCF  .0733  .26074       RVCF  .0948  .29303       VCT  .6362  .48122       1995 Funds  .6362  .48122       1999 Funds  .2214  .41528       2006 Funds  .0131  .11364       VC  .3382  .47319       MBO  .0738  .26150  Expansion Capital  .2947  .45602       AIM Investment  .2396  .42694    Management Buy‐In  .0220  .14656       MBO and MBI  .0957  .29432       Electronics  .0761  .26527       Telecommunications  .0215  .14503       Software Design and Consultancy  .0518  .22177       Hardware Consultancy  .0308  .17289       Biotech and IP Exploitation  .1060  .30794       MBO exit  .0126  .11161       Trade sale exit  .0817  .27403       IPO Exit  .0131  .11364       Write‐off  .1004  .30063   The  dataset  naturally  is  more  oriented  toward  the  VCT  investments,  given  the longer range and time period, and the larger scale of the VCT programme.  
6.5  Research question I: Effectiveness of interventions with different 
structures   Here we seek to examine the effectiveness of the VCT scheme compared with later schemes in its ability to direct funds to early stage firms. This analysis involved the combined  dataset,  and  saw  all  investments  aggregated  into  three  categories:  VC (or  early  stage);  expansion  stage;  and  MBO/MBI.  Logit  regressions  were performed  with  independent  variables  including  the  various  schemes  (in  two formulations), as well as timing and market variables as in Cumming (2007). The model used here is a logit regression where the left‐hand‐side variables equal one 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if  the  firm  received  its  initial  investment when  it was  at  that  stage  (for  instance early  stage  for  equations  (1)  and  (2),  expansion  for  (3)  and(4),  etc).  Different formulations  of  the  right‐hand‐side  variable  were  used  to  ensure  robustness  of results. These results took the form of a  formulation that  included the each post‐1998 fund separately, as well as one variable (1998_Funds) that included all post‐1998 funds. This grouping did not include the Enterprise Capital Fund, which (due to its creation in 2003) was not part of the same conceptual grouping as the other post‐1998  funds and which had a small number of  firms  in  the sample such  that multicollinearity issues began to emerge.   The model used in Equations (1), (3), and (5) was   [Exit  stage]  =  α  +  β1[VCT]  +  β2[RVCF]  +  β3[EGF]  +  β4[UCF]  +  β5[ECF]  + β6[Regional] + β7[Multiple] + β8[MSCI] + β9[InvYear] + β10[Bubble]  The model used in Equations (2), (4), and (6) was   [Exit stage] = α + β1[1995_Funds] + β2[1998_Funds] + β3[Regional] +β4[Multiple] + β5[MSCI] + β6[InvYear] + β7[Bubble]  Table 6.5.1 provides logit regressions of the probability of investment at different stages of firms’ development, and finds strongly significant chi‐square results. The results  in  this  table  are  the  effect  size,  which  shows  the  propensity  of  a  given characteristic to occur in a given stage. Therefore the analysis finds that VCTs are nearly 50% less likely to invest in expansion‐stage capital than the other firms in the sample, and 11% more likely to invest in MBO/MBI deals. Given the previous descriptive  data  and  concerns  discussed  in  policy  circles,  this  is  not  surprising, although one might have expected significant results suggesting a disinclination by VCTs to invest in early stage firms. As it stands the marginal effects sizes are large but not significant. 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Table 6.5.1 Logit regression for government scheme and investment type   Early Stage  Expansion Capital  MBO and MBI   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) Constant  73.182  147.672  173.789  46.597  336.834  331.942              
Type of fund             VCT  ‐0.106    ‐0.495***    0.112***   RVCF   0.040    ‐0.031    0.416   EGF  0.212*    ‐0.133**    n/a(1)   UCF  0.632***    ‐0.306***    n/a(2)   ECF  n/a(1)    n/a(1)    n/a(1)   Funds 1995    ‐0.137    ‐0.465***    0.040 Funds 1999    0.253**    0.188***    ‐0.061** Funds 2006    n/a(1)    n/a(1)    n/a(1) Regional  0.120  0.159  ‐0.139**  ‐0.128**  ‐0.020*  ‐0.060*** Multiple  0.456***  .0443***  ‐0.236***  ‐0.239***  n/a(2)  n/a(2)              
Market 
Conditions 
           MSCI Investment Year  ‐0.001**  ‐0.016***  0.001**  ‐0.001**  0.000  0.000 First Investment Year  ‐.0009*  ‐0.001**  ‐0.014***  0.005  ‐0.102***  ‐0.008*** Bubble  0.077  0.073  ‐0.072**  ‐.074**  ‐0.020  ‐0.017              
Model 
Diagnostics 
           Number  of observations  2113  2113  2113  2113  1892  2047 Number observations where dependent variable = 1 
           
Loglikelihood  ‐1145.799  ‐1212.90  ‐1117.47  ‐1193.392  ‐571.714  ‐573.999 Pseudo R2  0.153  0.103  0.1273  0.0680  0.110  0.130 Chi‐squared statistic  412.86***  278.65***  326.08***  174.24***  141.99***  170.99***  N/A(1)  –  In  instances  where  multicollinearity  was  detected  around  one  variable,  that variable was removed for the regression. This means that the Enterprise Capital Fund, the youngest of the schemes in this analysis is not considered as it has a very limited number of investments. N/A(2) – If an independent variable did not have any positive values in the formulation for a specific model, it was excluded. 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It  is  also  somewhat  unexpected  that  the  RVCF  scheme  does  not  seem  to significantly  differ  from  the  rest  of  the  group  in  any  of  the  categories.  The  very significant results showing the UCF scheme as 63% more likely to  invest  in early stage  firms  and  30%  less  likely  to  back  expansion  capital  is  expected,  given  the nature of the scheme. However the similar (albeit less strongly significant) results for  the EGF  scheme are  generally  surprising.  The  significant  results  showing  the greater  likelihood  of  post‐1998  funds  to  invest  in  early‐stage  investments  and expansion  capital  at  the  expense  of  MBO/MBI  investments  must  be  seen  as  an important result.   Regional  funds’ disinclination  to  support  expansion  capital  (14%  less  likely)  and MBO/MBI  (6%  less  likely  in  equation  (6))  is  particularly  interesting  given  the inclusion  of  several  expansion  schemes  that  received  funding  through  means typically  earmarked  for  small  firms.  The  strong  result  for  early  stage  and expansion  capital  for  those  investments  that  received  investments  from multiple government‐backed schemes should be interpreted very carefully (given issues of causality)  but  are  encouraging.  The  significant  but minor  effects  along  the MSCI control are to be expected, as is the decrease in expansion capital (presumably in favour of early stage investments) during the bubble period of 1999‐2000. A very interesting  result  is  found  in  the  results  for  first  investment year:  the  significant negative  values  for  MBO/MBI  investments  (which  still  must  be  interpreted carefully  given  the  spread  between  the  two)  suggest  that  government‐backed MBO/MBI  investments  have  become  less  common  as  time  has  progressed.  The weakly  significant  smaller  effects may  be  interpreted  as  being  due  to  the  larger size of the VCT scheme (in that there are overall fewer investments from the post‐1998 funds), but the continuing decrease in MBO/MBI investment is intriguing.  There  are  several  significant  and  interesting  results  from  this  data,  chief  among them results that suggest that as time has progressed newer schemes have become more  likely  to  direct  funding  to  capital  than  the  older  VCT  scheme.  Further, investments  in MBO/MBI  investments may be  interpreted  to have declined over time.  Both  of  these  findings  would  support  the  initial  historical  conclusion  that 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suggests that later schemes appeared to be more successful than the VCT scheme in directing funding toward early stage firms. However additional work remains to be done exploring these areas.  
6.6  Research question II: An initial exploration of demand for capital  Having  found that VCTs tended to  invest  in other  forms of  investment,  this  leads back to the previous discussion of supply and demand‐side factors. We therefore use  the  pool  of  all  exited  VCT  investments  as  a  rough  proxy  for  the  quality  of demand for capital; positive results in the area would suggest that the number of investment opportunities  is good, while negative returns would suggest a  lack of positive opportunities.  This is assessed using a number of pieces of descriptive data from the VCT dataset. For these investments internal rate of return (IRR) was used as a measure36. Table 6.6.1 shows the effectiveness of the investments made by the VCTs. These provide valuable  evidence  of  the  performance  of  individual  sectors,  and  show  the challenges of the scheme overall in generating positive returns. There are several notable factors  in this table,  first and foremost the overall negative mean IRR for all years of investment other than the first year of the scheme (1995, in which only three investments were made). It is surprising to see the distribution of returns for these  investments. The means  for most sectors show losses as well, and the only sector  to  show  positive  results  is  the  retail  sector.  Further,  the  benefits  of  the 1999‐2000 bubble are very clear from these investments. 1999 was generally the best  year  in  terms  of  internal  rates  for  return,  with  the  mean  of telecommunications  investments made  providing  374%  IRR.  However  following this  period  most  sectors  showed  greater  levels  of  losses  (though  this  must  be tempered  again  by  the  ‘lemons  ripen  faster  than  peaches’  truism,  which  would suggest that investments from 2003‐2006 would be less likely to be exited).  
                                                        36 It should be noted that for these calculations there were typically only beginning and end points (i.e. initial investment and value of exit) and so did not have the multiple valuation points that would normally be seen in IRR calculations. 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6.7  Research question III: Characteristics of investment exit  Given  the  suggestion  of  the  previous  sections  that  questions  the  strength  of demand, the other area of interest then relates to how easily firms are able to ‘cash out’ their investments. By examining investment exits we may empirically examine the effectiveness of and type of investments made by the schemes in this sector.  
6.7.1 Investment exit in the VCT sector An examination of  the exits made by VCTs  from their  investments  is provided  in Table 6.7.1. It shows the results from all 950 firms that received VCT funding and had proceeded to exit by December 2006.  
Table 6.7.1 All exits from venture capital trusts Exit Type  Number exits (% of total)  Mean Exit Size (thousands)  Median Exit Size (thousands) IPO Exit  17 (1.8%)  1,326.8  599.0 Trade Sale  245 (26.0%)  607.2  291.0 Market Sale  369 (39.2%)  164.2  54.0 MBO  27 (2.8%)  542.6  272.0 Failure  284 (30.1%)  ‐470.4  ‐361.5  This gives an interesting perspective on the results of individual investments. IPO exits were quite rare, but were much more profitable than any other investment. MBOs, traditionally seen as a mark of failure in the VC sector, were also successful. Investments  exited  on AIM were  in many  cases AIM‐specialist  VCTs, which  hold large portfolios and sell stocks at small profits. For VCTs trade sales proved to be the most reliably lucrative source of returns. In some cases firms would invest in companies  that would  subsequently  join  AIM.  Table  6.6.2  breaks  down  the  data further  to  focus  only  on  exits  from  firms  that were  unlisted when  they  received their initial investment, of which there were 505. 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Table 6.7.2 Exits from VCT investments in originally unlisted firms  Exit Type  Number exits (%  of  initial  unlisted investments)  Mean Exit Size (thousands)  Median Exit Size (thousands) IPO Exit  13 (2.6%)  1,608.5  636.0 Trade Sale  200 (39.6%)  664.3  365.0 Market Sale  49 (9.7%)  283.9  65 MBO  22 (4.4%)  684.2  310.5 Failure  221 (43.8%)  ‐511.8  ‐381.0  This shows clearly  that VCT  investors  in unlisted  firms viewed trade sales as  the most realistic, if not most desired option when orienting firms towards exit. True IPO  exits  remained  profitable  but  rare,  and  AIM  did  not  provide  a  great opportunity  for widespread,  highly  profitable  exit.  Further,  the  very  high  failure rates  (nearly  44%  of  investments)  would  mean  that  high  valuations  would  be required in order to break even, much less generate significant returns.   
6.7.2 Investment exit in the 1999 and 2006 schemes As  discussed  above,  the  VCT  datasets  demonstrate  a  strong  propensity  for investors  in  firms  to  make  exits  via  trade  sale  rather  than  by  accessing  the markets.  This  section  augments  that  data  with  the  other  dataset  consisting  of investments  made  in  the  1999  and  2006  government‐backed  schemes.  The 1999/2006 dataset does not  comprehensively  include  the value of exit, but does allow the comparison of exit types across different funds (though in some cases the investment size is indeed very small.  
Table 6.7.3 Exits by type for government­backed schemes Exit Type  RVCF  EGF  UCF  ECF  Reg‐ Scot  Reg. Wal  Reg. NI  Mult. IPO Exit  4 (10%)  1 (6%)  0 (0%)  0 (0%)  4 (16%)  3 (23%)  0 (0%)  0 (0%) Trade Sale  11 (29%)  8 (44%)  16 (50%)  0 (0%)  6 (24%)  5 (38%)  2 (100%)  3 (100%) MBO  4 (10%)  1 (6%)  2 (13%)  3 (100%)  2 (8%)  1 (8%)  0 (0%)  0 (0%) Failure  19 (50%)  8 (44%)  14 (44%)  0 (0%)  13 (52%)  4 (31%)  0 (0%)  0 (0%) 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We see here that even for the most entrepreneurial  firms backed by government VC  schemes,  trade  sale  remains  the predominant  form of  exit  for  the  firms. This again demonstrates some of the significant ongoing problems in identifying IPO or market‐based exit opportunities for these firms.   
6.7.3 Logit Analysis of Investment Exit This analysis of the initial funding behaviour was followed by a logit analysis of the likelihood of firms exiting investments in certain ways. As discussed in Chapter 2, it  is  established  cannon  in  the  VC  literature  that  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  exits: typically  IPOs  are most  heavily  favoured,  followed  by  trade  sales  to  other  firms, then managerial buy‐back and then finally writing off shares (see Kaplan 2006 and Gompers  and  Lerner  2002).  The  previous  chapter  discussed  how  this  particular heuristic has not necessarily matched the UK experience, and this analysis seeks to further that understanding.  The model used here is a logit regression where the left‐hand‐side variables equal one if an investment was exited in a given way (for instance IPO for equations (1) and (2),  trade sale  for (3) and (4), etc). Different  formulations similar to those  in the previous section were used to ensure robustness.   The model used in Equations (1), (3), and (5) was   [Exit  stage]  =  α  +  β1[VCT]  +  β2[RVCF]  +  β3[EGF]  +  β4[UCF]  +  β5[ECF]  + β6[Regional] + β7[Multiple] + β8[MSCI] + β9[InvYear] + β10[Bubble]  The model used in Equations (2), (4), and (6) was   [Exit stage] = α + β1[1995_Funds] + β2[1998_Funds] + β3[Regional] +β4[Multiple] + β5[MSCI] + β6[InvYear] + β7[Bubble]  The  results  of  this  analysis  are  not  as  strongly  significant  as  the  previous formulation; this is likely due to the relatively small sample size of firms from the post‐1998 pool that have exited. The small number of exits meant that there were 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multicollinearity  issues with  several  post‐1998  schemes,  including ECF  and UCF. Given the limited size of the sample, care must be taken with interpretation of the results.   Several of the results were robust and significant across formulations. There was a slight but significant indication that post‐1998 firms were less likely to reach IPO. MBO/MBIs  were  found  to  be  more  likely  to  exit  via  trade  sale,  as  might  be expected. As expected there were strong results suggesting that early stage firms were significantly more likely to fail than other firms. Less expected was an even greater probability for failure among firms that receive expansion funding. This is an  interesting  finding  that  might  be  linked  to  the  evidence  in  Nightingale  et  al (2009) suggesting that  firms go through a  ‘valley of death’ of  increased mortality after  receiving  funding  as  they  reconfigure  for  growth.  If  we  consider  that successful  exits  may  take  longer  periods  of  time  to  mature  (again  the  saying ‘lemons ripen before peaches’  is relevant here) then higher rates of  failure might be expected. 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Table 6.7.4 Likelihood of Investments Reaching Exit   IPO Exit  Trade Sale  Write‐off   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) Constant  198.00  165.02  451.85  456.978  413.858  397.057              
Type of fund             VCT  0.004    0.027    0.023   RVCF  0.005    0.037    0.049   EGF      ‐0.025    0.014   UCF      0.044       ECF             Regional  0.015  0.015  0.008  0.009  ‐0.006   Multiple             Funds_95    ‐0.005    0.028    0.030 Funds_99    ‐.0007***    0.029    0.029 Funds_06                          
Investment type             Early stage  0.042  0.034*  0.015  0.015  0.070***  0.067*** Expansion  0.042  0.044*  0.024  0.023  0.090***  0.095*** MBO/MBI  0.025  0.025  0.074***  0.074***  0.008  0.010              
Market 
Conditions 
           MSCI Investment Year  0.000  0.000  ‐0.001  ‐0.013***  0.000  0.000 First Investment Year  ‐0.001  ‐0.000  ‐0.013***  ‐0.013***  ‐0.016***  ‐0.015*** Bubble  0.003  0.003  0.025  0.025  0.022  0.022              
Model 
Diagnostics 
           Number  of observations  1865  2020  2086  2086  2020  2020 Number observations where dependent variable = 1 
           
Loglikelihood  ‐130.658  ‐132.608  ‐534.151  ‐535.640  ‐608.058  ‐609.047 Pseudo R2  0.0744  0.075  0.1007  0.0981  0.080  0.079 Chi‐squared statistic  20.99**  21.43***  119.56***  116.59***  105.99***  104.01*** 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6.8  Research question IV: Differentiation of capabilities in equity 
investments   The  thesis  has  previously  argued  at  other  points  that  there  are  different capabilities that have facilitated different results and different forms of success in the  UK  VC  sector.  Measuring  and  quantifying  capabilities  is  difficult  in  most circumstances, and is especially difficult in cases such as the VCT sector, which has relatively  small  groups  of  investments,  which  limit  the  effects  sizes.  However, some exploratory results can be outlined.   One very interesting element of these data is the performance of technology based investments  in  table  6.6.1.  Examining  those  investments  made  in  software  and computer  services  and  technology  hardware  and  equipment,  we  see  generally positive  mean  IRRs  for  investments  made  from  1995‐1998.  However  after  this period returns in these areas fall dramatically. This would provide support to our hypothesis  presented  in  the  previous  chapter  that  investments  in  technology‐based investment were largely made by people with knowledge of the sector until the ‘boom’ period of 1999‐2000, when less experienced investors invested heavily in  the  market  and  made  bad  investments  that  gave  negative  returns.  Whereas other  sectors  in  table  6.6.1  appear  to  show  performance  loosely  linked  to  the economy  (see  construction  and materials)  or  that  fluctuates  alongside  economic conditions  (see  financial  services),  the  technology  based  sectors  seem  to  be consistent with this trend.  Further  examination  of  the  case  of  the  biotechnology  sector  provides  some interesting  insights.  The  IRR  breakdown  by  year  shows  one  year  that  yielded positive  investments  in 1997  followed by  three  years  of  very poor performance, followed  by  mixed  performance  the  years  after  that.  This  would  support  our hypothesis above, however within the details another interesting nuance emerges when we consider listed and unlisted investments. Of the six investments made by VCTs in unquoted biotechnology firms, five were exited for a profit, and only one failed.  Of  the  35  investments  made  by  VCTs  on  AIM‐listed  biotechnology  firms, only eight of those investments were exited profitably, while the rest resulted in a 
 164 
loss  or  the  liquidation  of  the  firm.  This  suggests  that  the  few  VCTs  that  knew enough  about  the  market  to  invest  in  unquoted  biotech  firms  were  successful, whereas those that did not understand the market and took a chance on something on AIM were likely to be making poor investments. This would suggest some form of support for a capabilities‐based interpretation, and it would suggest there was some form of differentiation within  the screening processes based on knowledge and  understanding  of  the  sector.  This  would  support  the  suggested  path  of development  of  capabilities  for  the  VC  sector  proposed  in  Chapter  5,  perhaps suggesting that there are generalist VCs with little technical knowledge other than that  of  investment  evaluation.  These  non‐experts  these  have  been  differentiated from  the  more  technically‐oriented  VCs  who  have  specialist  knowledge  and,  it could be  suggested, make more  successful  investments  in  early  stage  technology firms.   
6.9  Summary and conclusion  This chapter has provided an empirical examination of UK publicly‐backed equity investments that draws upon the insights generated from the qualitative analysis in Chapter 5. Using a new, hand‐collected dataset of all  investments made under the  Venture  Capital  Trust  scheme,  which  was  then  merged  with  an  improved version of  the dataset used  in Nightingale et al  (2009),  it  tested and found  initial empirical support that relates to a series of common themes.  The  data  suggest  that  the  VCT  scheme  was  used  by  investors  for  MBO  based investments,  and  that  these  investors  tended  to  shun early  stage  firms. However later  schemes  such  as  the  RVCF,  EGF  and  others  were  generally  much  more successful  in  addressing  these  issues.  The  lack  of  investment  is  these  areas  is hypothesised  to  reflect  a  lack  of  demand  for  capital,  given  that  the  pool  of investments receiving capital from the VCT scheme failed to generate one year in which investments had mean positive IRR. The lack of demand is compounded by difficulties in reaching profitable exit. The high failure rates of firms receiving VCT investment is significant, as are the general preference of firms for trade sale exits 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over  other  forms  of  exit  that might  be more  profitable  but  are  generally  riskier. This supports the survey data in Murray (1994). Finally the chapter provides very initial  evidence  from  the  VCT  sector  that  provides  initial  support  for  the explanation  of  the  development  of  capabilities  in  the  UK  VC  sector  outlined  in Chapter 5.  The  following  chapter  will  summarise  the  empirical  chapters  and  will  link  the empirical  findings  in  these  chapters  to  the  theoretical  perspective  discussed  in Chapter 2. In doing so, it will argue that an evolutionary perspective may provide insights to the data discussed in the thesis that a principal‐agent perspective might be unable to provide. 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Chapter 7: Analysis and Conclusion  
7.1  Introduction  The  research  question  for  this  thesis  asks,  ‘What  has  been  the  historical  role  of policy in the emergence of the UK and US venture capital sectors? Further, are the stated  or  implicit  framing  assumptions  behind  creation  of  policy,  particularly regarding the principal‐agent perspective, reflective the empirical data?   And can the  evolutionary  perspective  provide  theoretical  understanding  of  the  VC  sector that a principal‐agent view cannot?’. Previous chapters have discussed the cases of the US and UK, with the former providing context for the latter, more detailed case. The  previous  two  chapters  provided  qualitative  and  quantitative  empirical evidence  from  the  UK,  with  particular  focus  on  evolution  of  UK  government‐backed schemes in providing funds to early stage firms; the quality of the field of potential  investments;  the  nature  and  quality  of  exit  opportunities;  and  the potential existence of different capabilities  in  the UK VCT sector. While  the cases and empirical  evidence presented  in  the previous  three  chapters  are  interesting, on their own they lack the ability to explain the broader differences in the sectors in the context of the framing of policy, as discussed above.  This  chapter  therefore  answers  the  research  question  by  contextualising  the empirical findings regarding the role of policy in the development of the UK and US VC sectors within the two distinct theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 2. It  will  argue  that  the  principal‐agent  and  evolutionary  perspectives  both  have strengths  and weaknesses  in  explaining  the  empirical  outcomes. However  it will suggest  that  an  evolutionary  perspective  is  able  to  provide  a  uniquely  nuanced perspective  on  key  policy  issues  that  do  not  emerge  under  a  principal‐agent perspective.  One  weakness  of  the  evolutionary  perspective  is  that  it  does  not immediately  point  to  a  clear  policy  agenda,  but  this  chapter  will  seek  to  make initial steps toward an evolutionary theory of policy.   Section  7.1  frames  the  chapter.  Section  7.2  will  summarise  the  empirical discussions  of  the  previous  chapters.  Section  7.3  will  argue  that  that  framing 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assumptions  of  the  theory  of  the  firm  lead  to  vastly  different  interpretations  of policy.  Section 7.4 will  discuss potential means  for  operationalising  evolutionary theory  into  a  policy  context.  Section  7.5  will  discuss  initial  policy  conclusions drawn  from  the  thesis,  and  Section  7.6  will  discuss  weaknesses  and  areas  for potential future research. Section 7.7 will conclude by discussing the contributions made by the thesis.  
7.2  Summary of the thesis  
7.2.1 Framing and research question This  thesis  seeks  to  explore  the  impact  of  policy  on  the  emergence  of  the  VC sectors  in  the  UK  and  US,  and  the  ability  of  theoretical  perspectives  to  explain these historical cases. The thesis draws upon the principal agent perspective and the evolutionary and capabilities perspective to frame the discussions of history.  The  principal‐agent  approach  draws  upon  the  view  that  all  relationships  are contracted  and  the  economic  system  is  based  upon  incentives  and  their appropriate  application.  From  this  perspective  the  VC  sector  is  characterised  by efficient contractual relationships in which the management of principal‐agent risk is the basis of the relationship between VCs and the firms they back. This view is relatively simple and powerful, and provides a clear line of argument for policy: in order to build a VC sector any equity gaps must be addressed and principal agent issues  must  be  covered,  and  if  these  conditions  are  met  the  sector  should  be allowed to grow unimpeded.   The  alternate  approach  used  in  the  thesis  draws  upon  the  evolutionary  and capabilities perspective. This approach views capabilities as the basis of firms, and because  firms  have  different  capabilities  the  marketplace  is  characterised  by heterogeneity.  In  this  way  competition  is  driven  by  firms  and  industries developing and implementing capabilities enabling them to derive value from their relationships. Therefore networks  and  institutions will  be particularly  important as these affect the ability to form and shape relationships. This approach is useful but does not provide a clear line of explanation from a policy perspective. 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These  theoretical  perspectives  discussed  above  are  tested  in  the  subsequent empirical work. The  thesis adopts  the  three‐relationship  framework discussed  in Chapter 2 as the general perspective for the analysis of the VC sectors in this thesis. In particular  it examines how policies have affected each of the three areas – the VC‐firm  relationship,  LP‐GP  relationship  and  firm‐IPO/exit market  relationship  ‐ and  have  subsequently  impacted  the  development  of  the  US  and UK VC  sectors. The  research design  is based around historical  examination of  elements of  these three  factors  in  both  the US  and UK.  Given  its  success  and  importance  in  policy discussions, the US is used as a contrasting case that provides context to the later, more detailed discussion of the relationship of policy to the UK.  For the case of the UK,  qualitative  discussions  were  then  followed with  quantitative  analysis,  using data from the proprietary datasets generated for this thesis.   
7.2.2 Venture capital in the US Chapter 4 discusses the emergence of the US VC sector. It discusses the history of the  sector,  arguing  that  the  venture  capital  sector  in  the  US  was  not  a  single revolutionary  invention  but  an  evolving  institution,  ultimately  including ‘merchant’  as well  as  ‘classic’  venture  capital. VC  in  the US  largely  took  shape  in two regions that were initially characterised by a single‐minded ethic to focus on small  firms  (in  Boston)  and  relative  isolation  from  large  financial  centres  (in Silicon  Valley). While  the  US  VC  sector  is  often  considered  to  be  a  single  entity based  upon  the  Silicon  Valley model,  the  chapter  suggests  that  several  regional models  of  VC  exist,  though  this  heterogeneity  is  often  not  appreciated.  In  cases where strong VC sectors have emerged, strong networks effects have been present. In  line with Kenney and Florida  (2000),  the  chapter  argues  that  these networks, involving entrepreneurs, VCs, universities, and providers of professional services, have subsequently played a key role  in driving demand  for  the services  that VCs provide.  The  chapter  argues  that  the  role  of  the  US  government  in  providing  financial support  for  the VC  sector  in  the US was  extensive  and  crucial.  This  intervention came not from direct involvement but typically in the form of indirect supply‐ and 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demand‐side support for the sector (as in Pavitt 1998). Supply‐side schemes such as  SBICs  and  the  ERISA  policy  change  typically  were  indirect  in  their  support, facilitating  the  growth  and  professionalization  of  the  industry  without  directly intervening  in  investment  patterns. Demand‐side  interventions  such  as  the  SBIR and  ATP  schemes  were  more  direct  in  awarding  funds  to  firms,  but  typically targeted  firms  at  relatively  earlier  stages  in  their  development  (Cooper  2003). These  demand‐side  schemes  have  generally  had  positive  effects  in  driving  the sector, and firms backed by these schemes have a positive track record of success and receiving VC funding (Lerner 1999).  At the same time, firms receiving support from VCs generated good returns, thus guaranteeing the continuation of the sector.  The ability to generate these returns may be due to several  factors (among them the  unique  legal  factors  discussed  in  Section  4.5.1),  but  perhaps  the  most important was the NASDAQ market, which gave a means for generating high value exits.  The chapter also presents a capabilities‐based explanation of the success of the US VC sector. It suggests that non‐dynamic capabilities exist for screening (Macmillan et  al  1986)  and management  of  agency  risks  (Gompers  1995).  Adopting  an  idea from  Ed  Steinmueller,  it  also  argues  that  there  exist  a  number  of  dynamic capabilities,  including  the  ability  to  extract  value  from networks  (Hochberg  et  al 2005); learning (See Reiner 1989 p. 384); and economies of scale, both in fund size and  exploitation  of  the  growth  opportunities  for  exit  via  NASDAQ  (Ingbretsen 2002). Further it argues for that there is another dynamic capability in the US VC sector  based  on  the  assembly  of  complementary  assets.  VCs  do  this  by  utilising expertise  and  reputational  capital  (Megginson  and  Weiss  1991),  syndication (Brander et al 2002), and relationships (Greenwood and Steier 1997), assembling the assets  required  for a  firm to grow to  the point where  it  can be exited. These dynamic  capabilities  have  enabled  the  sector  to  grow  and  succeed  in  very turbulent market environments.  
7.2.3 Venture capital in the UK Chapter 5 discusses  the emergence and development of  the VC  sector  in  the UK, arguing  that  the  UK  experience  with  VC  and  small  firm  finance  has  differed 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significantly  from  that  of  the  US.  It  argues  that  the  UK  has  been  dominated  for nearly eighty years by the notion of an ‘equity gap’, and proposes that the ‘equity gap’ has become a boundary object that is widely recognised but is interpreted by different  actors  to  have  different  meanings.  The  gap  has  its  origins  in  the identification  of  the  ‘Macmillan  gap’  in  1931,  and  from  that  time  the  UK government was more directly  interventionist, particularly  in addressing supply‐side  issues.  Institutions  such  as  ICFC  (later  3i)  were  created  to  fill  the  gap  in funding  to  small  firms.  After  1979  the  form  of  policy  interventions  shifted  from government‐backed  institutions  to  schemes  using  tax  incentives  to  leverage private funds to address targeted areas of finance. This approach, beginning with the  Business  Start‐up  Scheme  and  Business  Expansion  Scheme,  and  later  the Venture Capital Trusts and several others, sought to address the problems faced by small  firms  as  a  supply‐side  issue,  addressing  a  perceived  market  failure. Throughout this period, despite shifting definitions of what the equity gap  is and how  it  should be addressed,  it has remained a mutually agreed  issue, even  if  the precise definition is constructed differently by different actors.   This focus on the supply of capital was assumed to be a problem, regardless of whether  there was demand  for  the  capital  being  offered.    In  the  absence  of  demand  from  quality investments,  increases  in  the  supply of  capital, meant  to  address  the  equity  gap, would instead risk wasting the money on low quality firms, increasing the risk of an adverse selection effect as seen in Amit et al (1997).   The chapter also presents a capabilities‐based history of the UK VC sectors. The UK private venture capital sector began in the late 1970s, but has its roots in ICFC/3i, the original  small  firm  funding body.  From  its  early days  ICFC had maintained a strict policy against  intervening in the firms it backed (Coopey and Clark 1995 p. 210).  As  a  result  the  organisation’s  capabilities were  oriented  around  screening potential  investments (ibid p. 175). With the emergence of a private VC sector 3i staff left the firm to join new entrants into the VC market, bringing with them their capabilities, which  then began  to diffuse  through  the  sector.  If AR&D seeded  the Boston VC sector and investors related to Fairchild and Rock seeded Silicon Valley, so ICFC seeded the UK sector. 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Without  the  philosophical  or  locational  isolation  seen  in  the  US  VC  sector  and following some early high‐profile failures (Lonsdale 1997 p. 120), the UK VC sector began  to  shift  its  focus  toward  ‘merchant’  VC  deals.  The  screening  and  selection capabilities  developed  at  ICFC/3i  were  particularly  useful  in  identifying  these deals, and the new Unlisted Securities Market provided a means of exit.  The  economic downturn  in  the  early 1990s  slowed  the  growth of  the UK  sector, but  by  the  creation  of  the  Venture  Capital  Trust  scheme  and  the  Alternative Investment Market  in  1995,  the  base  of  capabilities  in  the  UK was  considerably narrower than that  in the US (see Murray and Marriott 1996, Locket et al 2002). This meant that UK VCs were poorly placed to replicate the results seen in the US when  the VC‐fuelled dot‐com bubble emerged  in  the  late 1990s. The  subsequent poor results drove UK pension fund managers (who were already prone to herding behaviour) away from early stage investments. This has been exacerbated by the growth of AIM, which provides capital but does not represent an immediate means to an exit (Khurshed et al 2005). This links to the suggestion in Murray (1995) that the  lack  of  highly  profitable  exits may be due  to  a  secondary  funding  gap  in  the phase of firm growth where firms would otherwise be growing rapidly.   The  chapter  concludes  by  summarising  key  issues  identified  from  this examination:  the  difficulties  of  using  a  supply‐side  interpretation  of  small  firm finance as a driver of policymaking; the challenges of developing markets for exits from  investments  in  small  firms;  and  the  issues  around  early  development  of capabilities in the sector. 
 
7.2.4 Success of UK government backed schemes: A quantitative analysis Chapter  6  extends  the  discussion  of  the  UK  case  via  a  quantitative  analysis  of  a series  of  UK  government‐backed  schemes.  It  uses  a  proprietary,  hand‐collected dataset  consisting  of  all  investments  made  under  the  Venture  Capital  Trust scheme, as well as another dataset (also used in an earlier form in Nightingale et al 2009)  containing  investments  made  under  several  subsequent  schemes.  Some parts  of  the  analysis  repeat  the  method  used  in  Cumming  (2007),  who  uses  a 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formulation  of  logit  regressions  to  test  the  effectiveness  of  a  set  of  funds  in achieving particular investment goals.  The  chapter  examines  four  research  questions  drawing  from  the  analysis  in Chapter  5:  that  purely  market‐oriented  supply‐side  schemes  are  less  successful than more  targeted, hybrid schemes  in attracting  funds  to early stage  firms;  that demand for capital may be an issue in the underperformance of investments; that investment  exit  opportunities  are  limited, making  the  investing  in  small  growth firms  less  attractive  for  institutional  investors;  and  that  there  are  variations  in capabilities within the VCT market.   The  examination  of  the  success  of  different  schemes  draws  upon  a  combined formulation of the two datasets to support the historically‐derived conclusion that a shift  from schemes based on tax‐incentivised  funds  from consumers  to  ‘hybrid’ schemes based on public and private funds resulted in greater investment in early stage firms. The findings are robust under different formulations, and suggest that the post‐1998 schemes are more likely to invest in early stage and expansion stage capital, and less likely to back MBO and MBI‐level investment.   Demand  for capital  is examined via proxy by considering  the performance of  the entire  pool  of  investments made  by  the VCT  sector.  Given  the minimal  selection effect present in firms backed by the VCT sector (as in Cowling et al 2008), the fact that the entire pool of  investments never had a year with a positive mean IRR of investments  suggests  that  the  demand  for  capital  from high  quality  investments may  have  been  somewhat  low,  especially  if  one  considers  that  these  aggregate negative  IRRs  include  the  more  favourable  investments  including  MBOs  and expansion capital found to be more prevalent elsewhere in Chapter 6.  Exit  patterns  in  the  UK  are  examined  using  both  descriptive  and  econometric analysis.  It provides new data  following on Murray (1994) showing that  for both VCTs and  the  schemes  that  followed,  IPOs  remained difficult  to obtain and  trade sales were  the dominant  and most  reliable  form of  exit.  It  also provides data on exit suggesting that firm failure rates among all interventions has been higher for 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expansion‐stage  firms  than  early  stage  firms,  possibly  providing  support  to  the ‘valley of death’ J‐curve seen in Nightingale et al (2009).  Finally  the  chapter  provides  initial  exploratory  evidence  from  the VCT  data  that gives  some  support  to  the  assertion  made  in  the  proposed  framework  for  the evolution  of  capabilities  in  the  UK  VC  sector  in  Chapter  5.  Drawing  upon  early stage technology investments it gives initial evidence that suggests specialist VCTs were  more  able  to  identify  and  profit  from  unquoted,  early  stage  technology investments than generalists, who came to market later and tended to have much larger losses.  These  results  provide  findings,  some  robust  and  some  more  explanatory,  that provide some support for the general framework identified in Chapter 5 regarding the  case  of  the  UK.  Given  these  findings,  the  following  sections  will  synthesise these and link the findings to the principal‐agent and evolutionary perspectives.  
7.3  Framing theories and policy: Different interpretations of the case 
of venture capital  The  research  question  for  this  thesis  questions  not  just  the  role  of  policy  in  the emergence of the US and UK VC sectors, but also seeks to understand the different ways  in  which  the  principal‐agent  and  evolutionary  perspectives  address  and explain the issues facing VC.   This section will answer these issues, and thus fully answer  the  research  question.  The  section  above  and  chapters  before  presented empirical  evidence  of  the  case  of  the  UK  and  US,  and  Chapter  2  outlined  the expected  differences  between  the  principal‐agent  and  evolutionary  perspectives interpretations  of  VC.  This  section  will  compare  those  expectations  with  the empirical data generated in the thesis, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. It will then demonstrate that different theoretical framings lead to very  different  interpretations  of  the  policy  challenges  associated  with  venture capital and small firm finance. 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7.3.1 The principal­agent perspective on venture capital in the US and UK The principal‐agent approach  is  the most commonly used theoretical perspective used for the analysis of the VC sector. It explains all economic activity in terms of contractual  relationships,  and uses  these  contractual  relationships  as  the  central unit of analysis. This has made it a useful perspective for the academic study of VC, because  agency  problems  are  among  the  most  prevalent  issues  that  VCs  and entrepreneurs  face.  This  approach  therefore  is  especially  useful  for  addressing most  of  the  main  relationships  in  which  VCs  engage:  specifically  with  firms  in structuring and monitoring deals, and with the institutional investors who provide funding.  However,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  2  it  does  not  allow  for  roles  for institutions  and  other  economic  elements.  Because  of  its  focus  on  contractual issues,  the  principal‐agent  view  tends  to  operate  on  the  assumption  that  if  the proper  contracting  and  incentives  are  in  place,  a  market  will  therefore  operate efficiently.  In  taking this approach  it overlaps with the prevailing view of market failure.  The principal‐agent view therefore explains the US as a relatively straightforward case  in  which  markets  have  worked  effectively.  From  this  perspective  the  US would therefore be judged as a case in which there was an initial market failure (or equity  gap)  facing  small  firms.  The  gap  was  partially  filled  by  AR&D  but  that company was not large enough to address the national gap on its own, so the SBIC programme  was  introduced  as  a  means  of  incentivising  entry  into  the  market. Many  VC  firms  entered  the  market,  providing  the  supply  of  capital  that  firms needed. The ERISA regulations facilitated much more capital being directed to VCs, and  the  market  had  growth  to  be  self‐sufficient.  With  efficient  contracting  and incentives  throughout  the  US  political  system,  the  market  was  ultimately successful.  This  may  be  contrasted  to  the  case  of  the  UK,  where  this  perspective  again provides  a  relatively  straightforward  interpretation.  It  would  acknowledge  the case  of  the  equity  gap  in  the  UK  as  a market  failure,  interpreting  the  supply  of capital to be insufficient to meet demand. In this case the fault would be perceived 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to  be  either  with  the  supply  of  capital  or  demand  for  capital,  and  given  the assumption  that  contracting may derive  efficient  returns,  it would be difficult  to explain in this framework any lack of demand for capital. (If there were to be such a  problem,  the  answer would  be  to  incentivise  firm  creation).  Consequently  the principal‐agent  view would  support  a  supply‐side  interpretation  of  the  problem, viewing  the  equity  gap  as  a  real  and  substantial  issue  requiring  government support.  Consequently  the  scheme would  advocate  an  incentive‐based  approach  to  filling the equity gap, similar to that used in since Conservative government of the 1980s. It  would  suggest  that  schemes  such  as  BES  and  VCT  were  not  successful  in addressing  the  equity  gap  because  they  did  not  provide  the  proper  incentive structures.  In  order  for  a  scheme  to  successfully  target  the  equity  gap,  the incentives would need to be properly aligned to specifically target investment in a certain direction. In this way, as incentives are manipulated and aligned, the sector may be able to grow and succeed.  The empirical analysis presented in this thesis does not present any material that significantly  contradicts  the  principal‐agent  interpretation  of  the  case  of  the  US. However  the  case  of  the  UK  is  considerably  more  challenging.  The  perspective embraces the equity gap as a market failure, but there are other results generated within  the  thesis  that  this  approach  is  less  readily  able  to  explain.  The  results suggesting  that  the  schemes  developed  after  the  VCTs  were  more  successful would, as  suggested above, be predicted. The approach would have considerably more difficulty explaining the suggestion that there may be demand‐side weakness in  the market.  Other  than  inefficient managers  or  contracting  there  is  relatively little scope in this perspective to explain low levels of firm quality, particularly on a wider scale. Similarly,  if efficient markets are to be embraced (as they are  in this perspective) the  issues of  institutional boundaries to exit (such as the absence of IPO markets) would be difficult to square with this view. In a situation where there is perfect information and agents act rationally, these agents would be expected to maximise  returns  and  find optimal prices  in whatever  form possible;  it  could be possible to explain these results from this perspective, but it would not be an easy 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explanation.  The  final  empirically‐backed  conclusion  from  the  previous  chapters relates to different capabilities; there is little room in the principal‐agent view for capabilities. Differences in firm performance can best be explained by differences in contracting, rather than specific characteristics of firms. Indeed it is easy, under such a view, to slide  into a reductionist view that adopts the neoclassical view of homogeneity  among  firms,  which  provides  no  room  for  firm  heterogeneity whatsoever.  Despite  these,  the  principal‐agent  view  has  a  number  of  significant  strengths.  It provides  a  clear  and  cogent  framing  of  the  issues  at  hand  in  the  VC  sector.  Its explanation  of  contracting  and  agency  issues  is  essential  for  understanding  the nature  of  the  relationships  with  which  VCs  engage.  It  is  intellectually  coherent, straightforward to understand, and provides a clear framework for addressing and understanding  policy  issues.  Policies  in  this  perspective  seek  to  address  an ongoing market  failure due to  information asymmetries, and the challenge  facing policymakers  is  to develop incentive structures that will direct  investment to the intended recipients  in  the most efficient manner.  If  the appropriate environment for success is generated, successful markets are expected to grow.  At  the  same  time  the  approach  has  a  number  of  significant weaknesses  as well. Despite  its  explanatory  powers  it  is  unable  to  address  several  empirical phenomena  documented  in  this  thesis,  meaning  that  its  explanatory  power  is limited.  It  also,  as  suggested  above,  has  the  tendency  to  become  overly reductionist, viewing all economic activity through its own lens and reducing the scale of economic activity to a palette easily explicable within its framework. When this  happens,  it  is  easy  to  interpret  one  perspective,  for  instance  supply‐side interpretations of funding issues, to the exclusion of other perspectives. The result can  easily  be  the  embracing  of  a  supply‐side  perspective  to  the  exclusion  of  a demand‐side view. This has the potential to be detrimental to policy in that it may address one aspect of an issue but exclude other issues that could produce a more holistic framing policy. 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Ultimately  the  strengths  of  the  principal‐agent  approach  must  be  considered  in balance  with  the  corresponding  weaknesses.    In  presenting  a  clear  framing  of issues  it  certainly has broad appeal, but  its  corresponding weaknesses must also be acknowledged when policy frameworks are being considered; specifically that despite the appearance of clearly presented economic rationale, a pure principal‐agent  or  contracting  approach  may  exclude  or  poorly  explain  elements  of economic activity that can be crucial for economic growth.   
7.3.2 The evolutionary perspective on venture capital in the US and UK While  the  market  failure/principal  agent  perspective  discussed  above  does maintain  explanatory  power  and  usefulness  in  a  policy  context,  the  empirical findings  discussed  in  this  thesis  suggest  that  an  alternate  theoretical  orientation may  provide  a  different  perspective  on  the  cases  of  the  US  and  UK.  There  are several  aspects  of  the  development  of  these  VC  sectors  that  are  less  easily explained by  the previous approach but which may provide particularly relevant insights for implicitly framing policy for the UK.  The  evolutionary  perspective,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  views  firms  as  being based  not  on  contractual  relationships,  but  instead  on  knowledge.  The  activities that  define  a  firm  from  this  perspective  are  therefore  identified  as  routines  or capabilities.  These  may  be  suitable  for  moderately  dynamic  markets,  but Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that  for turbulent markets simpler, dynamic capabilities must be present.   From  the  evolutionary  view  the  case  of  VC  in  the  US  would  represent  a coevolutionary process involving firms, VCs, and policy. The success of the sector would be attributed to a number of factors. This perspective places specific focus on  the  role  of  networks,  which  have  facilitated  a  very  fluid  labour  market  (see Carnoy  2007)  and  enabled  rapid  knowledge  sharing  throughout  networks. Further, these networks have been argued to drive demand for capital, providing VCs with a constant stream of high quality investment opportunities (Kenney and 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Florida 2000). At the same time participation in networks allows entrepreneurs to access both VCs, and knowledge of what VCs seed in firms (ibid).   In  addition  to  this  demand  for  capital,  the  evolutionary  perspective  would interpret much of  the success of  the US VC sector  to  the development of a  set of dynamic  capabilities  that  allow  VCs  to  navigate  rapidly  changing  market environments. These dynamic capabilities have allowed VCs to extract value from networks  (Hochberg  et  al  2005),  learn  (see  Reiner  1989  p.  363‐4),  and  exploit economies  of  scale,  both  in  fund  size  and  in  the  domestic  markets  of  the  US. Arguably the most crucial is the dynamic capability of assembling complementary assets  into  firms  that  can  then be  taken  to  IPO,  as  suggested by Ed Steinmueller (personal communication).  The  success  of  the US VC  sector would  also be  attributed  to unique  institutional structures  for exit and  investment  that have  facilitated growth of  the sector. The NASDAQ market has played a key role in providing VCs with a means of exit from their investments (Ingebretsen 2002), but its success has also been driven by the possibilities  for  economies  of  scale  present  in  the  US  economy,  as  well  as  the unique  institutional  features of  the  federal  system (see Bush 2005). Beyond  this, heavy  spending  by  the  US  government  on  the  military  and  higher  education systems  (see  Dosi  et  al  2005,  Galbraith  2007)  has  generated  circumstances  in which  the  results  of  government  investment  may  be  readily  appropriated  for private  gain.  This  serves  to  drive  both  demand  for  VC  (by  bringing  innovations with  market  potential)  and  supply  of  capital  (by  driving  exits,  which  increase returns and make VC a favourable investment).  In  this  way  the  success  of  the  US  may  be  interpreted  as  a  complex,  unique confluence  of  circumstances  that  coevolved  in  a manner  that  allowed  the US VC sector  to  grow  and  become  very  successful.  A  similarly  path‐dependent coevolutionary process has been observed in the UK as well, also including firms, VCs and policy. However the emergence of the UK VC sector, as interpreted by the evolutionary view, is quite different in its outcome. 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As argued in Chapter 5, the ‘equity gap’ has become a boundary object that has in many ways  focused policy attention on supply‐side  issues  in  the UK,  rather  than demand‐side  issues. Without  the strong networks driving demand as  seen  in  the US VC sector (see Kenney and Florida 2000), there has not been a constant stream of demand for capital. Some network effects have developed in the UK, particularly in  Cambridge  and  Oxford  (see  Keeble  et  al  1998,  Cooke  2001),  but  the  demand derived  from  them  for  the  VC  sector  is  relatively  unclear.  However  anecdotal (Guthrie 2007 describes RVCFs unable to find quality investments) and empirical (see  Nightingale  et  al  2009)  evidence  suggest  that  there  are  weaknesses  in  the demand  for  capital  from  firms.  This  assertion  is  tentatively  supported  by  the findings in Chapter 6, which were initially derived from the historical analysis. By finding that the entire pool of investments made by the VCT scheme was generally of  poor  quality,  it  suggests  that  purely  supply‐side  oriented  policy  may  not  be adequate for addressing the challenges of the sector.   The emergence and shape of the VC sector in the UK would also be interpreted to have been significantly informed by the capabilities displayed by the VC sector in the UK. The embeddedness and path dependence of capabilities would support the assertion  in  Chapter  5  that  the  sector  was  shaped  by  the  initial  capabilities developed  at  ICFC.  These  capabilities would  have not  been dynamic  capabilities, reflecting the moderately dynamic environment seen in ICFC at the time. Without the ability to adjust to dynamic markets, the non‐dynamic capabilities were found to be more successful in the MBO sector, while the VC sector was divided between specialists and some generalists. This assertion was also tentatively supported by the  empirical  findings  in  Chapter  6,  which  suggested  that  different  sets  of capabilities  had  emerged,  with  some  more  technically‐specific  (and  likely  more dynamic) than others, which were more similar to the capabilities seen elsewhere.  Finally  the  environment  for  exits  has  played  a  significant  role  in  the underperformance  of  the  VC  sector.  Without  the  means  for  generating  returns from  overvalued  IPOs,  as  has  happened  in  the  US with  NASDAQ,  the  sector  has been  unable  to  generate  the  returns  seen  in  the  US,  discouraging  institutional investors  from  backing  the  sector.  This  assertion,  suggested  in  Chapter  5,  was 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supported empirically in Chapter 6, which showed that VCs are more likely to seek exit via trade sale than any other means, even though it generates lower levels of return than other forms of exit.  These  broadly  evolutionary  perspectives  draw  out  nuances  of  the  nature  of  the venture  capital  sector  that  are not  immediately  explained by  the principal  agent perspective. They similarly provide an explanation of the emergence and dynamics of the US VC sector, but also identify some significant differences between the US and  UK  that  the  other  approach  does  not  consider.  They  also  provide  a  more holistic  perspective,  accounting  for  issues  of  firm  heterogeneity  by  encouraging firms  to  develop  capabilities  that  will  make  them  good  investments  from  the perspective  of  investors,  thus  avoiding  adverse  selection  scenarios.  This perspective  seeks  to  address  issues  of  supply  and  demand, with  an  aim  toward developing a successful ecosystem for firm financing and growth37.   The  approach  does  have  theoretical  and  policy  weaknesses.  From  a  theoretical perspective the evolutionary and capabilities view is very useful in explaining the emergence of  industries and  issues of competitiveness. However,  the perspective essentially lacks a role for incentives (see Dosi and Marengo 2007), which makes the  actual  targeted  design  of  policy  particularly  difficult.  Consequently,  the evolutionary  approach  is  only  unable  to  explain  the  difference  in  performance between VCTs and later schemes. If one is only able to explain economic activity in terms of capabilities, there is no scope for incentive or agency issues, which remain very real concerns for firms even if they are not able to explain every aspect of the activity  of  VCs.  In  this  way  the  evolutionary  perspective  is  useful  in  explaining aspects of the VC sector, but does not offer a fully developed means to completely inform theory and policy.  Consequently, while an evolutionary perspective may explain new nuances behind policy phenomena that a market principal agent perspective may not, this does not mean  that  an  evolutionary  view  can  (or  should)  supersede  any  one  perspective.                                                         37 This  is  preferable  to having policies  that  inadvertently  create  entire  sectors  that  then  collapse when a government scheme ends, as happened at end of the Business Expansion Scheme (see Cole 1993 p. 30). 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Instead it would seem that the most appropriate approach would be for a variety of  theoretical  ‘lenses’  to  be  used  when  considering  complicated  problems  with historical  and  institutional  antecedents.  Although  the  principal  agency  approach may provide useful insights about the nature of the VC sector that is well suited to addressing  policy  issues,  an  evolutionary  perspective  provides  a  complementary approach that also particularly relevant.  This section has framed the cases in the thesis in terms of the principal agent and evolutionary  theories  of  the  firm.  It  has  argued  that  while  the  evolutionary perspective  provides  useful  explanations  and  nuances  into  the  nature  of  the  VC sector, it is weakened by the inability to fully frame policy issues. The next section will  propose one way  that might be  able  to bridge  this  gap, moving  closer  to  an evolutionary perspective on policy.  
7.4  Gerschenkron and the role of comparative history in policymaking: 
Toward an evolutionary theory of policy  The  previous  section  argued  that  different  theoretical  perspectives  produce different  interpretations of policy,  and  that an evolutionary perspective provides an explanation of the differences in the US and UK VC sectors that is more nuanced than that of  the principal agent view. However the main  flaw of  the evolutionary perspective  in  this  context  is  its weaknesses  in addressing policy.  It  is useful  for explaining phenomena, but has historically been more limited in generating more normative  policy  guidance.  This  is  due  to  two  factors;  first,  as  discussed  in  the previous  section,  the  evolutionary  perspective  does  not  have  the  capacity  to address incentives. Actors are assumed to work toward weakly common goals, but there  is  little  role  for  governance  in  the  perspective.  This  is  an  area  for  future research  (see  Dosi  and  Coriat  2001),  as  discussed  in  Section  7.6.  However  the other  area of weakness  in  somewhat more broad,  and  similarly  challenging. The evolutionary  perspective  places  great  importance  on  issues  of  path  dependence and  institutions.  Historical  factors  are  interpreted  to  be  crucial,  and  institutions are similarly considered  to matter significantly. However whilst  the evolutionary perspective is useful for explaining situations ex post, it is less useful when actually 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seeking to generate policy recommendations. It is easy to criticise policymakers for ignoring  historical  and  institutional  factors,  but  the  evolutionary  view  is  itself unable to generate a forward‐looking set of policy recommendations; when asked for  policy  recommendations,  a  purely  evolutionary  theorist  will  only  be  able  to suggest considering these contextual factors (see Bryant 2001 p. 374, also Dosi and Coriat  2001).  This  has  been  a  significant  challenge  to  the  success  of  the evolutionary view as a useful economic perspective.  This  section  seeks  to  address  that  by  drawing  upon  the  writings  of  Alexander Gerschenkron. In his work (see Gerschenkron 1962, 1965, 1968), he explored the nature  of  industrialisation  largely  from  the  perspective  of  Eastern  European nations  in  their  move  from  “backwardness”  to  industrialisation.  He  argued  that European industrial development was not “a series of mere repetitions of the ‘first’ industrialisation  but…  an  orderly  system  of  graduated  deviations  from  that industrialisation” (Gerschenkron 1962 p. 44). In other words, there was not  ‘one’ single way to industrialise, but there were many paths to industrialisation, which became more different the greater the length of time from the original event. His work  has  obvious  overlaps  with  the  topic  of  this  thesis  (chief  among  them  the notion of graduated deviation, which has potential  to be applied to areas such as VC,  although  this  is  again  an area  for  future  research),  but  these direct  issues of comparison are not directly relevant in this context.  Indeed, Gerschenkron’s work is particularly interesting in this context not because of his particular theories, but indeed because of the intellectual foundations of his work. Much of Gerschenkron’s writing prefigured later work that would follow on path‐dependence and capabilities, and this section seeks to argue that these proto‐evolutionary  views  may  provide  the  means  that  will  allow  initial  steps  toward generating a systematic approach to generating evolutionary  theory‐based policy conclusions.  
7.4.1 Gerschenkronian levels of abstraction as a tool for evolutionary policy Gerschenkron takes as his approach to history a thoroughly realist perspective. His approach  to  history  and  its  interpretation  focuses  on  the  depth  of  historical 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experience38  and  rejects  generalisations  (see  Gerschenkron  1968  p.  41).  At  the same time he advocates maintaining  flexibility  in  the  level and scale of historical analysis (ibid p. 42) to suit the requirements of the question being examined. This expressed  approach  is  largely  common  to  that  of  the  evolutionary  perspective, which  similarly has  sought  to maintain a  thoroughly  realist  (Nightingale 2008 p. 546) and flexible (Dosi and Marengo 2007 p. 493) approach to economic problems.  At a similarly fundamental level there are commonalities between the processes at work between agents within  the Gerschenkronian and evolutionary  frameworks. Gerschenkron  describes  the  process  of  industrialisation  as  a  fundamentally unclear process:    “There is no intention to suggest that backward [non‐industrialised] countries necessarily engaged in deliberate acts of ‘substitution’ for something that had been in evidence in more advanced countries. Men in a less developed country may have simply groped for and found solutions that were consonant with the existing conditions of backwardness.” (Gerschenknon 1962 p. 359).   There is a striking similarity between the language employed here and Nelson and Winter’s  (1982)  discussion  of  the  core  process  of  economic  search  (which  they characterise as  ‘groping’  (p. 132). Further, Nelson and Winter’s discussion of  the role  of  institutional  development  displays  common  sentiments  to  those  of Gerschenkron:    “…  the process of  institutional development  is  an evolutionary process, both linked  and  akin  to  the  process  of  evolution  of  firms  and  industries.  It  is  a groping  incremental process,  in which  the  conditions of  each day arise  from the  actual  circumstances  of  the  preceding  day  and  in  which  uncertainty abounds.” (Nelson and Winter 1982 p. 404).   In  this  way  both  Gerschenkron  and  Nelson  and  Winter  (and  subsequent evolutionary  theory)  draw upon  the  uncertainty  behind  the  actions  of  economic actors  in  institutional  circumstances.  Gerschenkron’s  approach  points  to  the substitutability  of  national  factors,  but  implies  that  actors,  whilst  acting  within 
                                                        38  Gerschenkron  himself  was  said  to  refuse  to  write  about  a  nation  unless  he  could  speak  its language; by the end of his life he spoke more than two dozen languages (Dawidoff 2002). 
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their  means,  are  operating  in  a  boundedly  rational  way,  constrained  by  the institutions of which they are a part.  The  significance  behind  this  common  framework  between  Gerschenkron  and evolutionary factors lies in its applicability. Gerschenkron’s insights on the role of institutions  provide  us  with  an  understanding  of  evolutionary  implications  for policy. His  discussion of  the  substitutability  of  institutional  functions  leads us  to move  beyond  the  simplistic  assumption  that  ‘institutions  matter’.  Instead  his approach  leads  us  to  analyse  the  functional  role  of  institutions  in  the  past  in  a realist historical sense as a means by which to draw out policy conclusions. This, he  suggests,  is  not  easy;  it  relies  on  balancing  economic  predictabilities  whilst realising the limitations of predictions, and not confusing either with prophesying (Geschenkron  1962  p.  359).  Further,  he  suggests,  we  must  be  careful  in  our process of using abstract concepts, using a ‘sliding scale’ of abstractions (ibid 1968 p. 42) to identify the purpose or function that a certain institution played in a given economy. This may  lead us  toward  a  link  that  could more  explicitly  generate  an evolutionary theory of policy.  If our intent is to identify key functional roles from historical experience, we may be able to understand some of  these roles  in  light of  the capabilities  literature.  If we  seek  to  understand  the  crucial  functional  roles  that  institutions  have  played across  units  of  analysis  with  an  eye  toward  replicating  those  functions  in  a different  location,  drawing  upon  a  realist  interpretation  of  capabilities (particularly dynamic capabilities) may allow us to identify these functional roles. The process of  identifying these capabilities, and the  level on which they operate (i.e. firm, sector, nation) leads us to a clearer understanding of the functional role they  serve.  For  instance  in  Chapter  4  we  argued  that  there  exists  a  dynamic capability  for  extraction  of  value  from  networks.  The  empirical  identification  of extraction  of  value  from  networks  as  being  a  dynamic  capability,  and  the identification  of  the  role  that  this  particular  dynamic  capability  has  played  (i.e. using networks to gather and share information and take advantage of fluid labour markets)  identifies  a  functional  role  (in  this  case  the  importance  of  networks  as 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means  of  sharing  information  and  driving  demand)  that  can  be  operationalised into policy.   This represents an initial step toward developing what could be a potentially quite promising  policy  synthesis  that  could  draw  upon  the  theoretical  strength  of  the evolutionary  perspective  and  the  unusual  (and  at  points  oblique)  policy perspectives of Gerschenkron. These  initial  steps have great promise,  and would certainly bear further exploration in the future. In light of this the following section will present policy  implications  that draw upon  the empirical  conclusions drawn from Chapter 6.  
7.5  Policy implications   This  thesis has sought  to examine  the role of policy  in  the emergence of venture capital,  and  therefore  it  is  natural  to  seek  to  extend  the  empirical  conclusions generated within the thesis to make policy recommendations. This section seeks to provide  initial  policy  conclusions  drawing  upon  the  empirical  findings, synthesising them in the UK policy context.  
7.5.1 Capabilities and incentives in policy design One  of  the  main  empirical  findings  of  the  thesis  was  evidence  supporting  the assertion  that early stage  firms were  less  like  to receive  funding  from VCTs  than from later, more targeted policy measures. This was suggested to be related to the loose  regulations  around  investments made  under  the  VCT  scheme, which were tightened for subsequent schemes. This speaks to the importance of incentives and policy  design.  Chapter  5  discussed  the  creation  of  the VCT  scheme, which was  a compromise between a smaller proposed scheme that was narrowly focused, and larger proposed scheme that would include larger investments. In taking a middle path  that allowed significant  consumer  tax  incentives, much of  the benefit of  the scheme to small firms would seem to have been lost.  In this way incentives should be considered to be particularly important for policy design.  The  shift  from  purely  incentive‐based  schemes  to  hybrid  public‐private 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approaches  that  modify  investors’  risk  reward  ratio  is  encouraging.  However another aspect of policy design may be considered in the context of the discussion of  the different  capabilities  seen  in  the UK VC  sector. The BES and VCT schemes encouraged  the  proliferation  of  skills  focusing  around  small  cap  investments without  explicitly  addressing  capabilities  for  investing  in  early  stage  firms.  This speaks  to  the  importance  of  designing  policies  that  encourage  the  development and propagation of the capabilities seen as being desired.  This is in line with Moss’s (2002) discussion of the role of government as a holder and arbiter of risk; policies must be carefully designed to utilise the government’s role  as  rule‐maker.  Because  the  government  sets  the  rules,  the  consequences  of these rules must be considered. For the case of technology firms, the VCT scheme saw  generally  low  levels  of  investment  in  technology‐based  firms  (apart  from some  ICT  sectors).  Had  the  recommendations  of  the  Williams  Report  of  1998, which called for a tax exemption of 40% for VCTs focusing on technology and 20% for all other investments, been accepted, significantly more funds would have been directed toward UK high tech  firms. This could  likely have  led to other problems (either  adverse  selection  or  the  emergence  of  a  bottleneck  at  higher  levels  of funding (Murray 1994)), but the implication remains clear: the design of policy is key.   
7.5.2 Policy design for demand, profit and exit opportunities The empirical  findings of the thesis also point to two separate but related issues. On one hand, there is the suggestion that there is a lack of demand for capital from high‐quality firms. At the same time there is a lack of opportunities for high‐value exits,  which  makes  the  UK  VC  sector  less  attractive  to  potential  institutional investors. These issues in some way represent a chicken‐egg situation, in that one can  suggest  that  if  there  were  more  high‐quality  firms  then  exit  opportunities would  emerge,  whilst  it  could  also  be  argued  that  if  there  were  more  exit opportunities,  there  would  be  more  high  quality  firms  emerging  as  potential entrepreneurs would recognise the opportunity for generating wealth. Both issues are important, and both require policy attention. 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There is a significant case for aiming to support firm growth rather than new firm formation.  UK  policy  has  largely  oscillated  between  these  two  approaches, although  the  prior  has  generally  been  the  focus  most  often.  Policy  approaches providing  support  to  early  stage  firms  have  largely  taken  the  form  of  capacity building and business support, such as with the Business Links scheme. Additional targeted support for small firms to help them get to a point where they are ‘ready’ for investment and rapid growth is an area for increased policy attention, perhaps taking the ‘investment readiness’ platform and extending it.  The  results  with  regard  to  exit  show  that  IPOs  whilst  very  profitable,  are  not common,  leading investors to drive firms toward trade sale exits or management buy‐outs rather than IPO. This may be identified as being problematic in two ways: first,  this  suggests  that  promising  small  firms may  be  purchased  by  those  firms that they might have grown to rival had they been given more time, depriving the UK  economy of  a  new  ‘generation’  of  firms  (see Nightingale  et  al  2009).  Second, this  partially  explains  some  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  sector;  investors  will  not willingly  make  poor  investments,  and  therefore  avoid  VC.  If  returns  will  be generated by trade sales instead of IPOs, there seems to be little point in investing in such risky ventures when market index funds might produce similar returns.  Therefore the issue is to build and develop exit opportunities for small firms and their investors. Recent hybrid schemes have been designed on the basis of ‘priming the  pump’  to  demonstrate  to  investors  that  investing  in  the  equity  gap  can  be profitable (Mason and Harrison 2001 p. 664). The results generated in this thesis suggest  that  the  very  high  returns  that  would  be  needed  to  make  this demonstration would  likely  only  be made by  IPOs, which  are unlikely.  Similarly, this  perspective  is  also  aided  by  the  adoption  of  hybrid  funds  in  that  the  risk‐reward  profile  of  the  two  schemes  is  suitably modified  to make  otherwise  less‐desirable investments more palatable to the institutional  investors who drive the sector. This represents a degree of maturity of perspective by acknowledging that returns are  likely not to be able to match those of other alternative asset sectors such as MBOs. Instead it seeks to make investments in VC prove to be profitable in 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spite of the riskiness of the ventures. This is another forward step in the evolution of policy understanding of the issues discussed in the thesis.   
7.6  Limitations and potential for future research  This  thesis  has  attempted  to  address  an  immensely  complicated  series  of historical,  institutional and economic  issues surrounding the provision of  finance to small  firms. Given space, time and logistical constraints  it would be difficult to present a complete portrait of two national VC sectors, so this thesis has attempted to  provide  a  theoretically‐informed  overview  of  the  development  of  the  venture capital  sectors of  the UK and US. There are  several areas of  this  thesis  that have significant potential for expansion and further exploration.  Given  the  scale  of  the  topics  covered,  the  discussions  of  the  histories  of  the  VC sectors  in  the  US  and  UK  have  been  relatively  brief  and  have  left  room  for significant additional work. There is considerable potential for additional work in these areas, particularly in terms of more explicitly capabilities‐focused histories, possibly expanding of some of the Gerschenkronian perspectives discussed at the end. This is an area of significant historical and policy relevance that could provide useful  insights  into  the  emergence  and  role  of  VC,  especially  in  the  UK.  More broadly, the discussions of the history of the UK VC sector have the potential to be significantly  expanded,  in  particular  the  history  and  politics  of  the  creation  and success of AIM.  In  light of  the  failure of similar markets of  its generation such as EASDAQ and Neur Markt, AIM’s success (and yet failure to generate a thriving high tech IPO market)  is a rich topic for future study with ongoing policy implications for the European new issues markets.  The  capabilities‐based  perspective  of  VC  advanced  in  this  thesis  is  an  intriguing proposition  but  has  significant  potential  to  be  expanded  and  supported  with original  empirical  data.  Attempting  to  quantify  dynamic  capabilities  and complementary  assets  is  perhaps  a questionable  strategy,  given  the documented methodological challenges surrounding both topics, even accepting Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) realist view of dynamic capabilities. However the academic study 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of VC as  a  field has  suffered  from something of  a paucity of materials  generated from case study methodologies (see Steier and Greenwood 1995 for a discussion of VC‐firm relationships and Mason and Harrison 2004 on one Scottish government‐backed fund). As such, dynamic capabilities and assembly of complementary assets might be useful theoretical frameworks to explore using case study methodology.  The datasets used in this thesis have enormous potential for further exploitation. The cut of the VCT data used in this analysis looked at firms at the unit of analysis, but the data were originally collected at the investment unit of analysis. In order to match  the  1999/2006  dataset  (which  was  only  available  with  firms  as  units  of analysis) the VCT dataset was converted to match this. However there are a range of  interesting  topics  that  this  dataset may  help  explore,  particularly  in  terms  of investment valuation and  the role of  fund managers and boards. These VCT data are original and give a unique lens into the emergence and dynamics of an entire sector. The 1999/2006 dataset has potential for exploitation as well. It has already been  used  to  generate  the  results  in  NESTA/BVCA  (2009)  but  has  potential  for expansion to include other variables and econometric techniques.  Finally, one area of particular research interest in the future concerns the theory of the  firm and  the nature of  the VCT dataset. Dosi  and Marengo  (2007)  frame  the contrast  between  neoclassical  and  evolutionary  economics  in  terms  of  the differences  between  incentives  and  capabilities  under  a  bounded  rationality framework.  One  criticism  of  evolutionary  theory  is  that  it  does  not  provide  a means  for  considering  incentives  and  governance  in  terms of  capabilities.  Coriat and  Dosi  (1999)  and  Dosi  et  al  (2003)  have  tentatively  addressed  this  issue, seeking to bridge the evolutionary and capabilities literatures with the incentives‐based neoclassical literature. Similar links between evolutionary and institutional perspectives have been made by Nelson (2004).  There  may  be  a  means  for  bridging  some  of  this  divide  empirically  in  the  VCT dataset.  Chapter  5  hinted  that  there  might  have  been  specific  compliance capabilities  developed  in  the UK BES  and VCT  sectors  as  fund managers  seek  to make conservative investments yet stay within the bounds of regulation. The VCT 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dataset, with its exhaustive data on all investments, could provide data that could show investment patterns and possibly support the evolution of these capabilities. Government  regulations  changed  as  policymakers  attempting  to  clamp  down  on investments outside  the  realm of  the  intended schemes, providing an element of dynamism. Although further investigation is required, this may be a case that could serve to bridge the two literatures, and begin introducing an incentive element to the evolutionary literature, which would be crucial for the development of a truly evolutionary theory of policy.  
7.7  Contributions and conclusion  This thesis has made several contributions to the academic literature. It has made empirical contributions in the form of the new hand‐collected VCT dataset, which has  potential  for  significant  exploitation  beyond  the  data  presented  here.  The thesis also provides new data about the relative success of the VCT and post‐1998 schemes in directing funds to early stage firms, showing that schemes introduced after  the 1998 White Paper were much more  likely  to  back  small  firms  and  less likely  to  support  MBOs.  It  also  provides  new  empirical  data  on  exit  patterns  of VCTs,  presenting  data  that  supports  Murray’s  (1995)  original  data  on  the prevalence  of  trade  sales,  as well  as Nightingale  et  al’s  (2009)  suggestion  of  a  J‐curve  ‘valley of death’ pattern of  firm survival  for early  stage  firms  in  the UK.  In addition to these  it also presents a history of UK small  firm policy to the present period, which is useful as the most relevant histories of the UK VC sector (Coopey and Clark 1995 and Lonsdale 1997) extend up to the early 1990s.  The thesis also makes a number of  theoretical contributions.  It argues that while the  prevalent  principal‐agent  theory  does  have  explanatory  power,  there  are numerous  nuances  of  the  historical  experiences  of  the  US  and  UK  that  may  be better  explained  using  an  evolutionary  and  capabilities  perspective.  It  presents capabilities‐oriented histories of the US and UK VC sectors, arguing that the US VC sector  has  developed  dynamic  capabilities  for  assembling  complementary  assets into high growth firms that may then IPO. At the same time the UK has developed and encouraged static routines based around screening and managing agency risk. 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The  thesis  has  then  argued  that  an  evolutionary  and  capabilities  interpretation would  identify networks,  capabilities and  institutions as  factors  that were key  to the US  success  in VC  that  are more  suitably  explained  in  this perspective  than  a principal‐agent  approach.  In  this  way  one  contribution  is  the  introduction  and initial steps  toward and evolutionary explanation of venture capital performance in national contexts.  Further,  the  thesis makes  an  additional  contribution  by  linking  the  evolutionary literature  to  the writings of Gerschenkron, arguing  that Gerschenkron shares  the same  base  foundations  of  the  evolutionary  perspective  (particularly  Nelson  and Winter 1982) and that a Gerschenkronian  ‘sliding scales of abstraction’ approach may  provide  a  useful  means  of  mapping  policy  implications  of  capabilities  and functional  roles  of  institutions,  creating  initial  paths  toward  establishing  an evolutionary theory of policy.  In concluding, this thesis has demonstrated that, far from being a single ideal form of supporting innovation, venture capital’s evolution as a sector has represented a coevolution of policy, VC, firms and networks. Its success in the US was reflective of extensive networks, dynamic capabilities and institutions. In order for the UK to continue  to develop  its VC  sector  it will  need  to  focus on  supporting  institution‐ and historically‐sensitive policies that drive demand and build the capabilities that will allow the UK VC sector sustain  itself and thrive. Recent policy developments have shown promise in moving toward this direction, although there is still more work to be done. 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